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Abstract
Modern organizations collect massive amounts of data, both internally (from their employ-
ees and processes) and externally (from customers, suppliers, partners). The increasing
availability of these large datasets was made possible thanks to the increasing storage and
processing capability. Therefore, from a technical perspective, organizations are now in a
position to exploit these diverse datasets to create new data-driven businesses or optimiz-
ing existing processes (real-time customization, predictive analytics, etc.). However, this
kind of data often contains very sensitive information that, if leaked or misused, can lead
to privacy violations.
Privacy is becoming increasingly relevant for organization and businesses, due to strong
regulatory frameworks (e.g., the EU General Data Protection Regulation GDPR, the
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act HIPAA) and the increasing aware-
ness of citizens about personal data issues. Privacy breaches and failure to meet privacy
requirements can have a tremendous impact on companies (e.g., reputation loss, non-
compliance fines, legal actions). Privacy violation threats are not exclusively caused by
external actors gaining access due to security gaps. Privacy breaches can also be originated
by internal actors, sometimes even by trusted and authorized ones. As a consequence, most
organizations prefer to strongly limit (even internally) the sharing and dissemination of
data, thereby making most of the information unavailable to decision-makers, and thus
preventing the organization from fully exploit the power of these new data sources.
In order to unlock this potential, while controlling the privacy risk, it is necessary to
develop novel data sharing and access control mechanisms able to support risk-based deci-
sion making and weigh the advantages of information against privacy considerations. To
achieve this, access control decisions must be based on an (dynamically assessed) estima-
tion of expected cost and benefits compared to the risk, and not (as in traditional access
control systems) on a predefined policy that statically defines what accesses are allowed
and denied.
In Risk-based access control for each access request, the corresponding risk is estimated
and if the risk is lower than a given threshold (possibly related to the trustworthiness of
the requester), then access is granted or denied. The aim is to be more permissive than in
traditional access control systems by allowing for a better exploitation of data. Although
existing risk-based access control models provide an important step towards a better man-
agement and exploitation of data, they have a number of drawbacks which limit their
e↵ectiveness. In particular, most of the existing risk-based systems only support binary
access decisions: the outcome is “allowed” or “denied”, whereas in real life we often
have exceptions based on additional conditions (e.g., “ I cannot provide this information,
unless you sign the following non-disclosure agreement.” or “ I cannot disclose this data,
because they contain personal identifiable information, but I can disclose an anonymized
version of the data.”). In other words, the system should be able to propose risk mitigation
measures to reduce the risk (e.g., disclose partial or anonymized version of the requested
data) instead of denying risky access requests. Alternatively, it should be able to propose
appropriate trust enhancement measures (e.g., stronger authentication), and once they
are accepted/fulfilled by the requester, more information can be shared.
The aim of this thesis is to propose and validate a novel privacy enhancing access
control approach o↵ering adaptive and fine-grained access control for sensitive data-sets.
This approach enhances access to data, but it also mitigates privacy threats originated by
authorized internal actors. More in detail:
1. We demonstrate the relevance and evaluate the impact of authorized actors threats.
To this aim, we developed a privacy threats identification methodology EPIC (Evaluating
Privacy violation rIsk in Cyber security systems) and apply EPIC in a cybersecurity
use case where very sensitive information is used.
2. We present the privacy-aware risk-based access control framework that supports ac-
cess control in dynamic contexts through trust enhancement mechanisms and privacy
risk mitigation strategies. This allows us to strike a balance between the privacy risk
and the trustworthiness of the data request. If the privacy risk is too large compared to
the trust level, then the framework can identify adaptive strategies that can decrease
the privacy risk (e.g., by removing/obfuscating part of the data through anonymiza-
tion) and/or increase the trust level (e.g., by asking for additional obligations to the
requester).
3. We show how the privacy-aware risk-based approach can be integrated to existing
access control models such as RBAC and ABAC and that it can be realized using a
declarative policy language with a number of advantages including usability, flexibility,
and scalability.
4. We evaluate our approach using several industrial relevant use cases, elaborated to
meet the requirements of the industrial partner (SAP) of this industrial doctorate.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Data, including personal information, is an increasingly valuable asset for modern busi-
nesses and organizations. Indeed the amount of data collected by 2020 is expected to
exceed 44 billion of gigabytes worldwide [71] and the European Commission estimates
the European data market value to reach e 739 billion [72] by the same year. If care-
fully handled this data can enable organizations to understand and react with precision
to customers and stakeholders needs, providing tangible competitive advantages in the
marketplace.
However, the sensitive and personal nature of data is also increasing the burden for
companies, which are subject to strict regulation for collection, processing and sharing
data. In addition to the possible fines and sanctions prescribed by data protection laws
(e.g., in the Europe fines can reach 20 million euros or 4% of the global annual turnover
for companies failing to meet the EU General Data Protection Regulation GDPR require-
ments [57]), privacy breaches can have also a huge impact on companies reputation and
relationships with partners, clients, and employees, which has the potential to dramati-
cally increase the bill.
Therefore, companies must conduct thoroughly privacy threat investigations and eval-
uation to identify and remediate to any gaps with respect to applicable regulations and
agreements. This kind of process is, however, complex and expensive mainly due to the
lack of appropriate guides and tools [97].
Furthermore, privacy breaches are not only originated by external attackers, they can
also be originated by internal actors. In fact, an important number of data breaches
(around 30%) is originated by trusted and authorized actors [32]. The severity of these
threats and the lack of appropriate access and usage control mechanisms is pushing most
organizations to strongly limit access and exploitation of data, even internally, making a
large part of the information unavailable, and reducing the potential exploitation.
These issues create a strong need for new access control models able to dynamically
evaluate these threats and to take access flexible decisions based on the best trade-o↵
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between expected risks and benefits.
The aim of this thesis is to motivate, design, implement and validate a novel privacy-
aware risk-based access control model capable to balance the risk and benefits when eval-
uating access requests. Our model also proposes the application of adaptive adjustment
strategies to lower the risk or provide trustworthiness guarantees (i.e. guarantees that the
granted access will not be misused). These operations aim to increase the flexibility of the
access control process and enhance exploitability of the data while maintaining control
over privacy risk.
To identify and evaluate privacy threat scenarios, we also develop and validate a
methodology for evaluating privacy violation risk (EPIC). For practical reasons our method-
ology is designed in the context of cybersecurity, however, it can be adapted to conduct
a privacy threat evaluation in other contexts.
The research presented in this thesis was done partially in the context of the SECENTIS
Project 1 (The European Industrial Doctorate on Security and Trust of Next Generation
Enterprise Information Systems), financed by the European Union grant 317387, under
FP7-PEOPLE-2012-ITN and held in collaboration between the Fondazione Bruno Kessler,
SAP Security Research at Labs France, and the University of Trento. As in the scope of
the industrial doctorate, the research has been strongly based on industrial needs.
1.1 Objectives and research challenges
This thesis aims to achieve two main goals: i) Identify and study data breaches and
privacy threats by providing tools to systematically conduct a privacy violation threat
evaluation process in an enterprise setting. ii) Develop and validate solutions to mitigate
the identified privacy violation breaches in this environment while preserving data avail-
ability and utility. To accomplish these goals, we address the following research questions
(RQ), with associated challenges (Cs).
RQ.1 How can we carry a privacy violation threat evaluation in a meticulous but practi-
cal way? Which aspects should be considered, and which parties (e.g., stakeholders,
experts) should be involved in the process?
Cs.1 E ciently evaluating threats scenarios is a complex and time-consuming task [50],
due to various factors, mainly: There is a very large number of heterogeneous as-
pects to be considered (e.g., the system’s architecture, data flows, nature of the
data, human and organizational factors). This kind of information might not always
be available and must be discovered (e.g., some procedures are very specific to a
certain type of organizations and they can be di↵erent or non existent in others)
and investigated (e.g., collected through interviews, extracted from diverse types of
1www.secentis.eu
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documentation) for the threat evaluation purpose, and therefore several aspects can
be overlooked. In addition, such process requires the setting up teams of several
experts [120] with di↵erent skills and backgrounds, which results in challenging and
costly projects.
RQ.2 How to evaluate privacy threats risk? Which metrics to use at the organization
level? How can we balance the privacy risk with the best exploitation of data?
Cs.2 Despite the existence of several formal privacy metrics proposed to estimate the
likelihood of an adversary of learning a private sensitive information when getting
access to a given dataset, none of them in isolation seems appropriate to measure
the general privacy violation the risk incurred by an organization when processing
sensitive data. The reason is that the validity of these metrics often dependents on
specific assumptions on the considered adversary and/or data sharing model (some
examples are provided in [15, 56]), while enterprise systems (i.e., cybersecurity sys-
tem, enterprise resource planning) have many di↵erent components that process and
store heterogeneous data, complex architecture and data flows, and interactions (in-
cluding data access) with users with di↵erent roles. Therefore none of the existing
privacy metrics can be used in isolation to measure the general privacy violation
risks involved in running such systems. This complexity calls for a principled but
more high-level approach to privacy threat assessment. The prioritization of privacy
threats is yet another challenging aspect of threat evaluation. Similarly to secu-
rity threats, the mitigation of privacy threats often requires costly operations to be
implemented [97] and it is crucial for the organization to prioritize its action plan
according to the urgency of the threats to handle. Threat prioritization is not a
trivial task and it needs to be carefully conducted to avoid misleading misconcep-
tions. Indeed organizations generally tend to underestimate or miss-identify threats
(security and privacy threats) involving insider threats [45], which is very dangerous
the organization since these threats are real, represent an important percentage of
the overall number of threats, and they are quite di cult to identify and handle. For
example, the US State of Cybercrime Survey reported in 2014, that around 1/3 of
the total number of incidents registers that year were perpetrated by insiders and
had more damaging impacts than external attacks [32] (slightly di↵erent numbers
were reported in 2017 [33]).
RQ.3 How to mitigate the data breaches and privacy violation threats coming from
insider authorized actors without hindering their capability to fulfill their business
tasks, which need data access?
Cs.3 Unauthorized access to data through external attacks can usually be handled by
addressing the security and/or organizational controls and eliminating the leakages
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at the origin of the privacy threats [73]. Although this might be a challenging task
addressing threats coming from authorized access can be even more challenging. For
this kind of actors, we need to apply the data minimization principle when granting
access to the data but this is not an easy task since we need to evaluate the access
needs and risks both which can depend on a number of factors (e.g., trustworthiness
of a requester, security context of the query) that can not be accurately assessed
o↵-line and need to be re-assessed for each access.
RQ.4 How to accurately measure trust and risk in the context of a privacy-aware risk-
based access control?
Cs.4 Quantitative risk and trust values are well known to be very hard to compute [16,
111]. Indeed the diversity of risk scenarios, the intangible nature of trust, and the
limited amount of historical data for incidents makes an accurate quantitative assess-
ment extremely di cult. In a very restricted context, a fairly accurate qualitative
assessment based on domain knowledge and privacy expertise can be however this
kind of assessment is not suited for access control where we need a real-time assess-
ment for diverse types of access requests.
RQ.5 How to evaluate the feasibility e ciency of our solution performance, impact on
data quality and on privacy improvement of the privacy-aware risk-based access
control system?
Cs.5 While evaluating the performance might be a relatively easy task, it is much
harder to assess the impact of our solution on the quality of data (or data utility)
and evaluate the improvement it brings in terms of privacy and this is mainly due
to the lack of appropriate metrics for both aspects. Indeed the utility and privacy
is a very hard concept to quantify in a general context (for the reasons explained in
Cs.2 ).
1.2 Contributions
The contributions made by this thesis to address the aforementioned research questions
and challenges can be summarized as follows:
1. We provide a methodology for Evaluating Privacy violation rIsk in Cyber-security
systems (EPIC). It is a four-steps methodology designed to guide a privacy expert,
with the collaboration of security experts from the organization running the system,
to the identification of the main privacy threats, and to the assignment of a privacy
violation risk value to each of them. EPIC supports both qualitative and quantitative
risk values. The resulting evaluation can be used to prioritize mitigation actions to
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achieve legal compliance as explained in point a) above. Since the training, and more
generally trust, in a specific personnel role, is not considered until mitigation task
prioritization, the evaluation is useful for point b) as well. Finally, addressing also
point c) above. This contribution is detailed in Chapter 3 and addresses (RQ.1 )
and (Cs.1 )
2. We provide (in EPIC) a way to assess the priority of a privacy threat by considering
the trustworthiness of the adversary together with the privacy violation risk. This
overview (privacy threats details, risk, and priority ) helps planning and elaborating
the activities necessary to mitigate the risk of the identified privacy threats. This
contribution is also detailed in Chapter 3 and addresses (RQ.2 ) and (Cs.2 )
3. We develop a novel access control model where access decisions are based on a tread-
o↵ between the request’s trust with risk. Risk and trust are computed at run-time
taking into consideration a diverse number of factors to support access control in
dynamic contexts. When the risk is too large compared to the trust level, we propose
adaptive adjustment strategies that can decrease the risk and/or increase the trust
level to enhance the flexibility of the model while maintaining an acceptable level of
protection. The general model is described in Chapter 4 and addresses (RQ.3 )
and (Cs.3 ).
4. To support diverse data usage scenarios we propose two di↵erent privacy-aware im-
plementations of the general risk-based model in the context of privacy. The first
model in (Chapter 5) is based on syntactic anonymity metrics. The second (in
Chapter 6) is based on di↵erential privacy. In each model, we provide concrete
and understandable risk and trust assessment models to evaluate access, as well as
adjustment strategy to enforce the access decision. Both models were implemented
and evaluated using relevant case studies. This contribution addresses RQ.4 ) and
(Cs.4 ).
5. We provide in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 relevant industrial case studies against
which we assess the performance and utility of the privacy-aware risk-based access
control model. Moreover, in Chapter 7, we will use the privacy threat evaluation
methodology, EPIC, to assess our model from the privacy perspective. Indeed EPIC
can be used to compare di↵erent systems in terms of privacy implications, it can
also be used to evaluate the impact of a privacy-preserving solution implemented in
a system by comparing the variation of the risk levels of privacy threats identified
in a cybersecurity system before and after the adoption of the privacy-preserving
solution. These contributions address (RQ.5 ) and (Cs.5 )
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1.3 Structure of the thesis
Figure 1.1 describes the di↵erent steps followed during the thesis. It also indicates in
which chapters of this dissertation we report each step. In Chapter 2 we discuss the
main related work in the areas of privacy threat assessment and risk- and privacy-based
access control. The work reported in this chapter is orthogonal to di↵erent steps of
Figure 1.1.
Figure 1.1: Structure of the thesis
In Chapter 3 we try to identify and study di↵erent privacy threat scenarios in the infor-
mation system of an organization (step A). Since this is a di cult enough task, we chose to
focus on the cybersecurity systems a vital component of every organization’s information
system. To this end, we develop and validate “EPIC” a privacy threat identification and
evaluation methodology for cybersecurity systems. In Chapter 4 we design and evaluate
a novel access control model that combines trust with risk and supports access control in
dynamic contexts through trust enhancement mechanisms and risk mitigation strategies
(step B). We adapt this trust and risk-based access control model to the context of privacy
and propose a privacy-aware risk-based access control In Chapter 5. This privacy-aware
model uses syntactic anonymity metrics to assess the privacy risk. Another category of
privacy metrics equally interesting exists in the literature, the di↵erential private met-
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rics. In Chapter 6 we propose a privacy-aware risk-based access control using these
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Chapter 2
Related Work
The research areas most directly related to the work presented in this dissertation are
i) privacy and security threat assessment (Section 2.1); ii)context-aware and risk-based
access control systems (Section 2.2); and privacy-preserving access control (Section2.3).
In this chapter, we will present an overview of the related work each of these three areas
and discuss similarities and di↵erences with our work.
2.1 Privacy threat identification and evaluation
A lot of research has been conducted in the last decades on the identification of pri-
vacy threats related to the use of technology, on mitigation techniques, and on methods
to evaluate the risk of privacy violations. We can distinguish two main categories of
approaches:
(a) Formal approaches addressing specific privacy problems, proposing privacy enhancing
methods and metrics to quantitatively evaluate the resulting level of privacy.
(b) Methodological approaches for privacy threat identification and assessment.
Research has been focused on general personal data collected as part of di↵erent ap-
plications including e-health, geo-location apps, social networks, finance, marketing but
we are not aware of any research addressing specifically the evaluation of privacy risks in
deploying cybersecurity systems.
In the following we will briefly report on the main e↵orts regarding both categories
mentioned above. However, regarding the formal approaches and the related proposed
privacy metrics we will motivate why we decided not to follow this route for evaluat-
ing privacy risk violation in cybersecurity systems. Instead, we will illustrate how our
proposed methodology relates to the more qualitative privacy threat assessments of the
second category, and how it was inspired by work done on security threat assessment.
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2.1.1 Privacy metrics
Various privacy metrics have been proposed in the literature to estimate the likelihood
of an adversary of learning a private sensitive information when getting access to a given
dataset (i.e., obtaining the identity of an individual and associated sensitive information).
For example, since anonymity prevents privacy violations, several metrics have been pro-
posed to quantify the level of anonymity of a dataset [40, 92, 99]. Extensions of these
metrics have been proposed to evaluate anonymity in di↵erent data sharing contexts in-
cluding location-based service requests [19]. However, their value is somehow limited by
the problem of evaluating the adversary’s knowledge which can determine which infor-
mation can actually re-identify individuals. When identification cannot be successfully
prevented, various sensitive data obfuscation techniques and related privacy metrics have
been proposed. Some metrics measure the distortion or generalization applied to the
data, and hence the probability of the adversary to infer the actual sensitive information.
Other metrics are based on the notion of indistinguishability with di↵erential privacy met-
rics [55] being an example. A quite comprehensive list of the privacy metrics that have
been proposed in the literature can be found in [160]. Finally, there are valuable attempts
to provide guidance in the application of privacy enhancing technologies (PET), often
related to the above-mentioned metrics [15, 56].
Some of these metrics (and related PETs) may be applied also in the context of cy-
bersecurity systems; For example, some anonymity metrics may be used to evaluate how
anonymous is a dataset of security alert logs, and some di↵erential privacy notions may
be used to measure the probability of privacy leak in releasing a statistically perturbed
Web site access log. However, none of them in isolation seems appropriate to measure the
general privacy violation risks involved in running a cybersecurity system. This is partly
due to the fact that the validity of these metrics is dependent on specific assumptions on
the considered data sharing model while typical cybersecurity systems have many di↵er-
ent components that process and store data, complex architecture and data flows, and
data access by users with di↵erent roles. This complexity calls for a principled but more
high-level approach to privacy threat assessment.
2.1.2 Security threat assessment methodologies
Before considering privacy assessment methodologies we briefly report some methodolo-
gies adopted for security risk assessment since this is a related and more established field
of investigation. Security threat analysis is a common step in the secure software de-
velopment life-cycle. In the literature, we find several tools and methodologies such as
the OCTAVE method [30], ISRAM [82], and the Common Vulnerability Scoring System
(CVSS) [107] only to cite a few. Among the most widely used, the STRIDE model was
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proposed by Microsoft [69] as a security threat identification process, used to assist en-
gineers to consider security aspects during the development of a software product. This
process starts by analyzing the information flow within a system and then modeling sys-
tem’s components using Data Flow Diagrams (DFD); a list of possible security threats
is identified for each of the components. STRIDE classifies security threats into six cat-
egories (Spoofing, Tempering with data, Repudiation, Information disclosure, Denial of
service, and Elevation of privileges). This model-based analysis has inspired the method-
ology that we are proposing. Indeed, we extend the DFD notation to better model the
system components and focus on the privacy threat identification for each component.
STRIDE is often used with the threat evaluation model DREAD to assess security risks
[145]. DREAD proposes to rate security threats by computing a score based on five cri-
teria (Damage, Reproducibility, Exploitability, A↵ected users, and Discoverability). This
score implicitly expresses the likelihood and severity aspects of a security threat. A similar
approach is proposed in our methodology for privacy violation risk assessment.
2.1.3 Privacy threat assessment methodologies
The first approaches to privacy assessment were mostly in the form of checklists with the
goal of demonstrating legal compliance [42]. Privacy impact assessment (PIA) method-
ologies emerged later-on to refine these approaches. Several definitions have been given
to PIA (see [73, 75, 130]). David Wright in [161] defines PIA as a methodology for as-
sessing the impacts on privacy of a project, and for taking remediation actions to avoid
or minimize negative impacts. Several governmental bodies such as the CNIL (France),
NIST (USA), ICO (UK) and the EU Art.29 Working Party have proposed various PIA
methodologies [44, 57, 73, 118]. These guidelines although very useful to understand the
goals of the assessment, do not guide an organization through the specific steps that
should be performed. Among the works that contribute in this direction, Oetzel and
Spiekermann present a seven steps methodology to support a complete PIA analysis and
systematically match the threats and the appropriate countermeasure [120]. However,
their approach only considers the impact of a privacy threat and not the probability of
occurrence of the threat, which may lead to an incorrect overall risk estimation. Another
aspect that has a relevant impact on the e↵ectiveness of the guidelines is their special-
ization for a given sector. The methodologies mentioned above are designed for a generic
privacy assessment, and consequently, they may not be straightforwardly implemented
when addressing the problem in a specific context. Indeed, the development of sector-
specific PIAs is mentioned among the priorities in recent EU recommendations [57]. We
found very few sector-specific approaches, among which a PIA framework for RFID based
applications [46], and a PIA template for smart-grid and smart-metering systems [149].
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EPIC is not intended to be a complete PIA methodology, rather it focuses on the
systematical analysis of technical aspects of CSS and their implications on privacy. Some
non-technical aspects are also considered (intervenability, consent, etc.) but they are only
evaluated when they can have an impact on the privacy risk. For example, as we show
in the following, lack of compliance with existing regulations influences the impact of a
privacy risk and hence should evaluate. Still, EPIC is not intended to provide a system-
atical analysis of these non-technical aspects.
To the best of our knowledge, the only work in the literature that analyses the problem
of privacy violations in cybersecurity systems is a survey paper by Toch et al. [152] (co-
authored by some of the authors of this paper). The survey proposes a new categorization
of cybersecurity systems that help the privacy analysts to identify the personal data that
these systems may expose to unauthorized parties. Our work builds on this categorization
but takes the proposed analysis to a deeper and more operational level with the main goal
of evaluating and comparing the risk of the identified privacy threats. Our methodology
considers also aspects like the adversary knowledge, the capability to access the data,
amount of data leaked, number of users involved, and other factors that determine the
impact of a privacy threat. With respect to the survey that considered also cybersecurity
systems for new ecosystems like mobile and IoT systems, we focus on organizational cy-
bersecurity systems and test our proposed methods in a case study involving the systems
of a large organization.
Besides PIA, other privacy assessment approaches adopted a requirement engineering
perspective to promote the privacy by design principles [48,50,98,119]. Among them, the
closest to our proposal, despite not being specific to cybersecurity systems, is probably
LINDDUN, a privacy threat analysis framework for software-based systems proposed by
Deng et al. [50] and based on the STRIDE model [69]. Privacy threats in LINDDUN are
identified through potential misuse scenarios (i.e., scenarios in which an adversary can
violate privacy requirements upon accessing the data). Unfortunately, the processes of
identification and analysis of misuse scenarios are not specified by the methodology but
rely on the expertise of the analysts. LINDDUN does not provide a risk evaluation support
either. On the contrary, in our approach, we consider as a threat any data disclosure that
can reveal sensitive information about a respondent. Our methodology is specialized for
cybersecurity systems and hence the identification of threats is well guided by security
and privacy factors (e.g., adversaries’ capabilities and knowledge, types of exposed data).
We also propose a domain-specific risk assessment model evaluating the likelihood and
severity of a threat.
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2.2 Risk-based access control
Several approaches have been recently proposed to address the limitations of traditional
access control models in terms of lack of flexibility, inability to handle contextual infor-
mation, evaluation of the trustworthiness of users and in managing access risk.
Among these approaches, we first consider the idea of context awareness. Context-
aware access control models (see, e.g. [1, 17, 22]) propose the use of contextual and envi-
ronmental information (e.g. Spatio-Temporal information) to achieve fine-grained access
control. Although these models do not evoke an explicit notion of access risk, the re-
quest’s context and environment can provide relevant information that could be used to
assess the access risk. In our risk-based access control model (presented in Chapter 4) we
also consider contextual information when evaluation the access request, but, instead of
statically including the contextual condition in the policy we use contextual information
as a parameter to compute the trustworthiness of a request, i.e., we indirectly use this
information to balance risk.
In addition to context awareness, other works propose to increase the access control
flexibility by taking in consideration operational need. McGraw [104] (and later Kan-
dala et al. [81]) presents a Risk-Adaptable Access Control (RAdAC) mechanism that
determines access decision based on a computation of security risk and operational need.
Multiple factors are used to determine the risk and operational need for every request (e.g.
user trustworthiness, the sensitivity of the information requested, user role and privileges,
level of uncertainty and history of access decisions). This model allows adapting the deci-
sion thresholds such that operational needs may outweigh security risk when appropriate,
but it does not itself specify any risk model. In our model (see Chapter 4) we also propose
dynamic risk thresholds considering business needs among other factors. We include these
factors in the trustworthiness of the request following this reasoning: if a requester needs
to access a resource to accomplish a business task the likelihood the access is misused is
lower and the request is more trustworthy. In addition, our approach provides (according
to the organization preferences) the possibility to enhance this trustworthiness level and
allow more permissive access when this is required. These trust enhancement strategies
require the fulfillment of obligations providing assurances that the access will not be mis-
used (e.g., monitoring of the access) and to mitigate potential misuse impacts (e.g., create
a back of a modified data).
More dynamic approaches take both risk and trust in consideration in risk-aware access
control (e.g. [34, 35, 37, 52, 144]), In these models each access request or permission acti-
vation, the corresponding risk is estimated and if the risk is less than a threshold (often
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associated with trust) then access is guaranteed, otherwise, it is denied. Cheng et al. [37],
following the multi-level-security paradigm, compute risk and trust thresholds from the
sensitivity labels of the resource and clearance level of the users. They also consider what
we define a trust enhancement mechanism that provides users with a limited amount of
tokens, which allow them to access resources with a risk higher than their trust level. The
details on how this mechanism can be applied in real cases are not provided. In another
work, Chen et al. [34] introduced an abstract model which allows role activation based
on a risk evaluation compared to predefined risk thresholds. Trust values are considered,
and they have an impact on the risk calculation (decrease the risk). If the risk is too high,
the model includes mitigation strategies, indicated as (system) obligations. The paper
does not specify how to compute the risk thresholds, trust, and the structure and impact
of obligations. In a derived model [35], mitigation strategies have been explicitly defined
in terms of user obligations in addition to system obligation. A user obligation describes
some actions that have to be fulfilled by the user to get access. Although the model does
not consider explicitly trust, it introduces the concept of diligence score, which measured
the diligence of the user to fulfill the obligations (as in behavioral trust model) and impact
the risk estimation.
Following the original Chen et al. [34] model, these papers consider trust as part of
the risk value. As a consequence: i) trust enhancement and risk mitigation strategies
are mixed, and it becomes di cult to find an optimal set of strategies to increase access,
keeping risk under control, ii) trust thresholds become dependent on the risk scenario,
decreasing the flexibility in presence of multiple risk factors. Our model solves these issues
by clearly separating trust aspects from risk.
These approaches o↵er an important improvement in terms of flexibility compared to
traditional systems, however, these models still rely on the binary answers “allow” and
“deny”. Our model proposes a third outcome which is a partial access according to the
trust and risk levels. This access can be limited in time (e.g., accessing the resource for
one hour) or (in the case of data) granted to partial or anonymity views of the requested
data. This can provide limited but useful access with a lower risk. In addition, the above
approaches do not provide a concrete way to assess the risk and trust, nor concrete risk
mitigation strategies. In this thesis in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 we provide a concrete risk
assessment models, in the context of data privacy, leveraging well-established privacy met-
rics such as k-anonymity and di↵erential privacy. We also propose to use anonymization
techniques to enforce the risk mitigation prior to granting access.
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2.3 Privacy-preserving access control
In Chapter5 and Chapter6 we propose two privacy-aware access control models aiming to
preserve privacy when querying a sensitive dataset, Indeed, privacy issues are lately re-
ceiving growing attention and several access-control-based privacy-preserving approaches
have been proposed in the literature. These works can be classified into two categories:
(a) Approches to preserving the privacy of requesters: These approaches aime to protect
(hide) the identity of data requesters [7,78] and/or ensure the confidentiality of their
request [29, 165,166] when access control is evaluated and the responce is sent back
(b) Approaches to preserving the privacy of data-owner: These approaches aim to protect
the privacy of respondents/data-owner when granting access to a sensitive data by
applying one or several of the following principles “anonymity”, “pseudonymity”,
“unlinkability”, “linkability”, “undetectability”, “unobservability”
The work presented in this thesis is more related to approaches in category b). In this
category we identified two interesting types of privacy-preserving access control “policy-
based model” and “risk-based models”
Policy-based privacy-preserving access control In this category, some works propose to
extend existing access control models by adding conditions and obligation to enforce pri-
vacy paradises such as access purpose, limitation of use, quality of data etc. For instance
Martino et al. introduce in [101] a family of models (P-RBAC) Privacy-aware Role Based
Access Control models that extend the RBAC model by adding privacy-sensitive data
permission granted according to the purpose of access and in return of obligations to be
fulfilled. Byun et Li proposed an access framework for privacy-preserving access control
systems [27, 28] based on the notion of purpose. Intended purposes are associated with
data in order to regulate data accesses and play in a certain way the role of privacy poli-
cies. Access purposes are the requester purposes to access an data item so when an access
to a data item is requested, the access purpose is checked against the intended purposes
for the data item. These approaches o↵er a good support for expressing privacy-related
organizational policies and allow the enforcement of these policies within an access control
module. However, they don’t o↵er privacy concrete privacy guarantees (e.g., guarantees
that the data will not be misused, re-used for other purposes after release) nor they can
guarantee the enforcement of the privacy-preserving obligations. In addition similarly
to traditional access control, these approaches increase the rigidity of the access control
system by adding (often non-negotiable) privacy constraints which limited furthermore
the availability of the data.
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Unlike these approaches, we use a formal guarantee for privacy using syntactic anonymity
metrics(see [40,92,99] for review) in the model presented in Chapter 5; where access risk
is computer and mitigated to meet the required privacy level. And using di↵erential pri-
vacy (see [43,54] for review) in the model presented in Chapter 6. In the latter, we do not
explicitly compute the risk, since it is very hard to estimate risk for a data set generated
by a di↵erentially private mechanism [103]. However, after mitigation our access control
system guarantees the release of (✏) data [90].
Other works propose to consider users privacy preferences when controlling access to
their data or when this data is used. This would be achieved through privacy policies and
adequate architecture to enforce them, along with access control, in several scenarios (e.g.,
a third party handling the data, secondary applications re-purpose or re-use the data).
Ardagna et al. (in [4–6]) present a privacy-aware framework that integrates access control
policies together with privacy policies regulating how personal identifiable information
should be handled by the requester. These policies are established during a negotiation
between di↵erent parties and partially enforced by each of them, which requires apriori
knowledge of the requester or a complex dialog between parties. A similar approach is
based on the concept of sticky policies [125], in this framework, privacy policies, expressing
users preferences for data handling, are attached to the data, enabling to improve control
over the usage of personal information and to define usage constraints and obligations as
data travels across multiple parties (e.g., in the cloud). These policies are enforced at
data consumer’s level.
These approaches are very interesting in the context where the data-owners have some
control over thier which is often the case when the data is directly collected (the data-
owner provides the data to the data handler). However they are not adequate when data
is indirectly collected and the user has no control over it (or sometimes has no knowledge
this data is collected), which is often the case in several organizations IT systems e.g.,
client management and human resource systems (example described in Chapter 6), cy-
bersecurity systems (example described in Chapter 5). Our approach instead is not based
on data owner’s preferences but establishes and enforces quantitative privacy thresholds
to guarantee the privacy of respondents. We developed these thresholds considering the
urgency of the context (need-to-know) and some considerations legal requirements on
privacy and labor regulation (in the context of employees data).
Besides both approaches presented above assume the requester is trusted (up to a cer-
tain degree) since they partially delegate the privacy policy enforcement to them. In our
model, we actually assess the trustworthiness of the requester as part of the access con-
trol assessment. If a need for a more permissive access can be justified we propose trust
enhancement techniques to allow this access in return of fulfillment of certain obligations.
These approaches also present the traditional access control flexibility issue, o↵ering only
a binary all-or-nothing response since they do not consider anonymization, nor other risk
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mitigation strategies. In our model, we propose to use anonymization (among other tech-
niques) as risk mitigation strategy with the goal to increase the flexibility
Risk-based privacy preserving access control To the best of our knowledge, risk-based ap-
proaches to privacy-preserving access control have been barely explored in the literature.
In [156, 157] Ulltveit-Moe et al. propose to assess the likelihood of privacy violations in
intrusion detection systems (IDS) based on information entropy in network information
flow. Then, they use this measure to di↵erentiate between rules (IDS rules) with a high
likelihood of privacy violation and rules with low ones. They also propose to modify
rules with high privacy violation likelihoods or restrict access to sensitive data (on strict
need-to-know approach) and use anonymization to implement these restrictions. When
this information is accessed by security agents ( human agents) to monitor the IDS alerts.
This approach proposes to set two profiles of users according to the expertise level: the
first profile allows monitoring tasks using anonymized data the second consists of security
experts, with clearance to perform necessary privacy-sensitive operations to investigate
attacks. However Ulltveit-Moe et al. do not elaborate how this access control is imple-
mented, or how it behaves according to the likelihood of violation. The entropy-based pri-
vacy leakage metric they propose is very interesting, however, the violation likelihood/risk
needs to be computed o↵-line for each rule (prior to the access control) based on already
existing information in the IDS alarm database which might lead to assessment mistakes
depending on the database. Moreover, this model clearly increases the privacy protection
but it might be di cult to apply in realistic cases in the context of cybersecurity because
the risk mitigation relies on anonymizing the entire (source) dataset beforehand, resulting
in either low privacy or low utility.
Indeed privacy is a big issue in these cybersecurity systems (and generally in cybersecu-
rity) since network log and security log data used to monitor the information system and
detect security threats often contain very sensitive data. In Chapter 5 in Section 5.5 we
also tackle privacy violation scenarios threat detection systems (TDS). In our approach,
similarly to Ulltveit-Moe et al ’s approach, we aim to optimize the application of the need-
to-know principle. However, unlike them, we o↵er adaptive adjustment strategies, that
according to the priorities of the context, allows to mitigate the risk or provide trustwor-
thiness guarantees that the granted access will not be misused. These operations aim to
increase the flexibility of the access control process and enhance exploitability of the data
while maintaining control over privacy risk Besides our model that can be integrated to
well established access control models such as RBAC (example in Section 5.3) as ABAC
(example in Section 5.5)
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In the same context specific anonymization techniques for logs where proposed in [112].
We implemented several of the proposed anonymization techniques in a prototype of our
privacy-aware access control model (described in Section5.6), and, although based on
k-anonymity, our framework can include other privacy measures by changing the risk
function. More specifically, entropy-based privacy metrics can be easily integrated with
k-anonymity approach, as shown in [87].
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Chapter 3
Threat scenario and mitigation
strategies
In this chapter, we would like to investigate (identify, evaluate and prioritize)
the privacy threats in data-driven systems. This analysis aims to understand the
implication of insider authorized actors in potential privacy threats. It will also
help assess the impact of these threats and select the most appropriate mitigation
strategies. As an example of data-driven systems, we chose to focus on Cyber
Security Systems (CSSs).
CSSs play a fundamental role in guaranteeing data confidentiality, integrity, and
availability. Modern CSSs relay more and more on big amounts of data collected
by sensors (e.g., agent installed in end-user machines) deployed all over the net-
work or the information system to protect. The data are, then, sent to central
nodes (e.g., IDS Intrusion Detection Systems, SIEM Security Information and
Event Management) to undergo di↵erent kinds of analysis. This centralized
way of monitoring allows for having a wide perspective of what is happening
on the information system than other (isolated) security products. Therefore, it
enables better identification and faster reaction to increasingly complex cyber-
security threats. However, while processing the data, CSSs can intentionally or
unintentionally expose personal information to people that can misuse them. For
this reason, privacy implications of a CSS should be carefully evaluated. This
is a challenging task mainly because modern CSSs have complex architectures
and components. Moreover, data processed by CSSs can be exposed to di↵erent
actors, both internal and external to the organization.
Consequently, we needed to develop a new methodology, specifically designed the
evaluate privacy violation risk in cyber-security systems. Di↵erently, from other
general purpose guidelines, our methodology (called EPIC) is an operational
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methodology aimed at guiding security and privacy experts with step-by-step in-
structions from modeling data exposure in the CSS to the systematical identi-
fication of privacy threats and evaluation of their associated privacy violation
risk.
3.1 Introduction
Privacy policy makers and data protection authorities all over the world are considering
the impact on privacy of the large amount of identifiable sensitive data that are being
collected and processed by public and private organizations. This is mainly the result of
the adoption of new technologies like mobile and pervasive systems, social networks, and
big data analytics, but also the evolution of technologies applied in surveillance and cy-
bersecurity systems. An example of regulation activity motivated by these concerns is the
EU General Data Protection Regulation, adopted in May 2016 [150]. While regulations
di↵er in di↵erent countries, some general principles are shared; for example, user informed
consent remains a pillar, and de-identification, despite the limits of anonymization tech-
niques, is still considered a mean to avoid or, at least, mitigate privacy violation risk [66].
Another shared recommendation to organizations deploying complex automated processes
handling large amounts of personal data is to systematically and thoroughly analyze how
the process a↵ects the privacy of the individuals involved and evaluate the risks in order
to identify appropriate mitigation actions. This analysis is often called Privacy Impact
Assessment (PIA) and it is, in some cases, a legal obligation as a necessary element in a
privacy by design approach. However, its value goes beyond the design phase since it is
also highly valuable when evaluating the compliance of already existing systems as well
as when comparing the privacy risks of alternative systems.
Several documents exist guiding the experts in privacy impact assessments, but they
usually consist of high-level guidelines instead of step-by-step instructions, partly moti-
vated by the fact that they are sector independent. Therefore, the importance of de-
signing sectoral PIA methodologies emerges in recent documents by EU data protection
authorities [57]. In most cases, the interest is currently focused on sectors like healthcare,
e-commerce, finance, and insurance, and less attention is paid to cybersecurity systems.
These systems handle large amounts of sensitive information as, for example, the data
obtained by monitoring employees personal computers, mobile phones, and the whole
organization network tra c [57]. In the last decade, cybersecurity systems have been
increasing their strategic role for the protection of the IT infrastructure of industries and
organizations. The wide adoption of digital technologies to control even critical infras-
tructure and the extension of organizational IT systems to include mobile and IoT devices
have increased the attack surface and the impact that cyber attacks can have. This led to
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a significant increase in the complexity of cybersecurity systems in terms of components,
architecture, amount of data being analyzed, and personnel involved in managing the
systems.
The role of CSS with respect to privacy is twofold. On one side, CSS are an essential
tool to prevent privacy violation, e.g., by avoiding unauthorized access to data. On
the other hand, CSS often process a large amount of personal data, e.g., by monitoring
network tra c, and hence they can pose a privacy threat. For example, consider a security
administrator that discovers the sexual orientation of a colleague while reading email logs
during the investigation for a security incident. In general, privacy leaks from CSS can
lead to discrimination in the workplace a↵ecting both the relationships among colleagues
and between the employee and the management, including e↵ects on professional carrier.
Privacy leaks from CSS can also a↵ect external subjects, e.g., customers, with e↵ects
similar to the ones resulting from the release of private data through di↵erent channels.
This includes unsolicited advertising, and even more serious problems like identity theft,
blackmailing, and physical assaults. These consequences have an indirect impact on the
organization running the CSS which is responsible for properly handling private data.
An accurate evaluation of privacy violation risks in a cybersecurity system is important
for at least three reasons:
a) it identifies the gaps with respect to the applicable regulation, so that appropriate
remediation actions can be taken to achieve compliance;
b) it shows the responsibility of personnel like security, system, and network administra-
tors in terms of personal data access, suggesting role-specific training and screening;
c) it highlights data collection practices that may make employees worry about their
privacy and as a result, it can be an incentive for them to circumvent some of the cyber-
security mechanisms.
In the following, we present the EPIC (Evaluating Privacy violation rIsk in Cyber-
security systems) methodology. EPIC is composed of four steps designed to guide a
privacy expert, with the collaboration of security experts from the organization running
the system, to the identification of the main privacy threats, and to the assignment of a
privacy violation risk value to each of them. The proposed methodology supports both
qualitative and quantitative risk values, the latter being preferable when it is possible to
quantitatively assess how much a privacy threat would impact on the organization, for
example in terms of monetary loss. The resulting evaluation can be used to prioritize mit-
igation actions to achieve legal compliance as explained in point a) above. Since training,
and more generally trust, in a specific personnel role, is not considered until mitigation
task prioritization, the evaluation is useful for point b) as well. Finally, our methodology
can be used to compare di↵erent cybersecurity systems in terms of privacy implications,
and possibly to design new cybersecurity systems that can e↵ectively combine built-in
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privacy preserving features with protection from cyber attacks, addressing also point c)
above. The methodology is illustrated through a running example and then applied in
a use case considering the actual cybersecurity system of a large academic organization
managing over 15,000 hosts. In the last part of this chapter, we will analyze the re-
sults obtained from the use case and discuss adequate mitigation strategies for di↵erent
categories of threats.
This Chapter is structured as follows. We describe our privacy violation risk evaluation
methodology and explain its three first steps n Section 3.2. Section 3.3 is dedicated to the
fourth step of the methodology dealing with the assignment of risk values and prioritizing
mitigation actions, and Section 3.4 to the application of the methodology to the selected
use case. in Section 3.5 we will discuss possible threat mitigation strategies for each
di↵erent categories of adversaries involved in the identified threats. We will conclude
with a discussion in Section 3.6.
3.2 Methodology
3.2.1 Overview
The EPIC methodology is organized into four steps as illustrated in Figure 3.1. The whole
process requires the participation of a team, involving members with di↵erent expertise,
namely privacy, and security, as well as personnel of the organization in which the CSS
is deployed.
Security experts of the team have a major role in Step 2 while privacy experts take
the lead in Step 3 and Step 4. Step 1 (modeling the CSS) and Step 2 (identifying data
exposures) require the collaboration of personnel of the organization in which the CSS is
deployed. Indeed, information about the actual configuration of the CSS, the processes
involved, as well as about the structure of the organization including users, system, net-
work and security personnel must be acquired. In the following we use the term expert
to refer to a person that contribute to the analysis following the methodology.
The results of obtained at the fourth step of this methodology can be used to compare
the privacy level in di↵erent cybersecurity products. It can also be used to initiate a pri-
vacy threat mitigation phase where privacy enhancing solutions are selected, or developed,
and implemented to lower the privacy violation risk of identified threats
3.2.2 EPIC First Step: Model the cybersecurity system
The first step of the methodology aims to model the specific CSS under investigation.
This step is particularly relevant for two reasons. First, we can expect that some of
the experts involved in the privacy threat modeling process do not have the required
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Figure 3.1: Methodology organization in four steps.
knowledge about the system. For example, privacy experts are not expected to know
which are the components of the CSS, how data flow in the system and which actors
are involved. Second, an explicit system description helps the experts to collaborate and
prevents misunderstandings among them. In our use case, this step was completed by
members of our team supported by system and security administrators from the institution
running the CSS. Modeling a CSS as part of Step 1 must include the following aspects.
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• System aspects: overall architecture and control processes.
• Data aspects: data flow, data type, and data storage.
• Functional aspects: users, roles, and functional processes.
A well-known formalism to represent data and functional aspects is Data Flow Diagram
(DFD) [36]. This formalism allows us to represent five types of elements (see Figure 3.2):
data flow is denoted with a full arrow, entities are denoted with a rectangle, storage
with parallel line segments and functional processes (i.e., processes implementing the
main system functionalities) with a circle. Finally, a double circle is used to represent a
complex process i.e., a single component that represents several functional processes.
Figure 3.2: Elements of the traditional data flow diagram (DFD)
In this contribution, we extend DFD (and we call it DFD+) to also account for
system aspects and hence to better detect situations in which data is exposed to an
actor. We introduce four additional graphical symbols (see examples in Figure 3.3); a
box represents a hardware component, an arrow with a small circle represents a physical
channel connecting hardware components, a dashed arrow represents control flow and a
dashed circle represents a control process that implements IT controls such as maintenance
and security.
Figure 3.3: Elements of the extended data flow diagram (DFD+)
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In Example 1 we illustrate DFD+ and its use in CSS modeling as required by Step 1.
example 1. Figure 3.4 describes an application level firewall. Data flows from the source
entity Network to the destination entity Security administrator. Channel C1 shows how
data flows from Network to the Firewall hardware component. C1 is marked as a physical
channel and it is associated with a label (Network Tra c) that represents the type of
data; in this case, it is the portion of network tra c that should be checked by the CSS.
The logical destination of C1 is the Tra c Filtering process. Upon detecting a security
threat, this process sends the threat description to the data storage DS1. Note the di↵erent
representation of C2 with respect to C1 due to the fact that C2 is a logical channel.
From DS1 data flows through the physical channel C3 to another hardware component,
Remote Console, where threat reports are organized for visualization by process P2. Then,
P2 sends this information through physical channel C4 to the security administrator who
is the destination entity and the main actor interacting with the CSS.
In this diagram we also model a secondary actor system administrator interacting with
the hardware machine hosting the CSS (Firewall). The aim of the interaction is Admin-
istration and Maintenance and indeed CP1 is marked with a dashed circle representing
a control process. Similarly, the dashed arrows represent a control flow. Another control
process (CP2) allows the security administrator to manage data storage DS1.
Figure 3.4: CSS modeling with DFD+ (running example).
3.2.3 EPIC Second Step: Identify data exposure
The aim of the second step is to systematically identify all possible data exposures, i.e.,
situations in which data is disclosed to a potential adversary. A data exposure (or ex-
posure for short) is identified by the component that is leaking data and by the adversary
that can access that data; it is also characterized by other attributes that we specify in
this section. Component refers to channels, processes and data storages identified in
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Step 1. The term adversary refers to an actor identified in Step 1 as a subject normally
interacting with the CSS or other people, which can either be external adversaries (e.g.,
a hacker violating a machine and accessing a data storage) or internal ones (e.g., a net-
work administrator or other employees). An adversaries table (Table 3.1) containing a
list of adversaries, each associated with a brief description, needs to be identified at the
beginning of this step. In Table 3.1 we report this list considering our running example.
Table 3.1: Adversaries (running example)
Adversary Description
Security administrator Their main tasks are to perform monitoring and investigation as well as
the maintenance and configuration of the data storage (e.g. add, modify
roles and privileges).
System administrator Their tasks include maintenance of the system hosting the Firewall (e.g.,
troubleshooting, installing updates software/firmware)
Network administrator Their main task is to ensure the correct functioning of the network (rout-
ing, DNS, etc.).
Other internal adversaries Individuals attempting a nonauthorized access from inside the organiza-
tion network.
External adversaries Individuals attempting a non authorized access from outside the organi-
zation network.
While the organization management and owner, in principle, may also be an adversary,
they usually do not have direct access to the system and the risk of them violating privacy
can be easily evaluated by combining the risks computed for the operators that have
direct access, since they are the ones that can take order from them. Moreover, the risk
assessment is performed on their behalf and in their interest. This is similar to IT security
threat modeling: system owners are usually not considered as potential attackers of their
own system.
Step 2 also requires, for each component specified in the model, to identify the set of
adversaries that can acquire data from that component. More specifically the aim is to
identify the adversaries that:
• can access data transiting along a channel (either logical or physical) ;
• can read data from a data storage;
• can obtain data from a process, for example by observing the process output or
altering the process behavior.
Clearly, di↵erent adversaries need di↵erent e↵orts to obtain data from a component.
For example in the DFD depicted in Figure 3.4, the Security Administrator has the
credentials to access data storage DS1, hence the e↵ort is negligible. Vice versa, an
external adversary needs to violate a number of security systems and resources are required
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to accomplish this task (economical, computational, knowledge). In principle, external
adversaries may also obtain data from internal adversaries, and more generally adversaries
may collude with each other. However, as in security threat analysis, we first assume that
adversaries do not collude. The likelihood that an internal actor shares data with external
adversaries is related to the organization policies, legal agreements, and in general to the
level of trust in that actor.
We model the di↵erence in the e↵ort required to obtain data from a component through
the likelihood of access (La) parameter, that, intuitively, is inversely proportional to the
e↵ort required to access to the component. The likelihood of access only takes into account
the technical di culties that a given adversary has to face to access a component; it does
not depend on the willingness of the adversary to maliciously access that component or,
in other words, the trust we have on the specific person or in personnel acting under a
specific role (e.g., network administrators). These aspects are considered in Step 4.
We use the following five values for the likelihood of access:
• Negligible: it is technically very di cult for the adversary to access the component
and it is highly unlikely that access can be obtained with a reasonable e↵ort;
• Low : it is technically di cult for the adversary to access the component and a
significant e↵ort is required;
• Medium: it is technically possible for the adversary to access the component, but
this requires moderate e↵ort;
• High: it is technically easy for the adversary to access the component with a limited
e↵ort;
• Authorized : the adversary is authorized to access the component, hence no e↵ort is
required.
The likelihood of access depends on the security mechanisms (e.g., access control,
encryption) implemented to protect that component. For this reason, for each component,
we list the security mechanisms, together with their details, including, for example, which
users are authorized to access through an access policy (enforced by access control system).
This is called the components security table (see for example Table 3.2).
It is also clear that di↵erent exposures have di↵erent magnitudes and results in leaking
di↵erent amount of data. To estimate the exposure magnitude di↵erent approaches
should be used, depending on the type of component.
• Exposure magnitude in data storage. The amount of information incoming in the
data storage, as well as the retention period of this information, can help estimating
the exposure magnitude. For example, if we know that approximately 1, 000 logs
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Table 3.2: Components security (running example)
Component Authorized users Security
Certified
Security mechanisms
DS1 Security administrator YES Encryption, access control, authentication,
firewall, NIDS
C3 None YES Firewall, NIDS, private network
P2 Security administrator NO Access control, authentication, firewall, NIDS
are recorded in a data storage daily and that retention period is 30 days, we can
conclude that the data storage contains about 30, 000 logs.
• Exposure magnitude in channels. When data is exposed through a channel, we should
take into account the data throughput (how much data is transmitted in the unit of
time) along the channel and an estimation of how long the adversary can listen to
the channel.
• Exposure magnitude in processes. Similarly to channels, we should take into account
how much data the adversary can access. This may depend on how long the adversary
can access the process.
The results of Step 2 are reported in the data exposures table (for example Table 3.3)
that lists, for each combination of components and adversaries, the likelihood of accessing
data from that component by that adversary together with the exposure magnitude.
Example 2 illustrates an instance of this process and the result is shown in Table 3.3
where a brief motivation is also reported for each row. These notes are very important to
communicate with collaborators on the analysis (e.g., security expert) and they are also
useful if the analysis has to be repeated again in the future. The motivation field is used
in most of the other tables we present in our methodology, especially when the assessment
relies on the expert’s subjective judgment.
Note that the two leftmost columns of Table 3.3 are derived from previous tables
(i.e., adversaries table and components security table) while the four columns on the
right include new content. Henceforth we use the following notation: a double line (like
between “Adversary” and “Exp.” in Table 3.3) distinguishes the previous content (on the
left) from the new one (on the right).
At the end of Step 2 all exposures with a negligible likelihood of access are cleared
(e.g., those highlighted in Table 3.3), while the remaining ones are further investigated in
Step 3.
example 2. This example continues from Example 1 and presents the components security
and data exposures tables for three components: DS1, C3 and P2.
From the CSS model, we know that the security administrator can access DS1 and
we report this information in the components security table (Table 3.2). In this example,
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it is relevant to know that the security of DS1 has been certified, which means that a
specific auditing, possibly including penetration attacks, has been performed. We report
this information in the table. Finally, we list the security mechanism adopted to protect
DS1: encryption, access control, authentication, firewall and NIDS. No user is authorized
to access channel C3, whose security has been certified and that is protected by a firewall,
an NIDS, and a private network. Finally, the security administrator can access P2,
whose security has not been certified. This component is protected by access control,
authentication, firewall and NIDS.
Based on the results of the components security table, we now show how to create the
data exposures table considering four adversaries: security administrator, system adminis-
trator, network administrator and external adversary. The result is reported in Table 3.3.
Since the security administrator has access to the data storage DS1, the likelihood of
access is reported as authorized. Instead, the system administrator is not authorized to
access DS1 but has access to the physical machine hosting this component. By cracking
data encryption (note in the components security table that DS1 does implement encryp-
tion), the system administrator can obtain data from DS1, hence we associated this a
medium likelihood of access. The e↵ort required by the external adversary is even higher,
as he needs to elude the security protections of the network (firewall, NIDS) to gain access
to the machine hosting DS1, then bypass the authorization and access control mecha-
nisms and decrypt the data. These security mechanisms have been certified (as reported
in Table 3.2) and hence the likelihood of access by the external adversary is marked as
negligible. The likelihood of access by a network administrator is also negligible. Indeed,
since DS1 is well configured and security tested, this adversary has to elude all the security
mechanisms and make a considerable e↵ort in order to gain access to data from DS1.
Regarding C3, no user is authorized to access. Since the component’s security is cer-
tified, we can assign negligible likelihood of access to external adversary. In this case the
security administrator needs basically the same e↵ort as an external adversary to access
C3, so it is also marked as negligible. The same does not hold for the system administra-
tor, who administers the firewall machine and hence can listen to channel C3 with high
likelihood of access. The network administrator has access to the network equipment and
can attempt to listen to channel C3, thus the likelihood of access is considered high.
Considering the list of security mechanisms protecting process P3, an unauthorized
access attempt from either system administrator, network administrator, or external ad-
versary is very unlikely; however, since these mechanisms were not certified we assign low
(instead of negligible) likelihood of access to these adversaries for P3. The likelihood of
access for the security administrator is authorized as he is allowed to observe the output
of P3 as part of his security monitoring tasks.
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Table 3.3: Data exposures (running example)
Cp. Adversary Exp. La Exp. Magn. Motivation
D
S
1:
T
h
re
at
L
og
Security
admin.
Exp1 Authorized Important
⇡ 100k rec
Administrator of the DS (see DFD)
System ad-
min.
Exp2 Medium Same as above Can Access Mchine But data is En-
crypted
Network
admin.
Exp3 Negligible Same as above A Network admin. has to elude the net-
work protection bypass authentication
and AC mechanisms and the data is en-
crypted
Ext. adver-
sary
Exp4 Negligible Same as above The adversary has to elude the net-
work protection bypass authentication
and AC mechanisms and the data is en-
crypted
C
3:
ap
p
li
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ti
on
le
ve
l
th
re
at
s
Security
admin.
Exp5 Negligible Limited
⇡ 20k rec
Need to bypass network protection
System ad-
min.
Exp6 High Same as above Can Compromise the machine hosting
the Firewall and listen to channel C3
Network
admin.
Exp7 High Same as above Have access to the Network equipment
and can listen to channel C3
Ext. adver-
sary
Exp8 Negligible Very limited 
5k rec
The adversary has to elude the network
protection, bypass authentication and
AC mechanisms
P
2
:
T
h
re
at
M
on
it
or
in
g Security
admin.
Exp9 Authorized Limited
⇡ 30k rec
Can observe the output of process P2
System ad-
min.
Exp10 Low Same as above Should not be able to access, but secu-
rity has not been tested
Network
admin.
Exp11 Low Same as above Same as above
Ext. adver-
sary
Exp12 Low Same as above Same as above
3.2.4 EPIC Third Step: Identify privacy threats
The objective of Step 3 is to determine whether data leaked in each exposure identified
in Step 2 can potentially lead to a privacy violation. In order to assess this, we need
to take into account what type of data is actually exposed. A given component can
expose heterogeneous data. For instance, DS1 in Example 2 exposes some log records
that only contain the IP address of a user as well as others that also include the file
being transmitted by that user. Another example is reported in Figure 3.5, showing the
user interface of an application-level firewall (PAN-OS 6.1). The upper part of the figure
shows results from security threat detection based on URLs filtering while the lower part
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Table 3.4: Attributes description (running example)
Name Description Domain Example
IP(out-dst) The destination IP address of outgoing tra c IP addresses 216.58.205.195
IP(in-src) The source IP address of incoming tra c IP addresses 192.30.253.112
IP(in-dst) The destination IP address of incoming tra c IP addresses 132.133.56.45
File A file being transmitted String of bytes
report results from threat detection based on file filtering and the two tables have di↵erent
attributes.
Figure 3.5: PAN-OS 6.1 interface to the logs (from Palo Alto Networks live community video tutorials)
We refer to each data type being exposed as a data content, each composed by a
set of attributes. The attributes description table (for example Table 3.4). lists all
attributes exposed in each data content and reports their name, description, domain and
some example values. Table 3.4 shows the attributes description table for our running
example.
We then associate each exposure (i.e., component and adversary) with the data contents
it exposes. This is reported in the data content identification table (for example
Table 3.5). that presents, for each pair of component and adversary derived from the
data exposure table, the likelihood of access (as previously evaluated) and the list of
data contents exposed by that component to that adversary. Table 3.5 shows an example
reporting some selected exposures from Table 3.3. Note that in Table 3.5 each data
content is exposed by each considered component to each considered adversary. This is
not always the case as it can happen that two components expose di↵erent data contents
and that a component exposes di↵erent data contents to di↵erent adversaries.
We then evaluate whether a combination of exposure and data content represents
a privacy threat by analyzing how the adversary can discover the association between a
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Table 3.5: Data content identification (running example)
Exposure
Data content
Exposure Component Adversary La
Exp1
DS1. threat
log
Security ad-
ministrator
Authorized
dc1: IP(out-dst)
dc2: IP(in-src), IP(in-dst)
dc3 : IP(in-src), IP(in-dst), File
Exp7
C3.
application
level threats
Network ad-
ministrator
High
dc1: IP(out-dst)
dc2: IP(in-src), IP(in-dst)
dc3 : IP(in-src), IP(in-dst), File
Exp12
P2. threat
monitoring
Ext.
adversary
Low
dc1: IP(out-dst)
dc2: IP(in-src), IP(in-dst)
dc3: IP(in-src), IP(in-dst), File
sensitive information and an identified respondent. This is clearly related to the semantics
of the data being exposed and on the knowledge accessible to the adversary. We first
classify the attributes according to the following definitions.
• Potentially Sensitive Information (PSI): attribute or set of attributes that can
be considered as sensitive. I.e., the combined values of the attributes in each of these
sets reveal sensitive information about the data respondent.
• Identifier (ID): attribute or set of attributes that uniquely identifies a respondent
in a data-set.
• Quasi-Identifier (QID): attribute or set of attributes that, combined with other
information (including adversary’s background knowledge), can be used to identify
the respondent in a data-set (or to restrict the set of candidate respondents).
The recognition of QIDs and the related assumptions about background knowledge,
also required by most anonymization techniques, is one of the most di cult tasks in
privacy protection [20]; however, it becomes more feasible when considering a restricted
domain with specific types of data content and adversaries, like the one we are consider-
ing. Table 3.6 shows an example of the data content attributes analysis table that
reports the attributes classification for each data content and also describes the expected
adversary’s background knowledge. The privacy expert is also expected to motivate or
comment the classification of each attribute. These motivations should be reported in
the tables delivered at each step. However for sake of brevity, in this chapter, we will not
report the motivations in the tables but we report them in the text.
example 3. In Table 3.6, the attribute IP(out-dst), contained in data content dc1, is
classified as a PSI attribute . In fact IP(out-dst) is the destination IP address of outgoing
tra c/request (see Table 3.4); this address can reveal sensitive information about the
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Table 3.6: Data content attributes analysis (running example)
Data content ID
QID
PSI
Attribute Bg. Kowledge
dc1: IP(out-dst) None None None IP(out-dst)
dc2: IP(in-src), IP(in-dst) None IP(in-dst) List associating IP-
addresses with user-names
IP(in-src)
dc3 : IP(in-src), IP(in-
dst), file
None IP(in-dst),
file
List associating IP-
addresses with user-names
IP(in-src), file
respondent who sent the request e.g., in case of HTTP tra c this attribute will reveal the
domain name of the web page visited by the respondent. dc1 contains neither ID attributes
nor QID attributes because IP(out-dst) does not provide any information about the data
respondent in the organization that initiated the communication.
Data content dc2 contains no ID attributes and a QID attribute IP(in-dst) that refers
to the destination IP address of incoming tra c (see Table 3.4). It is the IP address of a
respondent receiving a request or most likely an answer to a request. IP(in-dst) can be used
to re-identify a respondent if the adversary has background knowledge allowing them to
associate an IP address with a user-name. dc2 also contains the PSI attribute IP(in-src).
Similarly to IP(out-dst), IP(in-src) indicates the IP address of a machine answering to a
respondent’s request that could be the domain name of a privacy-sensitive website that the
respondent is visiting.
Data content dc3 and dc2 have two attributes in common: IP(in-dst) classified as QID
and IP(in-src) classified as PSI. dc3 contains, in addition, the attribute file classified as
QID because it might contain information that can be used to re-identify a respondent
e.g., name and surname. file is also considered as a PSI attribute since files are very
likely to reveal sensitive information about the respondents health, a purchase, financial
information.
Each combination of exposure and data content is considered a privacy threat if that
data content contains PSI attributes and at least an ID attribute or a QID attribute.
For example, the combination of Exposure Exp 1 and dc2 (see Table 3.5) is a privacy
threat (if the adversary has the necessary background information), because dc2 contains
IP(in-src), which is a QID and IP(in-dst), which is a PSI.
If for a given combination of exposure and data content, that data content has no ID
nor QID attributes or if it has no PSI attributes, that combination can be cleared as
it is not a privacy threat. For example, {Exp1, dc1}, {Exp7, dc1}, and {Exp12, dc1},
highlighted in Table 3.5, are cleared. In fact dc1 (as shown in Table 3.6) is composed
solely by IP addresses of external machines and contains no ID or QID attributes.
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3.3 EPIC Fourth Step: Evaluate and prioritize privacy threat
risk
In this section, we describe the fourth step of our methodology aimed at measuring the
risk of each privacy threat identified in Step 3. Following a common approach in the field
of IT security, we compute the privacy violation risk as the combination of likelihood of
occurrence of a privacy violation L and its impact I. In the following we first describe
how to measure privacy violation likelihood (Section 3.3.1), its impact (Section 3.3.2) and
then we show how to measure risk (Section 3.3.3). Finally, we show how to prioritize risk
mitigation actions (Section 3.3.4).
3.3.1 Privacy violation likelihood
The privacy violation likelihood represents the likelihood that the privacy of any
respondent is violated due to the disclosure of a given data content in given data exposure.
It depends on two factors: the likelihood of access (specified for each data exposure in
the third step) and the likelihood that, from the exposed information, the adversary can
successfully complete the privacy attack.
In order to complete a privacy attack, the adversary needs to associate the sensitive
information with the respondent’s identity. While in general, this association task may
not be trivial, in the domain that we are considering sensitive attributes most of the time
appear in data logs together with identifying or quasi-identifying information (e.g., IP,
MAC address, UID). Since in this step, we are only considering data contents that contain
PSI (the others have been cleared in Step 3), the likelihood of successfully completing the
privacy attack corresponds to the re-identification likelihood i.e., the likelihood that
the data respondent is re-identified.
We define this likelihood with a qualitative scale, established mainly by analyzing the
ID and QID set of attributes identified in the data content in the previous step and
evaluating which background knowledge the considered adversary may actually have. We
provide the following guidelines and examples to assign re-identification likelihood values
(c is the data content):
• Certain. Data respondents’ identity is explicitly reported in c. Consider, for example,
a company that assigns to each employee an email address in the form name.surname
and assume that each record in c contains the senders’ email address for outgoing
email. In this case, each log record in c is explicitly identified.
• High. The adversary can discover the data respondents’ identity because (i) the
explicit identity is part of many records in c or (ii) c contains quasi-identifying in-
formation and the adversary has access to the background information that allows
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him, with limited e↵ort, to re-identify the respondents. As an example for case (i),
consider a company in which users can choose their email addresses; c contains the
senders’ email address of outgoing emails. In most of the cases, the email address
will be in the form name.surname, so the data respondent can be often identified.
As an example for case (ii), consider that c contains the source IP address of out-
going HTTP connections, the adversary is the network administrator and he has
background information to map an IP address to the corresponding user’s name.
• Medium. The adversary can discover the data respondents’ identity because (i) the
explicit identity is seldom part of c or (ii) c contains quasi-identifying information and
the adversary can use it, together with background information so that, sometimes
and possibly with an e↵ort, he can re-identify the respondent. As an example for
case (i), consider that c contains the name of a file being transmitted; it is possible,
though rare, that the file name contains the sender’s identity like in the case of a file
named name surname CV. As an example for case (ii) consider that c includes the
timestamp of outgoing HTTP connection; the adversary has access to the physical
entrance/exit logs for the building, so he can infer when a person was in the building,
and hence, in some cases, he can find the identity of the data respondent or at least
restrict the set of possible respondents to a few individuals.
• Low. Explicit identity is not part of c but c contains quasi-identifiers that the ad-
versary can seldom or with a significant e↵ort exploit to discover the respondent’s
identity. Consider this example: c contains the source IP address of outgoing HTTP
connection. The adversary is the system administrator that, generally, does not
know the association between IP addresses and employees identities. However, when
a system administrator is asked for help desk support, he can become aware of a
static IP address associated with a given employee, hence being able to re-identify
the data respondent.
• Negligible. Explicit identity is not part of c and any quasi-identifying information in c,
if any, can only be used to re-identify a respondent by using background information
that is unlikely to be available to the adversary. Consider the case in which c contains
the source IP address of outgoing HTTP connections. An external adversary does
not know which user is associated with each IP address, so he cannot re-identify data
respondents, especially if the address is dynamic or masked by a gateway.
The qualitative values for re-identification likelihood and likelihood of access are com-
bined to obtain a qualitative value for the privacy violation likelihood, which is measured
with a 5-values scale from negligible to very-high. Table 3.7 shows how to compute privacy
violation likelihood given re-identification likelihood and the likelihood of access. The in-
tuition behind Table 3.7 is that the two input likelihoods are combined with an operation
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Table 3.7: Likelihood matrix defining privacy violation likelihood as a combination of likelihood of access
and re-identification likelihood
R
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ti
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ca
ti
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d
Certain Negligible Medium High Very-High Very-High
High Negligible Low Medium High Very-High
Medium Negligible Low Medium Medium High
Low Negligible Low Low Low Medium
Negligible Negligible Negligible Negligible Negligible Negligible
Negligible Low Medium High Authorized
Likelihood of Access
similar to a product. For example, if one of the two input likelihoods is negligible (this is
intuitively analogous to a zero probability), then the output likelihood is also negligible.
The privacy violation likelihood table (see for example Table 3.8) lists all privacy
threats and for each of them it reports the likelihood of access (La) (derived from Step 3),
the re-identification likelihood (Lrid), that is evaluated according to the five qualitative
values defined above, the motivations behind this evaluation and, finally, the value of the
privacy violation likelihood (L) , which is computed according to the likelihood matrix
(see Table 3.7).
example 4. Table 3.8 is the privacy violation likelihood table for the privacy threats
identified in the running example in Section 3.2.4.
The likelihood of access reported in this table was computed in Step 2 (see Table 3.3).
Values for the re-identification likelihood were defined according to the following reasoning.
Let’s first consider data content dc2, including the IP addresses that an adversary can use
to re-identify a respondent if he can associate it with the user-name (either directly or,
for example, by first associating the IP address to the o ce number and then to the
user-name). As observed above, security administrator can know this association in some
cases, so the re-identification likelihood is medium. The network administrator has access
to the full list associating IP-addressed and user-names, so the re-identification likelihood
is high. Finally, external adversary cannot associate the IP-address to the user-name, so
in this case, the re-identification likelihood is negligible.
Let’s now consider data content dc3. Also, in this case, the IP-address is part of the
data content, so, for each adversary, the re-identification likelihood is at least as high as
with dc2. However, dc3 also contains a file (i.e., file name, file content, etc.) that can
sometimes be an explicit identifier or a quasi-identifier. For the security administrator,
who is an internal adversary, the file can often identify the user. For example the security
administrator can re-identify the user even if the file is a document signed with the first
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Table 3.8: Privacy violation likelihood (running example)
Exposure Data content La Lrid L
Exp1: DS1
Security administrator
dc2 Authorized Medium High
dc3 Authorized High Very-High
Exp2: C3
Network administrator
dc2 High High High
dc3 High High High
Exp3: P2
External adversary
dc2 Low Negligible Negligible
dc3 Low Medium Low
name only; this is possible because the security administrator knows that there is only one
person with that name, or because, from the context, the adversary recognizes the file as
coming from a given o ce, where there is a single person with that name. For this reason,
the re-identification likelihood is set to high for security administrator. Instead, external
adversary can only re-identify the issuer when the full name is reported in the file and, in
some cases, this might not even be enough, for example for very common full names. For
this reason, the re-identification likelihood is set to medium for this adversary.
3.3.2 Privacy violation impact severity
A privacy violation has a negative impact on the responsible organization. We model this
by assigning an impact severity (I) value to each privacy threat. The value depends
on three impact factors, defined in the following (Section 3.3.2). Impact severity can be
assessed both qualitatively (Section 3.3.2) and quantitatively (Section 3.3.2).
Impact Factors.
To provide an impact severity assessment with as much accuracy as possible we first need
to identify the consequences of a privacy violation, that we call impact factors. They are
summarized in the following list:
• Non-compliance (IC). If data content is exposed in a non-compliant way (e.g., re-
spondent was not informed), then the organization might incur a certain cost in the
form of e.g., non-compliance fines, respondents compensation for loss of their privacy,
remediation measures to address the privacy issues that led to the unlawful leakage.
• Failure to meet business agreements (IB). The organization might have agreements
with end-users or other organizations that imply penalties in case of privacy viola-
tions. For example, privacy protection could be part of a service level agreement and
the service provider may be subject to specific penalties in case of privacy loss.
• Reputation Loss (IR). A privacy violation can have an impact on the organization
reputation, that is a commercially valuable asset. Indeed, reputation loss can “erode
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the ability of businesses to successfully retain their markets, maximize shareholders
value, raise finance and manage debts, and remain independent” [89].
In the following, we discuss how to assign a qualitative or quantitative value to each
factor. In both cases, there are three aspects that should be taken into account and that
we collectively call violation magnitude.
i) The e↵ect of the privacy violation on the respondent. While the e↵ect of the privacy
violation on the respondent does not have a direct impact on the organization, it is
relevant for the evaluation of the three impact factors listed above. For example, if the
privacy violation discloses a person’s sexual orientation and this results in the person
being sentenced (homosexuality is still illegal in some countries), then the reputation loss
for the organization will be higher than in the case of a privacy violation that has limited
impact on the data respondent.
ii) The number of respondents. It can be assessed based on the exposure magnitude (see
Section 3.2.3) and an estimation of how exposed data is distributed among individuals.
iii) Nature of respondents. There are some categories whose privacy should be particu-
larly protected (e.g., minors, social minorities) or individuals for whom a privacy violation
can have worse e↵ects than for others (e.g., a politician, a CEO).
By considering these thee aspects the expert assigns a qualitative value to the violation
magnitude in the scale: Very limited, Limited, Medium, Important and Very important.
Impact Severity: Qualitative Assessment.
With this form of assessment a privacy expert and an organization representative jointly
evaluate the severity of each impact factor for each privacy threat and assign a qualitative
severity level to each factor on a 5-levels severity scale (Low, Med-low, Med, Med-high and
High). This evaluation takes into consideration di↵erent aspects for each of the three
factors. For example, the non-compliance severity will depend on the measures the or-
ganizations deployed in order to be compliant with the regulation or the lack of these
measures. It also depends on the violation magnitude; indeed, in case a compensation to
the violation victims is required, the non-compliance severity will scale linearly with the
number of respondents a↵ected. The reputation loss impact may depend on the adver-
sary, on the data handled by the organization, on insu cient organizational and technical
control, and most importantly by the number of individuals a↵ected. Indeed, reputation
loss is likely to scale with the privacy violation magnitude, not only in terms of number of
respondents a↵ected, but also in terms of the nature of these respondent (e.g., a privacy
violation for a social minority, a celebrity or a political figure will certainly have more
reputation impact than other leakages). Finally, the impact of non-fulfillment of business
agreements depends on the kind of data leaked and on the agreements themselves. An ex-
ample business agreement may be an SLA (service level agreement) with a cloud provider.
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Table 3.9: Qualitative privacy violation impact (running example)
Exposure Data cont. Th
Violation
magn.
IC IB IR I
Exp1: DS1
Sec. admin
dc2 Th1 Important Low Low Low Low
Exp7: C3
Net. admin
dc2 Th2 Very-
Limited
Med-high Low Med-low Med-high
Exp7: C3
Net. admin
dc3 Th3 Very-
Limited
High Low High High
Exp12: P2
Ext. adver.
dc3 Th4 Limited High Low Med-
high
High
SLAs usually specify a minimum level of data security and privacy. In case of failure to
meet those requirements penalty fees should be paid to the client as compensation.
After evaluating the impact factors, impact severity is computed as the maximum
severity level of the three factors: I = max(IC , IB, IR). In fact, the five severity levels
intuitively represent significantly di↵erent range of values (possibly even di↵erent orders
of magnitude). Thus, the overall impact severity will most likely preserve the range of
values of the highest severity among the considered impact factors.
The results are reported in the qualitative privacy violation impact table (see
for example Table 3.9) that reports, for each privacy threat, the violation magnitude, the
qualitative values of each impact factor and the resulting qualitative impact severity.
example 5. Table 3.9 reports the qualitative privacy violation impact table for a subset
of the privacy threats reported in Example 4.
In the first row, impact severity is low. Indeed, in threat Th1 users are informed that
the IP addresses (both local and remote) are collected for security purposes and might
be processed by the security administrator. For this reason, and because several measures
were taken to avoid privacy violations, the non-compliance impact factor (IC) is evaluated
as low. IB is low because the organization has no business agreements to fulfill. IR is
also low because the impact of this violation on reputation is minimal since a security
administrator is somehow expected to access information about user IP addresses.
Impact severity of Th2 is med-high. Considering Th2, non-compliance impact factor
is quite severe because respondents are not informed that the adversary can access exposed
data (actually, network administrator is not expected to access exposed data). However,
violation magnitude is very limited, because there are few respondents for the exposed
data. This mitigates IC that is evaluated as med-high. IB is low because the organization
has no business agreements. The impact on organization’s reputation I is estimated med-
low because the violation magnitude is very limited and exposed data does not contain
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particularly sensitive information (see Table 3.6 for dc2).
Threat Th3 is similar to Th2 with the di↵erence that in this case, the adversary can
also access files, which in turn can contain any type of data, including those particularly
protected by existing regulations, e.g., health-related information. For this reason both IC
and IR are high, and consequently impact severity is also high.
In threat Th4 a non-authorized person (i.e., an external adversary) has access to cd3
that include files. Hence, similarly to Th3, IC is high and consequently impact severity
is high.
Impact Severity: Quantitative Assessment.
Another approach to assess impact severity is to quantitatively estimate the economic cost
deriving from a privacy violation. We consider the same three factors as in the qualitative
approach but in this case, we associate each of them with an estimation of the economic
loss.
For example, non-compliance cost includes: (i) the fines that the organization has to
pay, (ii) the cost of remediation actions (both organizational and technical), and (iii) the
compensation to pay to each a↵ected respondent times the number of respondents.
The reputation loss costs are caused by the loss of trust and the degradation of the
relationship between the organization and its partners, employees, investors, customers
and potential future customers. It can be reflected on several levels e.g., turnover of
existing customers, diminished customer acquisition, cumulative abnormal stock returns,
decline of equity value [96]. It can also include the costs of e↵orts to control the incident
disclosure and reputation repair.
The failure to meet business agreements cost depends on the existing business agree-
ments and their nature.
In the case of a quantitative assessment, we compute impact severity of a privacy threat
as the sum of the costs associated to each impact factor: I = IC + IR + IB.
The results are reported in the quantitative privacy violation impact table that
is analogous to the qualitative privacy violation impact table (Table 3.9) with the only
di↵erences that impact factors and impact severity are reported as quantitative values.
3.3.3 Privacy violation risk
As mentioned in the beginning of this section, privacy violation risk depends on the
privacy violation likelihood and impact severity. If impact severity is assessed quantita-
tively, then we can compute a quantitative privacy violation risk. Otherwise, we provide
a qualitative privacy violation risk assessment.
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Table 3.10: Risk matrix defining qualitative privacy violation risk as a combination of privacy violation
likelihood and impact severity.
Im
p
a
ct
se
v
er
it
y
High Low Medium High High High
Med-High Low Medium Medium High High
Med. Low Low Medium Medium High
Med-Low Low Low Low Medium Medium
Low Low Low Low Low Medium
Negligible Low Medium High Very-High
Privacy violation likelihood
Table 3.11: Qualitative privacy violation risk
Th Exposure Data content L I R
Th1 Exp1: DS1, Security admin. dc2 High Low Low
Th2 Exp2: C3, Network admin. dc2 High Med-low Medium
Th3 Exp2: C3, Network admin. dc4 High High High
Th4 Exp3: P2, External adversary dc4 Low High Medium
Qualitative Evaluation
We define the qualitative privacy violation risk with three levels: low, medium and
high. We combine privacy violation likelihood and impact severity levels according to the
risk matrix (see Table 3.10). The idea behind this risk matrix (in Table 3.10) is that
when privacy violation likelihood is negligible, then we can exclude that the adversary
can successfully complete the attack, so the risk is low. If the privacy violation likelihood
is low, then risk is obtained by decreasing the value of the impact severity (e.g., impact
severity high results in a medium risk). Similarly, if the privacy violation likelihood is
medium, then risk is obtained by slightly decreasing the value of the impact severity (e.g.,
medium-high impact severity results in a medium risk but high impact severity results in
high risk). A high value of privacy violation likelihood implies that the values of impact
severity map to the same value of risk, with the exception ofmedium-low andmedium-high
that are “rounded up” to medium and high risk values, respectively. Finally, a very-high
privacy violation likelihood results in risk values that are higher than those of the impact
severity (e.g., medium impact severity maps to high risk).
The qualitative privacy violation risk table (see for example Table 3.11) reports,
for each privacy threat, the values of privacy violation likelihood and impact severity (that
were previously computed), together with the qualitative risk value that is computed based
on Table 3.10.
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Quantitative Evaluation
In the quantitative approach, we need to convert the qualitative measure of privacy vi-
olation likelihood into a numerical value. We propose the following association: Very-
High= 1, High= 0.75, Medium= 0.5, Low= 0.25 and Negligible= 0. Then, for each
privacy threat, we compute the quantitative privacy violation risk R as the product of
the privacy violation likelihood and of impact severity: R = L · I
The results are then reported in the quantitative privacy violation risk table
that is analogous to the qualitative privacy violation risk table (Table 3.11) with the
di↵erence that quantitative values are reported for the privacy violation likelihood, for
impact severity and risk.
3.3.4 Risk mitigation actions prioritization
In the fourth step, after assessing the risk values, we are now interested in defining in
which order the privacy threats should be addressed with mitigation actions. We model
this order with a priority value, a scale of integer values from 1 to 12 where 1 represents
the highest priority.
The priority of a privacy threat depends on two factors: its privacy violation risk and
the trustworthiness of the adversary involved in that privacy threat. Several definitions
of trust have been proposed in the literature (see [106] for a survey). In this paper we
consider the trust in an adversary as the organization’s level of confidence about the
actor not attempting to gain non-authorized data access or misusing the data to violate
privacy.
This level should be assessed by taking into consideration several aspects, including le-
gal agreements, specific training on handling personal data, personal characteristics (such
as morality, skills, and behavior [67]), and organizational procedures (e.g., motivational
practices and reward systems). Regarding legal agreements, note that employees with
access to the system usually have to sign such agreements as part of their contract. In
EPIC, the knowledge about these agreements is part of the domain knowledge acquired
as input for the whole methodology (see Figure 3.1).
Human factors are receiving increasing attention in the security field. Indeed actors
trust assessment is often included in risk management processes. Some approaches discuss
the trust level as a part of the risk computation [151] whereas others use this level as
an independent indicator to balance the risk at the decision making stage [12]. It has
been observed that the first approach tends to underestimate or hide the risks involving
insider threats [45]. Actually, insiders have a big potential to create threats intentionally
(by attempting malicious actions) or unintentionally (through lack of experience and
awareness). For this reason the EPIC methodology adopts the second approach, and we
do not consider adversary trustworthiness as a factor in the evaluation of privacy violation
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risk. The trustworthiness is rather used to define a priority value.
This approach has a twofold e↵ect. On one side, it provides an e↵ective priority
classification of threats to act upon. On the other side, it provides an explicit classification
of risk that also takes into account the adversaries’ trustworthiness. This risk estimation
will be useful in the process of deciding and designing what kind of training an actor
should have in preparation to fill a high-risk position and what kind of profiles to select
when hiring.
We consider the following four levels of trust.
• Fully trusted: Adversaries are fully trusted if they are trained to deal with personal
data at the CSS level. Their activities with data are monitored by logging mecha-
nisms and they are accountable for any personal data leakage. They often have very
high privileges allowing them full access to data.
• Trusted: Trusted adversaries are also trained to deal with personal data and their
activity is monitored. However, they have less responsibility in case of privacy leakage
and have restricted access to the sensitive data.
• Moderately trusted: Actors are moderately trusted if they are trusted at the orga-
nization level, however, they are not specifically trained to deal with sensitive and
personal information at the CSS level. These actors have often high privileges (e.g.,
administration privileges). They are responsible and accountable for any abuse of
their privileges.
• Untrusted: Adversaries are considered as untrusted if they have no training on how
to deal with private information and no authorizations to access the data.
We propose to use the priority distribution defined by the priority matrix (see Ta-
ble 3.12) to combine privacy violation risk and adversary’s trustworthiness in order obtain
each threat priority. This matrix is designed to give more weight to the risk than to the
trust. Priority of threats with the same risk level decreases (i.e., gets higher values) con-
versely to the trust level. In most of the cases, a privacy threat with a lower privacy
violation risk than another is associated with a lower priority, with some exceptions. For
example, a privacy threat with medium risk and untrusted adversary is associated with a
priority higher than a privacy threat with high risk and fully trusted adversary.
The results of this procedure are reported in the prioritized privacy threats table
(see for example Table 3.13) that indicates, for each privacy threat, its associated privacy
violation risk (previously computed), the adversary trust and the resulting priority value.
Adversaries that are not fully trusted may also be at risk of sharing data with exter-
nal adversaries or colluding with other adversaries. While dealing with collusion is not
explicitly taken into account by EPIC, the likelihood of this scenario can be reduced by
remediation actions that include specific legal obligations, and organizational measures
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Table 3.12: Priority matrix defining priority as a combination of privacy violation risk and adversary
trust
Adversary trust
Untrusted Moderately Trusted Trusted Fully Trusted
Privacy
violation risk
High 1 2 3 5
Medium 4 6 7 9
Low 8 10 11 12
like preventing the use of personal external storage or the use of any personal device in
the CSS control room.
Table 3.13: Prioritized privacy violation threats (running example).
Th. Exposure Data content R Adversary trust Priority
Th1 Exp1: DS1, Sec. admin. dc2 Low Fully Trusted 12
Th2 Exp2: C3, Net. admin. dc2 Medium Moderately trusted 6
Th3 Exp2: C3, Net. admin. dc3 High Moderately trusted 2
Th4 Exp3: P2, Ext. adversary dc3 Medium Untrusted 4
example 6. Table 3.13 illustrates the priority of threats considered in the previous section.
The first threat Th1 has a low risk level. The adversary is the security administrator that
is fully trusted to access and process the data content dc2 because they are highly trained
to deal with personal data and assume high responsibilities for any potential leakage or
misuse of this data. For these reasons, this threat has the lowest possible priority (12).
In the second and third rows (i.e., Th2 and Th3) the adversary is moderately trusted.
Network administrators are trusted within the organization, but they are not authorized
to access dc2 or dc3 nor specifically trained to deal with any private information collected
by the CSS. Consequently, Th2 and Th3 have priority levels 6 and 2, respectively.
In the last threat the adversary is external and hence untrusted. Since risk is medium,
according to Table 3.13 priority is 4.
3.4 Case Study
In this section, we present a real case study used to validate our methodology. This use
case considers the cybersecurity system protecting the network of an academic institution
including over 15,000 hosts. We also report some of the results and findings after applying
EPIC to our use case (The full analysis can be fund in [102]).
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Figure 3.6: Architecture of the University’s Cyber Security System
3.4.1 Case Study description
Figure 3.6 depicts the architecture of a university campus network along with its Cyber
Security Systems (CCSs). From here on we will refer to the ensemble of these cybersecurity
systems as UCSS (i.e., University Cyber Security System). The university network is
divided into di↵erent network segments located in three geographic areas and connected
among themselves by four main routing devices (R1, . . . , R4).
This network is protected in total by six types of cybersecurity systems: (1) Netflow
network collector (in short Netflow), (2) Network Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDS),
(3) application-level firewall, (4) Security Information and Event Management System
(SIEM), (5) cloud antivirus and (6) security mechanisms built into the routers and in
particular (i) Firewall at IP level and (ii) Virtual Private Network VPN (from now on,
we will refer to this ensemble of mechanisms as router).
To identify and assess the privacy impact of UCSS, we run the four steps of the EPIC
methodology for each of these six cybersecurity systems.
The Netflow is a hardware device configured to collect network packet headers. This
data is mainly used to detect network anomalies e.g., performance degradation, tra c
congestion, abnormal latency. In our architecture (Figure 3.6), we have a Netflow is
46
3.4. CASE STUDY
connected to each router and covering the whole network.
The NIDS are deployed in each network segment for monitoring the network tra c
and they raise an alert when suspicious patterns are detected. Each NIDS is equipped
with a remote console where alert logs are collected and a human analyst can access this
data for investigation and forensic tasks
Firewall at application level is used to detect threats such as web attacks, exploitation
techniques, malware infections, etc. (Figure 3.6 shows a single firewall connected to R2
but there is actually a firewall for each router). To this end, the firewall is able to process
a large spectrum of data types such as executables, PDFs, emails, multimedia files etc.
The firewall can be also configured to decrypt SSL tra c going to any external websites
and it acts as a forward proxy. Like the other cybersecurity devices, the firewall is also
equipped with a remote console to allow the security team to monitor the security events
and investigate threats.
The events and threats collected by Netflow, NIDS, application level firewall and
routers are sent to the SIEM for further analysis, which is considered the mastermind
of UCSS. Thanks to its capabilities such as data aggregation, event correlation, and ad-
vanced forensic analytics, this system provides a view on the big picture of potential
attacks running under the network and that the other CSS cannot detect separately. The
SIEM has a remote console allowing interaction between the system and human agents.
The Cloud antivirus is based on a technology that uses a lightweight software compo-
nent on the protected host while o✏oading the majority of data analysis to the antivirus
provider’s infrastructure. The goal of the software agent is to identify suspicious files
and send them to the network cloud where multiple antiviruses and behavioral detection
engines are applied simultaneously for improving detection rate. Cloud antivirus can also
use a “retrospective detection” where the cloud detection engine re-scan all files already
checked when a new threat is identified. Such technique can improve the detection speed.
The router as mentioned above can perform tra c filtering based on predefined net-
working ACLs (access control lists). ACLs indicate which tra c to allow or block based
on IP addresses and port numbers. Blocked tra c can be used to investigate network
attacks and incidents. Routers also allow to create and use VPNs however this security
mechanism does not collect any data thus it will not be considered in our analysis.
3.4.2 Summary of the results and findings
In this section, we summarize and discuss the important results obtained after running
the 4 steps methodology to the use case presented in the previous section.
In the first step we modeled the seven CSSs mentioned in Section 3.4.1 using the
extended data flow diagram DFD+ (as explained in Section 3.2.2). in Figure 3.7 we show
an example of DFD+ modeling the SIEM.
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Figure 3.7: Modeling UCSS SIEM component with DFD+
In the second step, we identify 350 exposures. In Table 3.1 we report a reference list
of adversaries for a cybersecurity environment that can be personalized for the specific
CSS and organization being considered. In the UCSS use case, we added the following
adversaries:
a) Security operator : in UCSS the security team is composed of a security administrator
and four security operators; the operators have the same tasks but fewer privileges than
the security administrator ;
b) Network user : this adversary role applies to any individual with approved access to
the university’s network.
For each exposure, we computed the likelihood of access La. This assessment takes
into consideration the adversaries and security mechanisms protecting each component
(see Section 3.2.3). Among the identified exposures 60 had non-negligible likelihood of
access including 38 exposures involving authorized actors. The rest of the exposures were
cleared.
As mentioned in Section 3.2.4 the data leaked in each exposure is composed of het-
erogeneous types of records (i.e., records with di↵erent attributes). We call each type of
records a data content.In the third step we identified 39 di↵erent data contents, composed
of di↵erent combinations the attributes described in Table 3.14 1. We also identified 1200
privacy violation threats. In average 60% of the total number of threats involve authorized
users. No threats were cleared during this step.
The analysis carried in the fourth step reveals that most authorized users threats have
elevated risk levels. In Table 3.15 we report a subset of the results obtained by analyzing
the SIEM (depicted in Figure 3.7 ).In this sample, we selected high-risk threats and we
1The exposures we identified actually leak other privacy neutral attributes (i.e., neither IDs, nor QIDs, nor PSIs),
however for sake of brevity we don’t report them in this table.
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Table 3.14: UCSS attributes description
Name Description Domain Example values
IP int IP adress (source or destination) of a
machin in the local network
IP Address 192.168.100.32
IP ext External IP adress (source or destination) IP Address 8.8.8.8
URL visited sites urls and parameters if any URL www.sitename.com/
search?s=parameter
file meta. File name, size, author creation time etc. name.pdf, 504kb,
2017-06-06 12:07:10
file A file being transmitted String of bytes
email header Email Object, Sender and Reciver adresses smtp header from: to: date: sub-
ject: etc.
email cont. Email Object, Sender and Reciver adresses
app. name name of the application and protocol used name, protocol,
etc.
Thunderbird 52.1.1,
smtp
can see that several threats were originated by authorized users (i.e., Security operator
and Security admin). Even after taking into consideration the trustworthiness of these
authorized users (acquired through training and legal commitment), the priority levels of
threats evolving them is still quite important. Which means this kind of threats should
not be overlooked when planning for mitigation solutions.
Table 3.15: Privacy violation risk and prioritization (SIEM)
Threat
Risk Trust Priority
Exposuer Data content
P3: Security operator IP int, IP ext, URL Medium Trusted 7
La: authorized IP int, IP ext, URL, http content High Trusted 3
P3: Security admin IP int, IP ext, URL High Fully Trusted 5
La: authorized IP int, IP ext, URL, http content High Fully Trusted 5
C1.3: Network admin. IP int, IP ext, URL High Moderatly Trusted 2
La: high IP int, IP ext, URL, http content High Moderatly Trusted 2
DS1: Security admin. IP int, IP ext, file metadata High Fully Trusted 5
La: authorized
DS1: System admin. IP int, IP ext, file metadata Medium Moderatly Trusted 6
La: mediun
The identification and evaluation of these threats in UCSS has a high value for the
academic institution, not only to better understand the privacy implications of the de-
ployed CSS and possibly mitigate the threats but also to comply with regulation. For
example, the new EU General Data Protection Regulation2 (GDPR) requires to keep de-
2Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural
persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive
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tailed “Records of personal data processing activities” (article 30), and the EPIC’s threat
analysis was an excellent tool to isolate this information for the CSS.
The prioritization is a further step with a central role in guiding the mitigation actions
for the identified privacy violation threats. Considering the UCSS use case, this step
of the EPIC methodology highlighted two benefits. First, it forced the trust analysis of
the di↵erent actors considered as adversaries, identifying the higher reliability of security
operators with respect to system and network administrators because of their di↵erent
training and expertise. Second, considering only trust, Th2 would be considered at highest
priority, while considering only risk Th1, Th3, and Th4 would be considered before Th2.
Only the balanced evaluation of the combination of the two factors suggests the non-trivial
priority order reported in Table 3.12.
3.5 Threat mitigation strategies
A natural follow-up to the EPIC analysis would be to guide through the selection and
implementation of privacy protection solutions, including organizational and legal in-
terventions. Regarding technical solutions, despite there are several privacy enhancing
techniques that could be applied in this domain, a careful evaluation is required specifi-
cally for preserving data quality and computational e ciency in order not to impact on
security protection. Indeed, some existing privacy enhancing techniques have been shown
to reliably protect privacy, however, they often severely a↵ect the quality of data and
come with a substantial computational overhead.
Moreover, the type of selected solution strongly depends on the nature of the actors
involved or originating the threat. Indeed the results of Analyses (presented in Section 3.4)
allowed us to identify two categories of threats: a) unauthorized actors threats and b)
authorized actors threats.
Unauthorized actors as the name indicates are actors who have no authorizations to
access the data from a given components. These actors gain access by attacking the CSS
of the network in which the CSS is deployed. The Unauthorized actors can be external
attackers but can also be insiders i.e., companies employees, network and IT personnel
etc. To address this kind of threats we need to eliminate the data leakage. This can be
achieved through the reinforcement of the network security to fix the security breaches
that lead to the leakage. In other cases where insiders are involved, we could think about
addressing the privilege assignments and privilege abuses. Data obfuscation mechanisms
such as encryption can also be used to mitigate non-authorized actors threats.
However, these solutions are not applicable to the threats originated by authorized
users since these users need to access the data in order to accomplish their daily business
tasks. Indeed to mitigate authorized actor threats one possible solution is to minimize the
95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation).
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data leakage by e ciently applying the need-to-know principle when releasing the data.
To do so anonymization techniques can be used to lower the granularity of identifying or
sensitive information. Which will clearly lower the privacy risk but it will also impact the
utility of the data and it is also expected to have a certain computational overhead. Thus
this kind of solution needs to be carefully used. Another solution would be to increase
our confidence the authorized actor will not miss-use the accessed data or in other words
increase the actor’s trust. This trust level can be increased through privacy training, the
signature of legal agreements, monitoring etc.
These privacy protection measures (e.g., anonymization, trust enhancement) can be
applied o↵-line. However in order to mitigate the negative impact, mentioned earlier, they
are better applied at run-time, request by request during the access control phase where
the privacy risk can be assessed more accurately by taking into consideration a number
of factors, often known at run-time only, such as the access history of the requester, the
security context of the query etc.
3.6 Chapter conclusions
In this chapter we presented “EPIC”, a methodology to identify and evaluate privacy vi-
olation threats resulting from the deployment of an organizational cybersecurity system.
The methodology guides a privacy expert, with the collaboration of the organization’s
security team, through four steps of analysis namely “modeling the cybersecurity sys-
tem”, “identifying data exposures”, “identifying privacy threats” and “evaluating and
prioritizing privacy threats”.
We refined and validated the methodology by applying it to the actual cybersecurity
system of a large academic institution. In Section 3.4 we provide a description of this
CSS and briefly report the end results of the analysis (the full application of EPIC can
be found in [102]).
Two contrasting needs emerged while designing the EPIC methodology: on one side,
in order to increase the accuracy of privacy violation risk assessment a larger number of
aspects needs to be modeled and deep evaluations by privacy experts need to be performed.
On the other side, the methodology should be practical: the experts should be able
to apply it to real systems with a reasonable e↵ort and time. Balancing these needs
required us to omit some details or special cases that add complexity to the process,
while not always a↵ecting the evaluation result in the specific context of privacy in CSS.
For example, in a first attempt to model privacy violation, we explicitly took into account
“linking information” i.e., attributes that can associate several pieces of information to
the same individual. Consider for instance a data log that reports a given sensitive
information associated with pseudo-id 123; another log contains the association between
pseudo-id 123 and respondent’s identity. By accessing these two logs the adversary can
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violate the respondent’s privacy through the “linking information” i.e., pseudo-id 123.
EPIC does not explicitly provide guidance to the experts for analyzing this re-identifying
method since in our case study, this form of reasoning never disclosed additional privacy
threats while adding complexity. Despite we believe that our use case is representative of
a large class of CSS, there may be cases that require a more detailed analysis, including
linking. Actually, linking information is captured by our formal model as a special case
of quasi-identifier (see our definition of quasi-identifier) and can be considered in Steps
3 and 4 of EPIC. More generally, a technically deeper analysis on specific aspects can
be conducted as a second phase assessment or as part of the remediation for particular
privacy threats and system components.
The privacy risk assessment resulting from the methodology can be used to compare
cybersecurity systems in terms of privacy preservation. By considering the trustworthiness
of the adversary together with the privacy violation risk, the methodology also provides
a prioritization of the activities necessary to mitigate the risk of the identified privacy
threats. This overview obtained (characteristics of the threat: adversary, component,
data, risk, and priority) helps starting the elaboration of a mitigation plan.
For example, one important finding after applying the methodology to this use case
(in Section 3.4) is that an important number of threats was originated by insider au-
thorized actors. These threats have elevated privacy violation risk levels and important
priorities. Privacy enhancing techniques such as encryption and security reinforcement
(applied alone) can be good solutions to mitigate unauthorized access privacy threats (ac-
cess achieved by unauthorized actors), but they are not applicable in case of authorized
access. Therefore other solutions need to be proposed to address these type of threats
mainly by decreasing the amount of data accessed by authorized actors. This kind of so-
lutions, e.g., anonymization, impacts the quality of data thus the level of anonymization
should be decided carefully depending on the privacy risk.
In this optic, we propose a privacy-aware risk-based access control system, where the
privacy risk is assessed at run-time for each request. If this risk is higher than the request’s
trust, several strategies can be applied to lower the risk and/or enhance the trust. In the
remaining chapters of this thesis, we will provide more details about this approach.
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Chapter 4
Trust- and Risk-based access control
Access control mechanisms are fundamental mechanisms in computer security
used to ensure that only authenticated and authorized users can perform allowed
actions on given resources under given circumstances. The rapid evolution and
diversification in today’s ICT landscape brought various challenges for access
control. Indeed this new environment requires a high level of data availability
and calls for more flexible access evaluation. In fact, in commonly used access
control systems (e.g., RBAC, MAC), it is current practice to grant all-or-nothing
access. Although this approach supports privacy and confidentiality, it lacks
flexibility and limits data exploitation and availability. Vigorous studies have
been conducted to dress these challenges. Among the proposed solutions risk-
aware access control approaches received increasing attention during the last
years. These systems grant or deny access to resources based on the notion of
risk. It has many advantages compared to classic approaches, allowing for more
flexibility, and ultimately supporting for a better exploitation of data.
In this chapter we propose a novel trust- and risk-based access control frame-
work supporting run-time trust and risk assessment. For each request, access
is evaluated based on a combination of these trust and risk values. Di↵erently,
from existing models, our framework supports access control in dynamic contexts
through trust enhancement mechanisms and risk mitigation strategies. This al-
lows striking a balance between the risk associated with a data request and the
trustworthiness of the requester. If the risk is too large compared to the trust
level, then the framework can identify adaptive strategies leading to a decrease
of the risk (e.g., by removing/obfuscation part of the data through anonymiza-
tion) or to increase the trust level (e.g., by asking for additional obligations to
the requester). We outline a modular architecture to realize our model, and we
describe how these strategies can be actually realized in a realistic use case.
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4.1 Introduction
The increase in the amount of data generated by today’s digital society is astonishing.
According to IDC estimate [71], the global volume of digital data will double every two
years, reaching 44 trillion gigabytes by 2020. The availability of such large and diverse
datasets (big data) enables the creation of new data-based businesses or optimizing exist-
ing process (real-time customization, predictive analytics, etc.).
Yet, organization and companies are often unable to exploit the full potential of this
data (e.g., providing access to analysts, sharing with and accessing partners data). Indeed
this data often contain confidential and sensitive information and providing access to
this information carries multiple risks of intentional or accidental misuse [1]. Moreover
currently used access-control mechanisms have major limitations for handling complex
data sharing scenario while managing potential security and legal risks. Already few
years ago, the JASON MITRE report [121] indicated that the inflexibility of (still-used)
access control mechanisms is a major obstacle when dealing with diverse data sources in
a dynamic environment. Therefore the success key of any organization is to find the right
balance between providing Flexibility while providing essential information and ensuring
the confidentiality of the data.
To overcome this problem, access control systems must weigh the risks of the incoming
requests. Then access decisions must be based on an estimation of expected cost and
benefits, and not (as in traditional access control systems) on a predefined policy that
statically defines what accesses are allowed and denied. In such approaches, referred to as
risk-based access control, for each access request, the corresponding risk is estimated and if
the risk is less than a threshold then access is guaranteed, otherwise, it is denied. Although
existing risk-based access control models provide an important step towards a better
management and exploitation of data, they have a number of drawbacks which limit their
e↵ectiveness. In particular, most of the existing risk-based systems only support binary
access decisions: the outcome is allowed or denied. Whereas in real-life we often need to
handle exceptions based on additional conditions. For instance, the access to sensitive
medical data (e.g., by a non-treating doctor) should be allowed in a situation of emergency
in return the doctor should sign non-disclosure agreements. In other words, if the risk
is higher than a certain threshold, the system should be able to propose appropriate
risk mitigation measures instead of denting any risky access. This way it enhances the
exploitation of the data while maintaining an acceptable risk level.
In this Chapter, we propose a novel access control framework that combines trust with
risk and supports access control in dynamic contexts through. This allows us to strike a
balance between the risk and the trustworthiness when evaluating a data request. If the
risk is too large compared to the trust level, then the framework can identify adaptive
adjustment strategies that can decrease the risk (e.g., by removing part of the data)
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and/or increase the trust level (e.g., by asking for additional obligations to the requester)
to increase the exploitability of the data instead of denying every “risky” request.
Our framework enjoys a number of features:
1. it explicitly models trust and risk, which are the key factors of any business decision;
2. it increases the flexibility of existing risk-based access control, by introducing trust.
3. it provides an understandable way to implement and enforce risk and trust adjust-
ment operations both prior to and after issuing the access decision;
4. it supports complex authorization scenarios by simply changing the configuration
(trust and risk configuration modules, and corresponding mitigation/enhancement
strategies).
5. it can be realized using a declarative policy language with a number of advantages
including usability, flexibility, and scalability. As we will see in Section 4.4 the
architecture and the policy structure1 we propose can be readily implemented as an
extension of a well-known declarative authorization language XACML.
With motivating use case, we will illustrate how the framework can work in practice, ad-
dressing access control requirements in a natural way, that would otherwise need complex
authorization structure and calibration.
In the next section (Section 4.2) we describe the selected use case. In Section 4.3 we
introduce our trust- and risk-based access control model and discuss approaches to trust
and risk evaluation and adjustment. In Section 4.4 we provide an architectural view of our
access control framework. In Section 4.6 we show how the proposed framework addresses
the requirements of our use case, and we conclude in Section 4.7 with some final remarks.
4.2 Use Case
Consider a company with an ERP system with a Human Resource (HR) Management
module, enabled with the proposed trust and risk-based access control system (see Fig-
ure 4.1). By using the ERP functionalities corporate user Alice can generate an HR
report containing a list of employees with their location and salaries. The report contains
sensitive information and personal data, typically subject to strict regulations, such as
European Directive on Data Protection 95/46/EC that, among other terms, prevents Eu-
ropean citizens personal information to be transferred outside EU countries (with some
exceptions that we do not consider here). and the company has strict rules for accessing
the data such as security measures to minimize the disclosure risk when data are moved
1In Chapter5 Section 5.7 we will present a sample of XACML attribute-based policies implementing privacy-aware
risk-based authorizations described in 4.1
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Figure 4.1: Use Case: Alice accessing an HR report with personal data covered by EU Directive on Data
Protection 95/46/EC.
outside the company. The risk scenario considered is the leakage of the salary information
associated with a specific employee (re-identification risk). To ensure compliance with EU
data protection laws, additional restrictions must be applied if data are accessed outside
EU. Data Controllers (i.e., the entities responsible for the personal data collection and
management processes, in this case, the company) have the legal obligation to adhere to
the directive but at the same time, Alice must be able to access the report.
In her daily business, Alice may access the report using multiple devices: her o ce
PC at corporate premises, a corporate smartphone, and her own smartphone. Access,
in mobility, su↵ers from a high level of risk, since it is more exposed to external attacks
and, depending on the geographical location, di↵erent rules may apply. A conservative
approach, easily implementable with traditional access control systems, would imply a
security policy like that:
• if Alice is on premises, then access is granted
• if Alice is in mobility, access is denied as the security and compliance risks could be
too high
Basically, access is limited to corporate premises, where full data can be viewed whereas
outside no information is available and no reports can be produced. Even though this
approach could seem simplistic, many real-life access control systems o↵er a similar level
of functionality [153].
Ideally, Alice would like to get a wider access to the data, and perform her business
tasks (e.g., reporting) also in mobility, using di↵erent devices in multiple locations, but
still keeping security risk under control, as summarized in Table 4.1.
In the next sections, In the next sections, we will show how these scenarios can be
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Table 4.1: Possible usage scenarios, comprising di↵erent devices and locations, and expected utility (i.e.,
type of reports needed) and security levels
Scenario Expected
# Device Location Administration Utility Security
1 PC on premises corporate full access no restriction
2 Smartphone EU corporate grouped by country medium risk
3 Smartphone EU personal grouped by region minimal risk
4 Smartphone no EU - no access no access
realized in our framework. We will present our trust- and risk-based access control model
and show how these scenarios can be realized in our framework.
4.3 Trust- and Risk-based access control model
In this section, we provide a general description of our trust- and risk-based access con-
trol model. We will also discuss the risk and trust models, assessment and adjustment
strategies.
4.3.1 Risk-based authorization model
The framework evaluates access decisions using the trust and risk values associated with
the access request. An access request issued by subject u to carry out action a (e.g.,
read or write) on resource obj (e.g., a file) in context C is modeled as a quadruple
req = (u, a, obj, C). For instance, a request issued by user Alice to read file HR-report.xlsx
from her corporate cell phone during her presence in the company’s premises is repre-
sented by req0 = (Alice, read,HR-report.xlsx, corporate cell phone, on premises). Let ⇧
be the access control policy of the organization. We write ⇧(req) = granted to denote
that req is granted access by ⇧, and ⇧(req) = denied to denote that req is explicitly
denied by ⇧. Some access control models, do not explicitly deny access in these models
⇧(req) 6= granted ⌘ ⇧(req) = denied. However this approach is clearly more restrictive,
and since we would to gain as much flexibility as possible we will only use this formu-
lation (Auth⇧(req) = deny if ⇧(req) 6= granted) when the access control does not allow
otherwise.
Auth⇧(req) =
8>><>>:
deny if ⇧(req) = denied
 (req) if T (req) R(req) < 0
grant otherwise
(4.1)
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Policy ⇧ can be extended so to take into account the risk R(req) and the trustworthi-
ness T (req) of the request req as shown in Eq. 4.1 above If the authorization is not denied
by ⇧, the request is evaluated by comparing the risk R(req) with the trustworthiness
T (req). T (req) plays the role of a risk threshold (in practice, the maximum amount of
risk that a requester can take in a certain context). If T   R access is granted, otherwise it
cannot be granted as is. In the latter case, instead of denying access, the system may iden-
tify and propose an adjustment strategy   whose application meets the condition T   R.
Adjustment strategies can be either (i) risk mitigating, i.e. mitigation strategies whose
application decreases the risk R or (ii) trust enhancing, i.e. mitigation strategies whose
application increases the trustworthiness T . An example of risk mitigating strategies the
imposition of obligations of the handling of data e.g., retention period restricted to 2
hours. An example of trust enhancing strategies are the (temporary) privilege escalation
and provision of an additional, stronger proofs of identity (e.g. a two-factor authentica-
tion). In the next chapter (Chapter 5) we will present policy sample and describe how
di↵erent elements of Eq. 4.1 are implemented in the policy.
4.3.2 Modeling Trust
Trust is a wide concept, and di↵erent definitions have been proposed in literature [76].
To our scope, we can use the definition by McKnight and Chervany [105], which better
related to the concepts of utility and risk attitude. 2
Trust is the extent to which one party is willing to depend on something or
somebody in a given situation with a feeling of relative security, even though
negative consequences are possible.
In our case, we consider trust expressing the level of confidence the resource controller
has that a user u will not misuse the resource he/she wants to access. We expect this level
to depend on the user u (identity, role, and previous behavior) and in the given context
C (e.g., the device or system environment he is using).
Trust values are assigned in various ways depending on the specific use cases. For exam-
ple in reputation models, trust assessments from other entities are combined to compose a
trust evaluation, or in behavioral trust, a value is assigned based on the historical records
of transactions [76]. Trust can be also derived from assessing a set of trust indicators such
as security metrics (e.g., level of authentication) and from trust assertions (e.g. stamp of
approval) issued by trusted entities (i.e., certification authorities).
From the risk-based system point of view, the identity of the requester heavily depends
on the e↵ectiveness of the authentication mechanism employed. To take into account this,
the trustworthiness of user u in context C, say Te↵ (u, C), should take into account the
2A popular used definition is from Gambetta [61], which stresses the reliability aspects of trust. For a discussion see [76].
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possibility that the authentication is not carried out correctly (e.g., an identity theft
scenario). This situation can be modeled in our framework by replacing T (u, C) with
Teff (u, C) in Eq. 4.1, where
Teff (u) = T (u)(1  Pit) + T (u0 6= u)Pit (4.2)
where T (u0 6= u) is the Trust associated to any, not specified, other user that is not u, in
practice it should be zero or negligible and Pit is the probability of an identity theft. Pit
represents the strength of the authentication mechanisms.
4.3.3 Modeling Risk
Risk is defined by the likelihood and the impact of the occurrence of one or more a series
of failure scenarios s 2 S (also called risk scenarios). Although di↵erent quantitative risk
methodologies exist, see [31] and references therein, for independent scenarios as risk can
be computed by:
R(obj, p) =
X
s2S(C)
P (s)I(s)
where S is the set of possible failure scenarios related to the access of p in the context
C, P (s) is the probability of occurrence of the failure scenario s, and I(s) the associated
impact (often measured as monetary cost).
The risk exposure can be decreased implementing a set of controls and mechanisms,
and in this case, we refer it as residual risk. In addition, temporary risk mitigation strate-
gies can be applied to further reduce the risk. In case of access control, they include
for example, decreasing the probability of failure, by obfuscating (part of) the data (e.g.,
anonymization) or imposing usage control restrictions (e.g., data retention period); or
decreasing the impact, by insurance.
Eq. 4.1 implies that trust and risk are measured in the same units. Ideally, risk should
be measured in monetary units (since the impact is the cost of occurrence of a certain
scenario), and, accordingly, trust should have the same units, as in the previous exam-
ple for financial transactions. Unfortunately, estimating risk in information systems is
much less consolidated practice, due to: i) the limited availability of historical data on
failure scenarios, which makes di cult to estimate the corresponding probabilities. ii) the
di culty to estimate the impact of a failure to protect intangible digital assets.3
To overcome these problems, existing risk-based access control systems use various
approaches: they estimate these values from the parameters of traditional (non-risk based)
access control models (e.g., see [37] for multi-level security models), they use relative
3For these reasons, so far, most of the risk assessments for information system are qualitative, where probability and
impacts are classified in broad categories and no explicit numerical values are assigned (e.g., in many application of ISO
27005:2011 [74]).
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Figure 4.2: Architecture of the trust- and risk-based privacy-aware access control framework.
measures for both trust and risk (in practice they normalize these quantities in the interval
[0, 1], see [13]), or they use heuristics for estimating these numbers from qualitative risk
assessments [31].
In the sequel, to demonstrate our approach, we will consider a single risk factor related
to data privacy (re-identification risk). This allows us to compare trust, normalized in
the interval [0, 1], directly with the probability of the risk scenario. The model can clearly
include any other security risk factors, as far as a quantitative risk estimation is possible,
for example, deriving risk values from the rating of the Common Vulnerability Scoring
System (CVSS) [68].
4.4 Architecture
In this section, we present an abstract architecture for our trust- and risk-based access
control framework, and we explain the di↵erent steps of the data request evaluation work-
flow. Figure 4.2 depicts the four main modules of our framework:
Risk-Based Access Control Module. This module is the entry point of the frame-
work. It intercepts each data request to perform the access evaluation. Access will
be fully grant, partial/conditionally grant, or denied (see Eq. 4.1) following a risk-
based approach were the request risk and trustworthiness are assessed and compared,
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possibly after applying the adequate adjustment strategy (set of operations aiming
to lower risk and/or enhance trust).
This module is composed of three main components inspired by the XACML stan-
dard reference architecture4(PEP, PEP, and PIP), which we adapted to the risk-based
authorization model that requires more complex operations, such as risk and trust
assessment and adjustment. We call the modified components respectively RBA-EP
(Risk-Based Authorization - Evaluation Point), RBA-DP (Risk-Based Authorization
- Decision Point), and (Risk-Based Authorization - Information Point).
Risk Estimation module. This module is used to assess the level of risk, based on the
data requested, context and criteria defined in the risk estimator configuration. To
estimate risk, this module can require additional information about requester and
context from the RBA-IP.
Trust Estimation module. This module is used to assess the trust level of a request.
In particular based on user attributes like role, and past behavior. Trust computa-
tion can also take into account context attributes, for instance, in our case, access
context (purposes) e.g., access is requested for maintenance of a pattern, and security
context e.g., access is requested during a security alert.
Trust and Risk Adjustment module. This module is activated by the Risk-Based Ac-
cess Control module (more precisely by the RBA-EP) to adjust risk and/or trust levels,
when the access risk to the requested resource exceeds the trust level, in such a case,
two possible options are available:
• Decrease Risk: if this option is selected this module, first, produces an estimation
of the minimal transformation level to be applied in order to meet the required
risk level (e.g., the minimal level of obfuscation, generalization). Then, the
optimal risk mitigation operations are applied (e.g., access restrictions and usage
control operations, which decrease risk but minimize the information loss).
• Enhance Trust: the trustworthiness estimation can be increased in return for
the execution of certain operations. Before granting access to the resource (e.g.,
second-factor authentication) at the moment of the access (e.g., monitoring or
notifications) or when specific events occur after granting access; for example, in
4In the XACML3.0 (eXtensible Access Control Markup Language) standard [58] the PDP is the point that evaluates an
access request against an authorization policy and issues an access decision and the PEP Policy Enforcement Point is the
point that intercepts user’s request call the PDP for an access decision then enforce this decision by allowing or denying
the access. The PIP is the point that can be called to provide additional information about the resource, requester or
environment.
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usage control, we may prescribe the deletion of a resource after that a retention
period expires.
In Figure 4.3, we illustrate the interactions between di↵erent modules of the framework
during the request evaluation and decision enforcement: First, the Risk-Based Access
Control module, more precisely the RBA-EP, extracts the request target (i.e., resource,
subject/requester and environment/context attributes) and sends the information to the
RBA-DP for evaluation. The RBA-DP checks if there are any access policies/rules matching
this target in the Policy Repository. During the matching, the RBA-IP can be called to
resolve or provide more information about some attribute. If the matching fails (e.g.,
missing or unknown attributes) or if the target matches a policy denying the access to the
specific target (Blacklisted Target), a deny response is sent to the requester. If a match
is found and the policy does not explicitly deny access, we need to compare the risk and
trust levels to check if we should grant access or if we need to apply adjustments to these
levels (see 4.3.1 (Eq.4.1)). To this aim, the Risk-Based Access Control module calls the
Risk Estimation Module to determine the risk level of the request and the Trust Estimation
Module to determine the requester and context trust. Then, Trust and Risk Mitigation
Module enters into play to increase trust and/or reduce risk, if necessary, before granting
partial or conditional access to the resource. In the next chapter (Chapter 5) we will
provide a sample of risk-based policy and more description of the evaluation process in
the context of privacy.
4.5 Trust and Risk adjustment Strategies.
4.5.1 Risk Mitigation.
Risk can be mitigated by decreasing/limiting access to the resource. A possible way is
to limit the quantity of data accessed e.g., by removing confidential data. In the context
of data privacy, anonymization (see [41]) is a commonly used practice to reduce privacy
risks, by obfuscating partially or completely, the personally identifiable information in a
dataset. Other techniques can be used to lower the sensitivity of the data by increasing
the granularity of the sensitive information. We will further discuss these techniques in
the next chapter (Chapter 5, where we will focus on privacy risks.
4.5.2 Trust Enhancement.
Enhancing the trust results in raising the risk threshold and adopting a more permissive
evaluation. In return, proofs and/or guarantees limiting possible misuse scenarios must
be provided; for instance by asking the user to provide a stronger authentication to limit
the likelihood of an identity theft and temporarily increase the trust of a user Tuser, which
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Figure 4.3: Sequence of interactions in the trust- and risk-based access control framework.
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Table 4.2: Trust values in di↵erent contexts C
Context T (u,C)
C1: On premise 1.0
C2: Mobility (secure) 0.5
C3: Mobility (standard) 0.1
C4: Mobility (outside EU) 0.0
impacts the trust value according to Eq. 4.2. We can also provide restricted access to a
resource for a determined amount of time, then delete the resource (data), this represents
a change in the context and, accordingly, it increases Tcontext impacting the request trust
value as well.
4.5.3 Trust and risk adjustment by obligation.
Trust and risk adjustment strategies can be implemented in the form of access and usage
control obligations.
Obligations are actions or operations that must be carried out as result of an autho-
rization decision. In the standard XACML architecture [115], obligations are defined as
parts of policies and included in authorization responses created by the PDP; they are
enforced by the PEP on behalf of the subject issuing the authorization request. Besides
their application as an outcome of the authorization decisions, obligations may also be
applied during or after the consumption of a requested resource or the execution of a
requested operation [2, 114]: for example, a policy may state a specific retention period
for any copy of a resource whose access was granted to the requester. In these cases, a
trusted component must exist that is able to operate in real time as a PEP. This situation
is generally referred as Usage Control (UC) [136]. UC models and mechanisms have been
proposed to address confidentiality and privacy requirements [5], and applied to both the
cloud and the mobile environments [51, 129].
AC/UC policy definitions may comprise a broader set of directives, regulating runtime
aspects originated from an authorized access; for example, a policy may prescribe to mon-
itor the location where a mobile user consumes a resource and to react with a deletion
obligation in case the user leaves the country. Such capabilities are particularly useful to
achieve compliance with directives (law requirements or corporate policies): for example,
data privacy regulations introduced in Section 4.5 impose the application of certain prin-
ciples and UC can enforce automatically some aspects [155].
Therefore, the usage of obligations, when their enforcement is guaranteed, can be
considered as a means to enhance a request’s trust estimation in our proposed system.
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In fact, it can be assumed that prescriptions specified by a security policy are applied
and that they can regulate how resources or operations are used, thus ensuring their
compliance. For instance, in our use case (Section 4.2) the trust level could change with
the context as shown in Table 4.2. For the sake of simplicity we assume that trust
is independent from the specific user, i.e., T (u, C) = T (u0, C) for all contexts C and
users u and u0. In the for the most trusted environment (On-premise) we can thus have
T (u, C1) = 1. C2 refers a context of mobility inside the EU territories where the request is
issued from a secure device (e.g., a corporate smartphone or laptop). In addition, in this
environment, potential UC/AC obligations enforcement can be guaranteed. This context
has a trust level T (u, C1) = 0, 5. In C2 access is requested in mobility within EU from
a non-certified device (e.g., a personal smartphone). The security level of this device
is not verified and UC/AC obligations enforcement cannot be guaranteed. Therefore
T (u, C1) = 0.1 whereas for requests coming from outside the EU that cannot be trusted
and thus T (u, C4) = 0.
4.6 Application to the use case
We now show how our framework can support the scenarios introduced in Section 4.2 and
achieve the expected utility and security levels (see Table 4.1). In all scenarios considered,
we assume user Alice requests access to the data-view v presented in Table 4.3.
Table 4.3: HR report: original view
Name Job Location Salary
Timothy Lulic Senior Developer London 74200
Alice Salamon Support London 45000
Perry Coda Junior Developer London 52000
Tom Torreira Admin Milan 28000
Ron Savic Senior Developer Rome 66000
Omer Regini Senior Developer Shanghai 47000
Bob Eramo Support Macau 18000
Amber Mesb Admin Bangalore 30000
Elise Moisander Admin Bangalore 31000
We will now describe the evaluation results of this access request req(Alice, read, v, C)
in four di↵erent contexts C 2 {C1, C2, C3, C4} introduced in our use case (Section 4.2).
In Table 4.4 we report the initial request trust and risk ( T ⌘ TC and R ⌘ R(v, read, C))
for each of the four scenarios (i.e., each of the foure contexts C). we also report the
adjustment strategies applied in each scenario, the trust and risk values after adjustment
(T 0 ⌘ T 0C and R0 ⌘ R0(v, read, C)), and finally the access decision.
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Table 4.4: Trust and Risk adjustment strategies applied to the request req(Alice, read, v, C)
Context T R Adjustment T 0 R0 Decision
C1 1.0 1 None needed - - Allow
C2 0.5 1
Prevent sharing,
Delete after 2 hours,
Generalize to country level
0.75 0.75 Allow
C3 0.1 1
Generalize to regional level
Decrease the sensitivity
0.1 0.1 Allow
C4 0.0 1 None possible - - Deny
Scenario #1: Access from business environment. In the first scenario, Alice asks for the
HR report from a business environment. The Risk Estimation module is called to estimate
the access risk associated with the request req1 = (Alice, read, v, C1) set: R(v, read, C1) =
1, since the report contains personal data with an elevate likelihood of re-identifying
individuals as well as learning a sensitive information (i.e., salary) about them. Alice
is a trusted actor and she authorized by a security policy to perform this operation,
therefore we will consider her from here on, for simplicity sake, we will consider her fully
trusted and consider the context trust as request trust T (Alice, C) = TC . The Trust
Estimation module, in turn, computes the trust associated to the context where the
request is originated: TC1 = 1, since Alice is in her o ce. Therefore, Auth(req1) = Allow
and access is granted with no need to apply any adjustment operation.
Scenario #2: Access, in mobility, from EU using corporate smartphone. Since the request
is performed in mobility TC2 = 0.5 and while R(v, read, C2) = 1. The Trust and Risk
Adjustment module then triggers the trust enhancement and risk mitigation strategies.
Specific AC/UC obligations are thus assigned to the report (e.g., do not share, delete after
2 hours, only usable in EU) to be enforced by an obligation enforcement engine deployed
on the corporate smartphone. The application of these measures increases the trust in
the context to T 0C2 = 0.75. To decrease risk, generalizing the report to country level (by
obfuscating the identity of the employees) allows to reduce the re-identification risk to
0.755. Therefore, Auth(req02) = Allow (req
0
2 = (Alice, read, v2, C2)) and Alice receives
the generalized view (v2) of Table 4.5.
Scenario #3: Access, in mobility, from EU using personal smartphone. This scenario
is similar to the previous one, with the notable exception that now no trust enhancing
measures can be enforced on the mobile phone. Therefore, the Trust and Risk Adjustment
5risk in this example was assessed based on the re-identification risk and the sensitivity of the information that will be
further explained in Chapter 5, in the next chapter (Chapter 5) we will provide more details about how we compute this
risk using well-known privacy metrics such as k-anonymity
67
CHAPTER 4. TRUST- AND RISK-BASED ACCESS CONTROL
Table 4.5: HR report v2: anonymized (country level).
Name Job Location Salary
*** *** UK 74200
*** *** UK 45000
*** *** Italy 52000
*** *** Italy 28000
*** *** Italy 66000
*** *** China 47000
*** *** China 18000
*** *** India 30000
*** *** India 31000
module can only apply the risk mitigation strategy. By generalizing the report to regional
level and decreasing the granularity/sensitivity of the salaries to salary ranges the risk is
mitigated to 0.1. The trust of the request considering the context C3, is TC3 = 0.1 (see
Table 4.1 access though personal smartphone), and thus after adjustment Auth(req03) =
Allow (req03 = (Alice, read, v3, C3)). The report (data view v3) received by Alice in this
scenario is given in Table 4.6.
Table 4.6: HR report v3: anonymized (region level) and salary ranges.
Name Job Location Salary
*** *** EMEA [71k-90k]
*** *** EMEA [31k-50k]
*** *** EMEA [51k-70k]
*** *** EMEA [10k-30k]
*** *** EMEA [51k-70k]
*** *** APAC [31k-50k]
*** *** APAC [10k-30k]
*** *** APAC [10k-30k]
*** *** APAC [31k-50k]
Scenario #4: Access in mobility from outside EU with personal smartphone. In this
case, the risk of violating the regulations is maximum. This means that the trust in the
environment is 0, no mitigation strategies may be adopted and therefore TC4 = 0 (request
from outside EU), R(v, read, C3) = 1, and thus for the request req4 = (Alice, read, v, C4)
the decision is Auth(req4) = Deny.
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4.7 Chapter conclusions
Motivated by the need to balance the advantages of big data availability, and stringent
security and confidentiality requirements, novel access control paradigms are emerging.
Risk plays a central role, and access control decisions can mimic the business decision
process, where risk is assessed relatively to trust. In this chapter, we proposed a novel
access control framework based on these two factors (trust and risk) and showed that it
can address complex authorization requirements by dynamically applying strategies for
risk mitigation and trust enhancement. The possibility to play with both risk and trust
at the same time and its application to a real use case are the main novelties of our work.
Our approach, although promising still faces a number of open issues. In particular, the
overall approach (as for any quantitative risk model) relies on the numerical estimation
of risk and trust which are di cult to compute [16, 111]. Indeed, the diversity of risk
scenarios, the intangible nature of trust, and the limited amount of historical data for
incidents makes an accurate quantitative assessment extremely di cult.
In The next chapter, we will adapt our risk-based access control approach to the context
of data privacy. Moreover, we will propose to measure the trust and risk values using some
domain-specific heuristics. Using these heuristics we will show how it is possible to derive
sound relative estimation (i.e., using dimensionless units) for trust and risk (for a specific
usage scenario).
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Chapter 5
Privacy-aware risk-based access
control
Several risk-based access control models were recently proposed to address flexi-
bility issues in traditional access control models. However, very little attention
was given to privacy. For instance, if we take the case of querying databases
containing personal and sensitive information, the current practice is to adopt
restrictive approaches, reluctant to take any risks, to avoid the disclosure of
any sensitive information. These approaches ensure privacy but they o↵er very
limited access to the data, which does not fit any more in the new data-driven
environment where companies and organizations evolve.
These issues can be addressed using the risk-based access control approach we
propose in the previous chapter. In fact our model enhances data exploitation
by adopting a flexible risk management, however, our model (more specifically
the risk assessment model and risk and trust adjustment strategies) needs to be
adapted to the context of data privacy.
In this privacy-aware model, we propose to assess the privacy risk using well-
known privacy metrics. Indeed there are two main categories of approaches to
assess and handle data privacy in the literature, the “ syntactic approaches” and
“ di↵erential privacy”. Each category has several advantages and a number of
issues, but both categories are equally interesting for us since they cover two
di↵erent areas. Syntactic metrics are more suited in the context of Privacy-
Preserving Data Publishing (PPDP) whereas di↵erential privacy is typically used
for Privacy-Preserving Data Mining (PPDM).
In this chapter, we will focus on a privacy-aware risk-based access control model
using syntactic anonymity for privacy risk assessment and mitigation (a model
using di↵erential privacy will be discussed in another chapter). We will design
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two frameworks following this model, the first implemented on top of a role-based
access control model (RBAC) and the second using the attribute-based access
control (ABAC). Then we will show how the two frameworks can simultaneously
address both the privacy and the utility requirements in two di↵erent industrial
case studies. The experimental results presented at the end of this chapter prove
that this approach leads to meaningful results, and real-time performance, within
both case studies.
5.1 Introduction
Increasingly sophisticated analytic tools invade modern workplaces. These tools collect a
large verity of data on employees, partners and clients to di↵erent purposes spanning from
workforce intelligence (e.g., optimized recruiting, talent management, turnover impact as-
sessment) to cybersecurity (e.g., next-generation firewalls, security information and event
management systems ). Although extremely useful, sometimes, vital to the organization,
these tools often raise numerous ethical privacy issues [26] since the data collected often
contain sensitive and personal information. Therefore access should be limited to the
data relevant to the task at hand as mandated by data protection regulations. To this
end, data need to be pre-processed to eliminate or obfuscate the sensitive information.
Additional security/accountability measures may be also applied to reduce the privacy
risk, such as logging the access to the personal data or imposing deletion obligations.
Anonymization is a commonly used practice to reduce privacy risk, obfuscating, in
part or completely, the personal identifiable information in a dataset. Anonymization
methods include [41]: suppressing part of or entire records; generalizing the data, i.e.,
recoding variables into broader classes (e.g., releasing only the first two digits of the zip
code) or rounding/clustering numerical data; replacing identifiers with random values
(e.g., replacing a real name with a randomly chosen one).
Anonymization increases protection, by lowering the privacy risk, and enables a wider
exploitation of the data. However, anonymization techniques should be carefully applied
since they clearly impact the quality (utility) of the data. Accordingly, di↵erent level
of anonymization should be considered depending on a number of factors, often known
at run-time only, such as the trustworthiness of the requester or security context of the
query.
In this Chapter, we propose and demonstrate a privacy-aware risk-based access control
framework, which addresses the concerns described above. This framework is an adap-
tation of the risk-based access control model proposed in the previous chapter, to the
privacy context. In our framework, access-control decisions are based on the privacy risk
level associated with a data access request. This risk level is dynamically evaluated using
widely used privacy metrics (e.g., k-anonymity). and (if needed) anonymization is applied
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on the specific resulting data set.
The inclusion of on-the-fly anonymization allows for extending access to the data, still
preserving privacy below the maximum tolerable risk. Risk thresholds can be adapted
to the trustworthiness of the requester role, so a single access control framework can
support multiple data access use cases, ranging from sharing data among a restricted
(highly trusted) group to public release (low trust value). Besides trust enhancement
strategies can be applied to o↵er further flexibility in very delicate contexts (e.g., a security
emergency, medical emergency) in return further guarantees should be supplied to ensure
the leaked data will not be misused.
In addition to its flexibility, the proposed approach has a number of other advantages:
1. it provides a simple framework to address the, often conflicting, privacy and utility
requirements;
2. it allows to easily set the risk and trust levels, and configure the adjustment strategy
to meet the priorities of the organization (e.g., optimize utility or performance goals).
3. it can be easily integrated to widely used access control systems such as RBAC and
ABAC.
To evaluate the feasibility and e↵ectiveness of this approach we selected two cases
studies namely “HR information disclosure” and “Privacy aware threat investigation”.
We developed two prototypes based on a slightly di↵erent version of the framework and
run a set of experiments on each implementation.
In the first case study, we simulate the behavior of our framework in a scenario of an
employee survey results dissemination. Then we assess the performance and impacts on
the utility of a first version of the prototype by running a number of queries against the
Adult DataSet from the UCI Machine Learning Repository, a publicly available dataset
that is widely used by the research community. The experimental results were encouraging
and confirm the feasibility of our proposed approach.
The second cases study (Privacy aware threat investigation) addresses the exploitation
of employees network and system logs in the context of cybersecurity. In fact, due to the
increasing complexity and variety of attacks, modern Threat Detection Systems (TDS)
are becoming more sophisticated and data-intensive. They leverage the correlation of
security events from several logs (collected from di↵erent sources in the organization’s
information system) to detect and prevent cyber attacks [123,168]. This is typically done
in two main steps: an automatic pattern or anomaly detection phase which highlights
suspicious events followed by a detailed investigation carried out by a human expert who
must decide whether the anomalous pattern corresponds to an actual attack. In this
second phase, the expert must often inspect the raw data (log files) that triggered the
alert.
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Although the security investigation can constitute a legitimate purpose for their pro-
cessing of the log data, whenever they contain sensitive or personal information (e.g., user
ids, IP addresses, logins) access must be restricted on need-to-know bases. Therefore data
must be anonymized to obfuscate those elements that are not strictly necessary for the
task at hand. However, the application of anonymization techniques can deteriorate the
quality or utility of the data. Although some analytics can still be run on anonymized log
data [87], in many cases the anonymization a↵ects the quality of results and, ultimately,
decreases the ability to detect and react to cyber threats. By using our framework to
control the data leakages, we do not require an a priori risk mitigation measure anymore,
i.e., o↵-line, anonymization of the data sources. The automatic pattern detection phase
uses the original data set, and anonymization is applied only if a subsequent, human-based
analysis is needed on the resulting data.
In the next section (Section 5.2), we present the privacy-aware model. Section 5.3
we will describe the HR information disclosure case study and show how the framework
can be combined with an RBAC access control model and applied to this case study. In
Section 5.4 we report some preliminary results of the performance and impact on data
quality of this model. In Section 5.5 we describe the second case study (i.e.,Privacy aware
threat investigation) . In this second case study, our model is implemented on top of an
attribute-based access control model. Section 5.6 discusses the results of an experimental
evaluation of the proposed approach in terms of performance, scalability, and data utility
(after anonymization). We describe in Section 5.7 how risk- based authorizations can be
expressed through attribute-based policies and we provide some policy examples Lastly,
we conclude in Section 5.8 with some final remarks.
5.2 Privacy-aware risk-based access control
In the privacy-aware risk-based access control we propose the access requests are assessed
according to the authorization function we defined Eq. 4.1 the last chapter (Chapter 4).
Auth⇧(req) =
8>><>>:
deny if ⇧(req) = denied
 (req) if T (req) R(req) < 0
grant otherwise
We will, however, introduce and use a risk model R, a trust model T , and a set of trust
and risk adjustment strategies   specific to the context of data privacy. In the following
sections, we will start by introducing privacy concepts that will be used in risk assessment
and mitigation. Then we will refine the risk and trust model based on these concepts.
finally, we will discuss some privacy preserving adjustment techniques.
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5.2.1 Risk Model
As mentioned in the previous chapter, risk can be expressed in terms the likelihood of
the occurrence of certain (negative) events system and the (negative) impact of these
events [60]. In this chapter, we focus on the risk associated with privacy breaches in
information systems. Privacy breaches are often associated with individual identifiability,
used in most data protection privacy laws (e.g., the EU data protection directive [59],
the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) [141]). To prevent
individual identifiability the regulation requires that disclosed information (alone or in
combination with reasonably available information from other sources or auxiliary infor-
mation [116]) guarantee a certain level of anonymity i.e., it should not allow an intruder
to identify individuals in a dataset (identity disclosure) or to learn private/sensitive infor-
mation about individuals (attribute disclosure) with a very high probability or confidence
(see [148,158]).
To quantify the level of anonymity of a respondent in a dataset, various syntactic
anonymity metrics have been proposed in the literature (see [21, 43] for a review), the
most popular being k-anonymity [134], `-diversity [99], and t-closeness [93]. These metrics
di↵er in a number of ways, but they all express the risk of disclosing personal-identifiable
information when granting access to a given dataset.
Assuming a data represented as a relational table, called private table, where each
record in the table is relative to a specific respondent, the above anonymity metrics propose
to classify attributes (columns) in the table as follows:
• Identifiers. These are data attributes that can uniquely identify individuals. Exam-
ples of identifiers are the Social Security Number, the passport number, the complete
name.
• Quasi-identifiers (QIs) or key attributes [47]. These are the attributes that, when
combined, can be used to identify an individual. Examples of QIs are the postal
code, age, job function, gender, etc.
• Sensitive attributes. These attributes contain intrinsically sensitive information about
an individual (e.g., diseases, political or religious views, income) or business (e.g.,
salary figures, restricted financial data or sensitive survey answers).
The k-anonymity condition requires that every combination of QIs is shared by at least
k records in the dataset. A large k value indicates that the dataset has a low identity
privacy risk, because, at best, an attacker has a probability 1/k to re-identify a record
(i.e., associate the sensitive attribute of a record to the identity of a respondent). Consider
now a table with a group of k records sharing the same combination of quasi-identifiers
have the same sensitive attribute. Even if the attacker is unable to re-identify the record,
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he can discover the sensitive information (attribute disclosure). The `-diversity metrics
was introduced to capture this type of risk. It requires that for every combination of key
attributes there should be at least ` values for each confidential attribute. Although the
`-diversity condition prevents the attacker from inferring exactly the sensitive attributes,
he may still learn a considerable amount of probabilistic information: if the distribution
of confidential attributes within a group sharing the same key attributes is very dissimilar
from the distribution over the whole set, an attacker may increase his knowledge on
sensitive attributes (skewness attack, see [93] for details). To overcome the problem,
t-closeness estimates this risk by computing the distance between the distribution of
confidential attributes within the group and in the entire dataset. These measures provide
a quantitative assessment of the di↵erent risks associated to data release, and each of them
(or a combination thereof) can be applied to estimate privacy risk depending on the use
case at hand.
In this chapter, we will use k-anonymity as anonymity metrics to present our ideas,
but it must be emphasized that the approach can easily be adapted to use alternative
metrics (including `-diversity and t-closeness).
In presence of identifiers the re-identification likelihood (Lid) is clearly maximum (i.e.,
Lid = 1), but even if identifiers are removed, the combination of QIs can lead to the
identification of individuals and this implies a high risk. The k-anonymity condition
requires that every combination of QIs is shared by at least k records in the dataset. A
large k value indicates that the dataset has a low re-identification risk because an attacker
has a probability Lid = 1/k to re-identify a data entry (i.e., associate the sensitive attribute
of a record to the identity of a User). Therefore, the (re-identification) risk related to a
k-anonymous data-view v is:
R(v) = Lid(v)⇥ I(v)
where I is the impact associated with the identification of the respondents in the dataset.
The severity of the impact is often evaluated in terms of monetary cost but it can also
be assessed by assigning severity levels (e.g., spanning from minimal to critical). In this
paper we will evaluate the impact in the interval [0, 1], where 0 is minimal impact and 1
is maximal impacts. For the sake of simplicity, we will set the impact I = 1 and consider
the risk R(v) = Lid(v) this will allow us to normalize the risk and the trust values to [0, 1]
(as we discuss in the previous chapter).
5.2.2 Trust Model
In a general context we defined the trustworthiness as the confidence we have that a
requester will not misuse the resource they are granted access to (see Chapter 4, Section 4.3
for more details). In our framework trust plays the role of a risk threshold: trusted users
76
5.2. PRIVACY-AWARE RISK-BASED ACCESS CONTROL
are allowed to take large risks.1
We will use this definition as well in the context of data privacy, the risk threshold
should be set to ensure a requester will not use the data leaked to violate the privacy
of a respondent. Consequently, the trustworthiness of a request should reflect the set of
parameters that will ensure a requester/an access context is not violating privacy.
Among these parameters we can name for requester (Tuser(u)): requester behavior
(with precedent accesses), requester seniority in a position and rank in a hierarchy2, her
experience and training in dealing with private data. The requester competence and tasks
are also a very important parameter to take into consideration. Indeed Following the data
minimization policy, the requester should have enough trust to access the resources (data)
needed to the fulfill a set tasks she is expected to fulfill according to her role/competence.
In the two use cases Sections 5.3 and 5.5 we will see some examples of how we assess Tuser
taking into consideration these parameters.
Regarding the request’s context trust (Tcontext(C)): This trust value should (among
others) reflect the level of safety of the environment in which the data will be released.
This could depend on the device used to request access, the communication protocols
etc. In addition, the urgency of the context the data is requested in (e.g., a cybersecurity
emergency, medical emergency) can justify the need to access (or access more) data.
Therefore in such contexts, the request trust is expected to be higher, and this is justified
by a stronger need-to-know requirement.
For example the case study “Privacy-aware threat investigation” Section 5.5,we con-
sider two main tasks namely “Perform Maintenance and Improvement tasks” and “Re-
act to a Security Incident”. The first task is expected to be regularly carried, and it
is not linked to a security alert thus the access context is a noAlert context with a
Tcontext(noAlert)). The task “React to a Security Incident”, instead,o be fulfilled in the
context of Alert when a security threat of anomaly is found. This context has the trust
level Tcontext(Alert)). It is easy to see that the two contexts have di↵erent access require-
ments. Indeed, in the latter, the need to react to a security threat overcomes the privacy
requirements. The request could be granted access to sensitive data and therefore can be
given a higher level of trust Tcontext(Alert)   Tcontext(noAlert).
To compute the request trustworthiness (total trust value) we can use the approach for
multi-dimensions trust computation proposed in [95], where the total trust is computed
as a weighted sum of trust factor values.
T =
nX
i=1
Wi ⇥ Ti( i)
where  i, Ti(), and Wi is a trust factor, a trust function and the weight of the i-th trust
1See [76] for a survey of di↵erent approaches to defining trust.
2See [45,117] for a review on trust factors in the organizational context.
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factor for i = 1, . . . , n respectively, subject to the constraint
nP
i=1
Wi = 1. In our case,
n = 2 and we can express our total trust value as:
T (q) = W ⇥ Tuser(u) + (1 W )⇥ Tcontext(c)
5.2.3 Trust and Risk adjustment strategies
We presented the general idea of trust and risk adjustment in the previous chapter (Chap-
ter 4 in Section 4.5) as well as some techniques used to decrease risk level and/or increase
trust. In the following, we will provide more detailed about risk mitigation and trust
enhancement that could be used in the context of data privacy. we will also discuss the
e↵ects of some of these techniques.
Risk mitigation. A possible way to decrease the privacy risk is anonymization (this en-
ables to lower the likelihood of re-identification of respondents in a dataset). Anonymiza-
tion can be achieved through obfuscating, in part or completely, the personal identifiable
information in a dataset. Anonymization methods include [41]:
• Suppression: Removal of certain records or part of these records (columns, tuples,
etc., such name/last name column);
• Generalization: Recoding data into broader classes (e.g., releasing only the first two
digits of the zip code or replacing towns with country or regions) or by rounding/-
clustering numerical data;
Besides anonymization other operation can be applied to the data, before its release, to
reduce the privacy risk. Among these operations we can mention:
• Data perturbation: can be partial (e.g., for instance in IP addresses we can pertur-
bation the machine address and preserve the network address) or total. It can be
achieved through randomization or noise addition
• Pseudonymization: is a technique where identifying information are replaced by one
or more artificial values or pseudonyms. Real information and pseudonyms can have
a one-to-one mapping or in a more sophisticated way, the identifying information can
have several pseudonyms to avoid linking several records to the same individual (same
pseudonym). Pseudonymization can also be static meaning that the pseudonyms are
set for the whole lifetime of a data set, or dynamic in which case pseudonyms are
cyclically replaced after a period of time.
The risk mitigation operations (mentioned above) has an important computational
overhead (besides other e↵ects that we will discuss later) and therefore they are usually
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run o✏ine. However new technologies and products proposed more recently would facil-
itate the implementation of an on-the-fly, flexible privacy risk mitigation. Among these
products, we can find the in-memory databases combined with column-store optimized
algorithms provided by SAP Hana that can be easily integrated with new data-intensive
business applications.
Trust enhancement. As mentioned in the previous chapter, trust enhancement will result
in increasing the risk threshold and consequently exposing more data (more sensitive
data). Therefore trust enhancement operations in the context of privacy need to ensure
that the exposed data is processed in compliance the legal requirements. For instance,
logging and monitoring access might be used to enhance “user trust” (Tuser). Usage control
operations controlling the retention period and ensuring the deletion of data can be used
to enhance the “context trust” (Tcontext). The “context trust” can also be enhanced by
informing respondents that their data will be logged and processed, specifying the access
purpose to them, and if needed requesting their consent.
Adjustment strategies selection. It must be noted that adjustment strategies normally
bring some negative side e↵ects. For example, anonymization degrades data quality and
this may a↵ect its utility. Privilege escalation can increase the complexity of the secu-
rity governance. Thus to identify the best adjustment strategy it is necessary to strike
a balance between the advantages brought by the application of the strategy and the
associated side e↵ects.
For instance, if we focus on data access and privacy risk and limit the adjustment
strategies to anonymization, then we can find an optimal anonymization strategy  ˆ, among
all the possible anonymization strategies, that allows for data access reducing risk (so
fulfilling Eq. 4.1) and, at the same time, maximizing the utility after application of the
strategy. This can be expressed as a utility-privacy optimization problem:
 ˆ = argmax
 
U(obj0)
s.t. req0 =  (req) and R(req0)  T (req0)
where obj0 denotes the resource in the request generated by the adjustment strategy,
i.e. req0 = (u0, a0, obj0, C 0).
In practice, the number of mitigation strategies is often very limited. The optimiza-
tion problem is therefore reduced to testing a small set of anonymization strategies and
estimating (either on the basis of numerical thresholds or expert assessment) if the utility
of the result is su cient for the business task under consideration. If this is not the case,
trust enhancement mechanism can be triggered.
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5.3 HR information disclosure
In this section we propose a privacy-aware risk-based access control designed on top the
RBAC model, to manage privacy preserving HR information release in a corporate envi-
ronment. First we will present an case study describing the specificity of this environment.
Then we will describe the Privacy-aware Risk-based RBAC framework and show how our
framework can address issues described in the case study.
5.3.1 Employee survey use case
Employee surveys are a widely used instrument for organizations to assess job satisfac-
tion, quality of management, people motivation, etc. Considering the possible sensitiv-
ity of data, surveys should be anonymous, meaning that the organization and manage-
ment should not be able to identify how a specific employee responded. Usually, the
organization—say, a large company—conducting the survey outsources the data collec-
tion to a third-party. When processing the data, the third-party has access to individual-
level information, whereas the same data is not accessible to the company. To protect
the anonymity of the survey, the company can access the data under the condition that
(i) identifiers are removed and (ii) the number of respondents is larger than a certain
threshold (usually between 10 and 25). Di↵erent splits of data can be requested (e.g., per
organization, per job profile, etc.), but data are accessible only if the query results contains
a number of respondents that is larger than the fixed threshold. On top of that, addi-
tional access control rule can be enforced, e.g., a manager would only see data referring
to his/her team or department (provided that conditions (i) and (ii) are also fulfilled); an
employee would be allowed to see overall (company results) only. As an example, consider
a question like “Do you respect your manager as a competent professional?” with a five
points scale (1 to 5). A manager could see the response of his/her team if at least, say, 10
people answered to it. If the manager decides to refine the analysis asking for data related
to the people in his/her team AND with a “developer” role, again the response should be
made available only if at least 10 respondents with that role answered to the question.3
Current systems typically do not provide any data if the number of respondents is below
the defined thresholds (for the specific role). In other words, in order to avoid the risk
of disclosing too much information, an overly conservative approach is taken and risky
queries are not permitted altogether. Ideally, the access control system should be able to
provide the largest possible amount of information (still preserving anonymity) for any
query. In practice, in presence of queries that might cause anonymity issues (i.e., not
enough respondents, or more generally, too small a result set), the system should be able
3In real surveys single records are actually never shown, but just percentages, in this example it would be something
like 10% answered 1, 25% answered 2, etc. Since the number of respondents is known, in practice, for one question, this
equivalent of getting the data with no identifiers.
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to quantify the disclosure risk associated with the query and compare it with whatever
risk level has been set as the acceptable threshold. If the threshold is exceeded, the system
could apply, for example, a “generalization” operation (making the query less specific),
thus increasing the cardinality of the result set and reducing the risk of disclosing the
identity of respondents. Of course, applying such an operation would not yield the exact
data set the user asked for, but this method would: 1) provide some relevant (i.e., as close
as possible to the original query) information to the user, and 2) preserve anonymity
according to some pre-defined disclosure-risk levels (possibly linked to the requestor trust
or role). In the next sections,we discuss how to implement such a system using risk-based
access control, and anonymization mitigation strategies.
5.3.2 Privacy-aware Risk-based RBAC model
In this section we show how we can integrate our Privacy-aware risk-based approach in a
Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) model. This integration is inspired by the Risk-Aware
Role-Based Access Control (R2BAC) that has been introduced in [34,35].
Risk-Aware Role-Based Access Control. The R2BAC model consists of the following com-
ponents:
• a set of users U ;
• a set of permissions P , usually representing action-object pairs;
• a set of access requests Q, modeled as pairs of the form (u, p) for u 2 U and p 2 P ;
• a set of risk mitigation methods M, i.e., actions that are required to be executed to
mitigate risk;
• a function   mapping permissions into risk mitigation strategies, i.e., lists of the form
[(l0,M0), (l1,M1), . . . , (ln 1,Mn 1), (ln,Mn)], where 0 = l0 < l1 < · · · < ln 1 < ln  1
and Mi 2M for i = 0, . . . , n;
• a set of states ⌃, i.e., tuples of the form (U, P,  , ⇡) where ⇡ abstracts further specific
features of the state; for instance, in the Risk-Aware Role-Based Access Control
(R2BAC) model [34], ⇡ comprises the set of rolesR, the user-role assignment relation
UA ✓ U⇥R, the role-permission assignment relation PA ✓ P⇥R, the role hierarchy
⌫✓ R⇥R.
• a Risk function: risk : Q⇥ ! [0..1] such that risk(q,  ) denotes the risk associated
to granting q in state  ;
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• an Authorization function Auth : Q⇥ ! D⇥2M with D = {allow, deny} such that
if q = (u, p) and  (p) = [(l0,M0), . . . , (ln,Mn)], and   the current state, then
Auth(q,  ) =
(
(di,Mi) if risk(q,  ) 2 [li, li+1), i < n,
(dn,Mn) otherwise
where di 2 D. Intuitively, if the risk associated with access request (u, p) is l,
then Auth returns an authorization decision and a set of risk mitigation methods
corresponding to the interval containing l.
Privacy-aware Risk-based RBAC. In this paragraph we describe our Privacy-aware Risk-
based RBAC framework, we highlight the main di↵erences with chen and cramptons
model [34], and show how our model can be mapped to the general risk-based model
presented in Section 4.3. Let V be a set of database views (or virtual tables). If v is a view,
then |v| denotes the anonymity of v according to some given metrics (e.g. k-anonymity).
The higher is the value of |v|, the smaller is the risk to disclose sensitive information by
releasing v. Thus, for instance, we can define the (privacy) risk of disclosing p to be 1/|v|
and the (privacy) risk of disclosing v to u in   = (U,V ,  , ⇡) to be
risk (u, v) =
(
1 if not granted⇡(u, v)
1/|v| otherwise (5.1)
where granted⇡(u, v) holds if and only if u is granted access to v according to ⇡. For
instance, if ⇡ is an RBAC policy (U,R, P, UA,RA,⌫), then granted⇡(u, v) holds if and
only if there exist r, r0 2 R such that (u, r) 2 UA, r ⌫ r0, and (p, r0) 2 PA. Note that
the p 2 P is the permission to perform an action a on a data-view v (p = (a, v)). In this
chapter we are only interested in the action read from the view v: For simplicity sake,
from here on, we will use v to represent both the data-view an the permission (read, v).
When the risk associated to the disclosure of a certain view v 2 V is greater than
the maximal accepted risk t, we can use obligations for obfuscating or redacting the view
and thus bring the risk below t. In this paper we consider k-anonymization functions
 k : V ! V for k 2 N as risk mitigation methods, but functions based on other metrics
can be used as well. Clearly | k(v)|   k for all v 2 V . We then consider risk mitigation
strategies of the form  (v) = [(0, ◆), (t, d1/te(.))], where ◆ : V ! V is the identity function
(i.e., such that ◆(v) = v for all v 2 V) and the following authorization decision function:
Auth (u, v) =
(
(allow, d1/te(·)) if risk(u, v)   t
(allow, ◆) if risk(u, v) < t
(5.2)
Auth always grants access but yields an anonymized version of the requested view if the
risk is greater that the maximal accepted risk t. In other words, if user u asks to access
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v, then access to v is granted unconditionally if risk(u, v) < t, otherwise an anonymized
version of v, say  d1/te(v), is computed and returned to u.
This authorization function is easy to map with the general risk-based access control
authorization formula (presented in Chapter 4 in Eq. 4.1). The main di↵erence is that in
Eq. 5.2 we do have a deny outcome. As discussed in Section 4.3 in RBAC it is not possible
to explicitly deny access through the access policy (unlike other models e.g., attribut based
access control ABAC, ACLs). However access is denied if it is not explicitly granted by
a policy. following this traditional approach we can add a third case to Eq. 5.2 where
Auth (u, v) = (deny) if not granted⇡(u, v). In this case there is no need to compute the
request risk if it is not granted by the policy. Which may o↵er a high level of protection
but restricts access to a predefined set of users.
example 7. To illustrate assume Alice asks for a view v1 such that |v1| = 4 and that
 (v1) = [(0, ◆), (t, d1/te(.))] with t = 0.1, i.e.  (v1) = [(0, ◆), (0.1, 10(.))]. It is easy to see
that risk(Alice, v1) = 0.25 and that Auth((Alice, v1),  ) =  10(v1). Alice then asks for
a view v2 such that |v2| = 20 and that  (v2) =  (v1) = [(0, ◆), (t, d1/te(.))] with t = 0.1,
i.e.  (v2) = [(0, ◆), (0.1, 10(.))]. It is easy to see that now risk(Alice, v2) = 0.05 and
therefore that Auth((Alice, v2),  ) = ◆(v1) = v1.
The following results state that the risk of disclosing the view returned by our autho-
rization decision function is never greater than the maximum accepted risk.
In many situations of practical interest, we want the risk threshold t to depend on the
trustworthiness trust(u, v) of the query q = (u, v). With trust : U ⇥R⇥ P ! (0..1] is a
function that assigns a trust value to users. In the context of RBAC, roles correspond to
job functions, it is natural to assign trust to roles and to derive the trust of a user from
the trust assigned to the roles assigned to that user in the following way:
trust(u) = max{trust(r0) : (p, r0) 2 PA and 9r ⌫ r0 s.t. (u, r) 2 UA}.
5.3.3 Application of the model
We now show how our privacy-aware risk-based RBAC model can be used to support
the case study of Section 5.3.1. This will be done by setting appropriate values to the
parameters occurring in the definition of the risk function (5.1).
For sake of simplicity we consider a small company, with 8 employees and one manager.
The company runs an employee survey, with one single question with answer ranging in
a five points scale (from 1 to 5) (sensitive attribute, cf. Section 5.2.1), and collecting
user names4 (the identifiers), as well as the job title and the location of the o ce (the
quasi-identifiers). The actual dataset is in Table 5.1(a).
4In real cases they are typically user IDs
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Table 5.1: The Employee Survey Example
(a) Original dataset
Survey Administrator view
|vall| = 1
Name Job Location Answer
Timothy SeniorDeveloper Houston 4
Alice Support Houston 5
Perry JuniorDeveloper Rome 5
Tom Admin Rome 3
Ron SeniorDeveloper London 4
Omer JuniorDeveloper London 4
Bob Support Houston 5
Amber Admin Houston 3
(b) Anonymized version: identifiers and quasi-
identifiers are suppressed
Employee View
|vsupp| = 8
Name Job Location Answer
*** *** *** 4
*** *** *** 5
*** *** *** 5
*** *** *** 3
*** *** *** 4
*** *** *** 4
*** *** *** 5
*** *** *** 3
The outsourcing company collecting the data is considered fully trusted and will there-
fore have access to all the information. We model this by setting the trust of the admin
role to 1, i.e. trust(admin) = 1. Thus, an administrator can access the original dataset,
say vall with anonymity |vall| = 1 (i.e., all distinct values, see Table 5.1(a)). If we set the
trust value of the manager role to 0.35, i.e. trust(manager) = 0.35 (corresponding to ac-
cess views with anonymity k   3), than a manager cannot access vall as is, since 1 > 0.35
and some anonymization, as risk mitigation strategy, must be carried out on the data to
decrease the risk. For example, if we suppress the identifier attribute (Name) and the
quasi-identifiers (Job and Location), we obtain the view vsupp shown in Table 5.1(b). The
view vsupp corresponds to an anonymity level |vsupp| = 8 and since 0.125 < 0.35, access
is granted to the manager.5 The manager can also ask for more granular views of the
Table 5.2: Views of the employee survey for the Rome location
(a) Before generalization.
View: Location=Rome, |vRome| = 2
Name Job Location Answer
*** *** Rome 5
*** *** Rome 3
(b) After generalization
View: Location=Rome
Anoymized |vEMEA| = 4
Name Job Location Answer
*** *** EMEA 5
*** *** EMEA 3
*** *** EMEA 4
*** *** EMEA 4
results. For example, if she wants to know the distribution of the answers in one location,
say Houston, |vHoust| = 4, the risk 0.25 < 0.35 is still smaller than the trust. On the other
5In real surveys the result will appear as a report like: 37.5% answered 5, 37.5% answered 4 and 25% answered 3. For a
single question this is equivalent to the view in Table 5.1(b).
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hand, if she asks for the result in Rome, |vRome| = 2, then the risk associated with the view
for the manager is 0.5 > 0.35 and the access is granted only if appropriate anonymiza-
tion is performed. In this case, location could be generalized from Rome to EMEA (so
including London workforce), as shown in Table 5.2(b). The resulting view has anonimity
|vEMEA| = 4 and since the risk 0.25 is smaller than the trust (trust(manager) = 0.35),
then the manager is allowed to see the view.
Table 5.3: Views of the employee survey for Rome and JuniorDeveloper
(a) Before generalization of location and job
Loc=Rome AND Job=JuniorDeveloper
|vRome+JuniorDeveloper| = 1
Name Job Location Answer
*** JuniorDeveloper Rome 5
(b) After generalization of location and job
View Loc=Rome AND Job=JuniorDeveloper
Anonymized |vEMEA+Dev| = 3
Name Job Location Answer
*** Dev EMEA 5
*** Dev EMEA 4
*** Dev EMEA 4
Similarly, if the manager wants to see the results per location and per job func-
tion (say in Rome for JuniorDeveloper only, see Table 5.3(a)), the anonymity level is
low, |vRome+JuniorDeveloper| = 1, and the associated risk is greater than 0.35. Again, in-
stead of simply denying access, the system can perform generalization on both the quasi-
identifiers, Job (generalized to the job family developer) and Location, thereby increasing
the anonymity (|vEMEA+Dev| = 3) and decreasing the risk (risk(manager, vEMEA+Dev) =
0.33) to an acceptable level for a manager (see Table 5.3(b)).
Finally, employees should have access to the global results only. The trust value is
therefore set to trust(employee) = 0.125 and the only view permitted is with suppression
of all identifiers and quasi-identifiers, which has |vsupp| = 8, see Table 5.3(b).
5.4 Feasibility evaluation using the employee survey use case
This section documents the results of an initial evaluation of our approach. The two
questions we investigate are (A) whether the approach described in this paper can be
realized in practice and (B) whether the performance that can be expected under typical
workloads matches the needs of real-time (more precisely: online) operation.
In order to address question A, we realized a prototype system that we have used to
85
CHAPTER 5. PRIVACY-AWARE RISK-BASED ACCESS CONTROL
run sample scenarios. We use the same prototype also to study the response time under
several representative conditions (queries of varying complexity, di↵erent levels of user
trust and therefore, di↵erent loads for the anonymizer module).
In the following, we first describe our prototype implementation, then we present the
dataset we used for the evaluation and outline the results of the experiments we run on
that dataset.
5.4.1 Prototype Implementation
In order to evaluate the practical feasibility of our approach, we developed a proof-of-
concept implementation of our framework that we used to run the experiments described
in the following.
Our prototype is implemented in Java 7 and uses MySQL Server version 5.6.20 to store
the dataset. The Risk Aware Access Control module mimics a typical XACML data flow,
providing a basic implementation of the PDP, the PEP, and the PIP functionality as well
as a set of authorization policies. The Risk Mitigation module is implemented using the
ARX6 anonymization framework [85]. The ARX toolkit o↵ers a Java API supporting data
de-identification. ARX is capable of altering input data in a way that guarantees minimal
information loss while ensuring that the transformed data adheres to well-defined privacy
criteria, expressed in such metrics as k-anonymity, `-diversity, t-closeness, etc. ARX
also o↵ers several reporting features allowing to collect metrics such as execution time,
information loss, etc. We evaluated other available anonymization libraries (e.g., Cornell
Anonymization Toolkit7, University of Texas Anonymisation Toolbox8). We eventually
adopted ARX because we found it easy to integrate and considering that it is a well-
documented, actively developed, and well maintained project.
5.4.2 Dataset
To test the performance of our framework, we used a dataset that is widely used in
the research community, namely the Adult Data Set 9 from the UCI Machine Learning
Repository. This dataset contains 32561 records from the US Census dataset with 15
demographic and employment-related variables. We removed records with missing values,
ending with 30, 162 usable records, and we reduced the number of fields to nine, as shown
in Table 5.4.
The choice of the identifiers, QIs and sensitive attribute set, typically, depends on the
specific domain. QIs should include the attributes a possible attacker is likely to have
6http://arx.deidentifier.org/overview/
7http://anony-toolkit.sourceforge.net/
8http://cs.utdallas.edu/dspl/cgi-bin/toolbox/index.php
9Available at http://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/datasets/Adult
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access to (e.g., using a phonebook or a census database), whereas sensitive attributes
depend on the application the anonymized data are used for.
Generally speaking increasing the number of QIs increases the risk, or results in strong
anonymization impacting the usefulness of the resulting view. In our experiments we set
QI ⌘ {AGE,NATIVE-COUNTRY}. In the census data, the SALARY-CLASS attribute
is typically chosen as a sensitive attribute. We also classified RACE as a sensitive attribute
because of its discriminatory nature.
Table 5.4: Summary of the dataset columns, number of distinct values, and nature of each column
UCI Adult Dataset
Attribute Values Nature
AGE 72 QI
NATIVE-COUNTRY 41 QI
EDUCATION 16 not Sensitive
OCCUPATION 14 not Sensitive
WORKCLASS 7 not Sensitive
MARITAL-STATUS 7 not Sensitive
GENDER 2 not Sensitive
RACE 5 Sensitive
SALARY-CLASS 2 Sensitive
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[17, 24] ...
[30,39]
(...)
[40,59]
[40,49]
(...)
[50,59]
(...)
[60,99]
(...)
(...)
A5
A4
A3
A2
A1
Figure 5.1: Generalization hierarchy for the attribute AGE [17, 99]. Level A1: Age is generalized in 5
year range. Level A2 in 10 year range. Level A3 in 20 years. Level A4 in 40 year range. In level A5 the
age is fully generalized. Age is not generalized in level A0 (not shown).
QIs will be generalized according to the generalisation scheme of Figure 5.1 (for the
attribute AGE) and Figure 5.2 (for the attribute NATIVE-COUNTRY).
87
CHAPTER 5. PRIVACY-AWARE RISK-BASED ACCESS CONTROL
(***)
US
US
US
Out-of-US
AmExUS
NAmExUS SAm
As
As
Eu
Eu
NC4
NC3
NC2
NC1
Figure 5.2: Generalization hierarchy for the attribute NATIVE-COUNTRY: Level NC1: NATIVE-
COUNTRY is generalized to US (United States), AmExUS (America Excluding United States), Asia
(As), or Europe (Eu). Level NC2: NAmExUS (North America Excluding United States) and SAm are
generalized to AmExUS (America Excluding United States). Level NC3: All countries excluding United
States are generalized to Out-of-US. Level NC4: native countries are suppressed. Level NC0: native
countries are not generalized (not shown).
5.4.3 Experiment and Results
In order to evaluate the performance of our tool, including the computational overhead
caused by the anonymization engine, we used a number of queries of increasing complexity
in terms of the size of the returned views and the disclosure risk. The queries are given
in Table 5.5 and the corresponding size and anonymity level of the views returned by our
tool are reported in Table 5.6. In the following we will indicate both the queries and the
corresponding views as Q1, Q2, Q3, Q4.
For our experiments, we want to investigate the impact of risk mitigation, anonymiza-
tion, on (i) the performance of the access control system and (ii) the quality of the
resulting data. For case (i) we focus on the views with the largest sizes (namely, Q1 and
Q2, with more than 20,000 tuples each as shown in Table 5.6). For case (ii) we focus
on the views with the highest risk profiles (namely, Q1, Q3, and Q4, with the lowest
possible anonymity), whose computation is significantly a↵ected by anonymization. We
consider five risk thresholds trust i.e. users/role with di↵erent trustworthiness level, as
shown in Table 5.7, and each experiment is run 100 times to average out the variance
of the response time. In Figure 5.3 we report the results of the experiments for the four
queries, panels Q1, Q2, Q3, and Q4, respectively, for the five di↵erent trustworthiness
levels. Figure 5.4 shows the (possible) impact of generalization on the data accuracy,
as measured by the Precision metric (Prec) [147], which counts the average number of
generalization steps performed on the generalization trees (cf. Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.2).
For Q1, we observe that the anonymization process increases significantly the response
time. Indeed the query is carried our by the most trusted user (trust = 1), with no
anonymization needed, takes on average 8ms (see Figure 5.3.Q1, horizontally striped bar
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Table 5.5: Queries
Q1: Data about male respondents
SELECT * FROM ADULT
WHERE SEX = ‘‘Male’’;
Q2: Data about adults between 30 and 75 years old born in the United States
SELECT * FROM ADULT
WHERE AGE BETWEEN 30 AND 75
AND NATIVE-COUNTRY = ‘‘United-States’’;
Q3: Data about adults between 30 and 35 years old working in the private sector and originally
from the american continent excluding United States
SELECT * FROM ADULT
WHERE WORKCLASS = ‘‘Private’’
AND AGE BETWEEN 30 AND 35
AND NATIVE-COUNTRY IN
(<America Excluding the United-States>);
Q4: Data about adults without-pay
SELECT * FROM ADULT
WHERE WORKCLASS = ‘‘Without-pay’’
Table 5.6: Size and disclosure risk level of the views returned in response to the queries
Query Size Anonimity Risk level
Q1 20,380 1 High
Q2 19,392 32 Low
Q3 215 1 High
Q4 14 1 High
Table 5.7: User roles and trustworthiness
User Name Role Trustworthiness
Alice SuperUser 1
Megha Admin 0.52
Dana SeniorDataAnalyst 0.1
Frida JuniorDataAnalyst 0.028
Eliyes IT 0.015
corresponding to trust = 1). By decreasing the trustworthiness of the requester the view
must be anonymized and the average response time increases to 27ms (cf. Figure 5.3.Q1,
horizontally striped bar corresponding to trust = 0.52). This time di↵erence is entirely
due to the anonymization time (19 ms, as shown in Figure 5.3.Q1, diagonally striped bar
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Figure 5.3: Average total response time (horizontal striped bars) and average anonymisation time (diag-
onally striped bars) for the four views and di↵erent trust levels.
corresponding to trust = 0.52). Decreasing further the trust level results in additional
anonymization. Also the attribute NATIVE-COUNTRY (NC) gets anonymized (cf. Fig-
ure 5.4.Q1), but this does not significantly a↵ect the response time (see Figure 5.3.Q1).
We can observe a similar behavior in the other queries (see Figure 5.3.Q2, Q3, and
Q4), with an increase of response time when anoymization takes place and no significant
variations in performance for di↵erent levels of anonymization. For instance, for Q2 we
have a view with an already high level of anonymity (k = 32), and a small anonymization
(a single level of generalization for the Age attribute, see Figure 5.4.Q2 for trust = 0.015)
still significantly impacts the performance. In case of Q3 we see that, despite di↵erent
combinations of anonymization strategies for di↵erent values of trust (Figure 5.4.Q3), the
response time is not a↵ected (Figure 5.3.Q3), except for trust = 1 where we have no
anonymization. We should note that for Q3 (as well as Q4) the di↵erence in the average
response time with and without anonymization is relevant (trust = 1 has response time of
0.16ms, and trust = 0.52 of 1.6 ms) but these views have few tuples and these times are
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Figure 5.4: Generalization levels for the four views. Horizontal striped bar shows PREC metric (see
text), diagonally striped bar the level of generalization for Age attribute and dotted bar the level of
generalization for Native Country attribute. A.D. stands for Access Denied.
small in absolute value, with large fluctuations, as shown by the high standard deviations.
Q4 is characterized by a low cardinality and (consequently) by high anonymity. Ex-
cept for the maximum trust value the data are strongly anonymized and for low trust
levels trust = 0.28 and trust = 0.015 access is denied in spite of the anonymization, see
Figure 5.4.Q4. Note that in these cases, the anonymization engine tries to minimize the
risk (anonymization time is not zero, see Figure 5.3.Q4), but due to the low cardinality
no solution is found.
From these experiments, we observe that when anonymization is applied the response
time increases significantly, but, even in the worst cases, the increase is far less than one
order of magnitude with no impact on the real-time response of the system. Moreover,
the application of di↵erent anonymization strategies have no impact on the response time.
The experiments were carried out using a MacBook Air, operating system OS X 10.8.5,
processor 1.3GHz Intel Core i5, memory 8GB 1600Mhz DDR3 and flash storage 120GB.
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5.5 Privacy aware threat investigation
Modern intrusion detection systems at application-level (called Threat Detection System,
TDS, herein)10, collect security information on the application stack and correlate it with
context information to detect potential threats. Usually, a TDS first collects application-
level log files from various sources, enriches the data gathered from logs with contextual
information (e.g., time and location), and finally stores the resulting data in a database.
The events data are then automatically analyzed on a periodic basis against pre-defined
threat patterns to detect potential anomalies and attacks. A pattern represents a com-
bination of suspicious log events that could indicate a threat. Often it is defined as a
set of filters applied to the event database and compared with some thresholds. If the
threshold is exceeded, then an alert is triggered. For instance, the ensemble of events
indicating a Failed Login initiated by the same source (e.g., Terminal) may indicate that
a Brute Force Attack is underway if the number of attempts exceeds, say, 20 attempts in
less than 10 minutes. When an alert is raised a human operator is asked to step in in
order to evaluate if the alert corresponds to an actual threat and when this is the case to
undertake appropriate countermeasures. To carry out his task, the operator may require
access to the details of the data that triggered the alert. The operator should be granted
access to sensitive data if this is strictly necessary to carry out her task and the severity
of the problem justifies it.
Figure 5.5 illustrates the architecture of the system as well as the di↵erent users in-
volved in the process. In Table 5.8 we provide an example of user/roles interacting with
the TDS and the corresponding access authorizations required to execute their tasks.
Table 5.8: Roles
Operator Classify alerts and report patterns anomalies His/Her tasks
require access to pattern detection results (events/log data re-
lated to the suspicious pattern) in case of alerts.
Administrator Has all Operator tasks and privileges. They can also Inves-
tigate alerts, Create or Reconfigure patterns. He/She should
have access the detection results and events data related to the
patterns.
Advanced
Administrator
Has all Administrator tasks and privileges. Can also grant
exceptional access to the data by attributing higher trust level
to an Operator or an Administrator.
Although log files may contain personal information (e.g. names, IP addresses) inves-
tigation can constitute a legitimate purpose for their processing. Yet access to sensitive
10We refer to these systems as TDS, to distinguish them from network-level intrusion detection systems (often called
IDS or SIEM). We base our description on the SAP Enterprise Threat Detection, but the analysis can be applied to other
solutions, including IDS. For a comparison between application- and network-level intrusion detection systems, see [79].
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Figure 5.5: Business Roles and System Landscape
data should be done according to the data minimization principle, i.e. that access to
personal information should be limited to what is directly relevant and necessary to ac-
complish the specified purpose. This is usually achieved in TDS by carrying out some
(pseudo-)anonymization before analyzing the event data, such as replacing real user name
or IDs with pseudonyms.
Still, with the increasing variety and complexity of collected log files, a full anonymiza-
tion of the log dataset before processing could, on one hand, provide a good privacy
protection, but also significantly impact the performance of the system, both in terms
of the utility (the quality of results of the pattern detection phase, or the information
available to the operator for the manual inspection) and processing time (anonymization
on large data set could be time-consuming, and on data stream re-run regularly)
To address this challenge, a more dynamic approach is needed: instead of anonymiz-
ing the complete event data-base beforehand, whenever a user performs an operation
accessing event tables, we have to apply specific anonymization methods which reduce
the privacy risk but preserving the most relevant information for that operation. In prac-
tice, the anonymization process should be customized for each operation (to preserve the
information useful for completing the task) and for each type of users, which can have
di↵erent levels of access to the data. In the next section, we will propose a framework
that to realize this scenario.
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5.6 Experimental Evaluation
In this section wi will use the second case study described in Section 5.5 to assess the
performance of our approach (described in Section 5.2). The TDS is expected to provide
accurate real-time results, therefore we investigate the impact of our approach on the
functioning of the TDS, in particular, whether the expected Performance and Utility
matches the accuracy and real-time requirements.
More in details, as mentioned in Section 5.5, the TDS allows to detect potential attack
patterns automatically, and then if additional investigations are needed, a human oper-
ator can browse the log data of the events corresponding to a given pattern for manual
inspection.
Ideally, the operator should be able to perform the manual investigation (i.e., decide
if the detected threat is a false or true positive). Some investigations can be conducted
on data where the personal information are anonymized (or in any case, where the re-
identification risk is low). If the operator does not have su cient information to decide,
he/she should be granted access to less anonymized (riskier) data, or in other words get
higher access privileges (trust enhancement) acquiring administrator rights, or directly
involving an administrator.
Accordingly, we need to check:
• Utility. Does the model allow a low trusted operator (i.e., small risk threshold) to
perform the investigation in most cases, and relying on trust enhancement for the
remaining cases?
• Performance. Does the additional anonymization step impact real-time performance?
Before addressing these questions (see Section 5.6.6), we need to describe our prototype
implementation (Section 5.6.1), the data set and its attributes classification from a privacy
risk perspective (Section 5.6.2), the selection of typical patterns used for the validation
(Sect. 5.6.3), the utility measure (Sect. 5.6.5) and the trust level setting (Section 5.6.4).
5.6.1 Prototype Implementation
Our prototype is implemented in Java 8 and uses SAP HANA Database. It is composed
of 3 main modules:
• The Risk Aware Access Control module: mimics a typical XACML data flow, pro-
viding an implementation of the PDP, the PEP, and the PIP functionality as well as
a set of authorization policies.
• The Risk Estimation module: evaluates the privacy risk using pre-configured criteria
(privacy metrics, anonymization technique, identifying information). It compares
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Table 5.9: An extract of the Log dataset columns, privacy classification of each column and anonymization
technique to be applied
Log Events data set
Attribute Type Anonymization
EventID Non-Sensitive
Timestamp Sensitive
UserId (Origin) Identifier Suppression
UserId (Target) Identifier Suppression
SystemId (Origin) QI Generalization
SystemId (Target) QI Generalization
Hostname (Origin) QI Generalization
IPAddress (Origin) QI Truncation
MACAddress (Origin) QI Truncation
TransactionName Sensitive
TargetResource Sensitive
the privacy risk to the request trustworthiness level, then produces an estimation of
the minimal anonymization to be applied in order to meet this level.
• The Trust & Risk Adjustment module: we implemented the Risk Adjustment Com-
ponent to perform anonymization. It uses ARX [86] a Java anonymization framework
implementing well-established privacy anonymization algorithms and privacy metrics
such as k-anonymity, `-diversity, t-closeness, etc. (the Trust Adjustment Component
was not implemented in this version of the prototype.)
5.6.2 Data Set and privacy classification
To test the performance of our framework in the TDS use case, we used a dataset con-
taining around 1bn record of log data collected from SAP systems deployed in a test
environment 11. The logs dataset is composed of 20 fields (in Table 5.9 we present a
summary of the most important fields)
As described in Section 5.2.1, to assess the privacy risk of releasing a dataset, we first
need to formalize our assumptions on the attributes that can be used to re-identify the
entry, or, in other words, classify the attributes in terms of identifiers, QIs, and sensitive
attributes. This classification, typically, depends on the specific domain. QIs should
include the attributes a possible attacker is likely to have access to from other sources,
whereas sensitive attributes depend on the application the anonymized data are used for.
For example, in our experiments, we set (obviously) User ID as an identifier and the IP
address as a quasi-identifier. Similarly, we assume that the Transaction name (the called
function) cannot provide any help for re-identification, therefore we consider it a sensitive
11For an analysis of the performance of the model on a benchmark dataset see 5.4.
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Table 5.10: Queries: Resulting views Size and Risk level
Query Corresponding Pattern View Size Risk Level
Q1 Brute Force Attack Large (50550) Very High (k = 2)
Q2 Security Configuration Changed Large (40300) Medium (k = 7)
Q3 Blacklisted Function Called Medium (14500) Very High (k = 1)
Q4 Table Dropped or Altered Small (228) Medium (k = 6)
Q5 User Assigned to Admin Group Very Small (12) Very High (k = 1)
attribute (and no anonymization will be applied). Table 5.9 provides an example of this
classification, and, for identifiers and quasi-identifiers, the corresponding anonymization
methods applied.
***
AF EU
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Figure 5.6: The generalization hierarchy for host names is organized as following: l1 and l2 are a location
based generalization by country then by continent. in level l3 host names are totally obfuscated and
entirely revealed at the level l0.
5.6.3 Pattern detection and investigation
In our experiments, we focus on 5 typical Patterns with di↵erent complexity in terms of
the size of the returned data-views and the privacy risk. Two di↵erent kinds of queries are
used during each phase respectively Detection Queries and Investigation Queries. The
selected queries {Q1 ... Q5} described in Table 5.10 are all Investigation Queries. An
Investigation Query is a “SELECT *” extracting all the details of the events corresponding
to certain pattern.
5.6.4 Roles and Trustworthiness levels
We have 3 roles Operator, Administrator and an Advanced administrator with increasing
access requirements (to fulfill their tasks), therefore increasing privacy clearances, (i.e.,
larger risk tolerance). Usually, for k-anonymity, k values in the range 3 10 are considered
medium risk, k > 10 low risk, and for k  2 the risk is very high (clearly, for k = 1 the
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Table 5.11: Users/Roles Privacy clearances and Trustworthiness levels
Role
Access
Requirement
Privacy
Clearance
Trust Level
(Risk Threshold)
Operator Low Minimal (k > 10) Tu 2 [0.05, 0.1[
Administrator Medium Medium (k > 2) Tu 2 [0.1, 0.5[
Advanced administrator High Maximum (k  2) Tu 2 [0.5, 1]
risk is the maximum, no anonymity) [122] . Therefore we propose the parameter setting
described in Table 5.11, where for sake of simplicity we have considered a single trust
factor T = Tu (i.e. we set W = 1 in Eq. 5.2.2).
5.6.5 Utility Evaluation
The e↵ect of anonymization in terms of utility is a widely discussed issue in the liter-
ature several generic metrics have been proposed to quantify the “damage” caused by
anonymization (see [63] for a review). However, these metrics do not make any assump-
tion on the usage of the data (so-called syntactic metrics), limiting their applicability on
realistic use-cases.
Other approaches propose to assess the accuracy loss (Utility loss) of a system (i.e.,
IDS in [88], Classifier in [24]) by comparing the results of certain operations run on
original then anonymized dataset using use case related criteria ( i.e., in the context of a
TDS the comparison criteria can be the number of False positives). Although interesting
for our context, this approach cannot be applied in our use case, since it assumes that
the analysis is run directly on anonymized data, whereas, in our use case, the pattern
detection is performed on clear data, and the anonymization is applied only on the results
(data-view).
We propose a method combining both approaches and that would include an evalua-
tion:
• From Syntactic standpoint: The information loss caused by the anonymization, we
use the precision metric that allows us to estimate the precision degradation of QIs
based on the level of generalization with respect to the generalization tree depth (e.g.,
for the generalization tree 5.6 if we allow access to continent instead of host-names
we used the 3rd level generalization out of 4 possible levels so dp(hostnames) = 3/4 =
75% precision degradation for host-names ).
• From Functional standpoint: The e↵ect of this loss on our use case. During the in-
vestigation phase, the operator, mostly, bases their analysis on a subset of attributes,
which are di↵erent for each attack pattern. Thus we will assign a utility coe cient uc
to di↵erent attributes based on the relevance of the attribute to the pattern/query.
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Combining the two approaches we compute the utility degradation of a data-view v as
Ud(v) =
X
ai2A
ucai ⇥ dp(ai) (5.3)
with A = {a1..ai} the set of attributes in the data set. We also set the precision degrada-
tion of the identifiers to dp(identifiers) = 1 as they will be totally suppressed after the
anonymization.
5.6.6 Results and Analysis
For our experiments, we want to investigate: (i) Performance: the impact of on-the-fly
anonymization (as risk mitigation strategy) on the performance (response time). (ii)
Utility: we would like to investigate if the quality of resulting data is generally enough to
fulfill the expected tasks for every user/role for various pattern investigation.
In order to evaluate these aspects we run several experiments considering 5 pat-
terns and 7 users/role with di↵erent trustworthiness level, t = {0.055, 0.083} Operators,
t = {0.12, 0.15, 0.45} Administrators, and t = {0.9, 1} Advanced Administrators. The
corresponding size and anonymity level of the views returned by the queries (correspond-
ing to the selected patterns) are reported in Table 5.10. In the rest of this section we will
indicate both the queries and the corresponding views as Q1, Q2, Q3, Q4 and Q5.
Performance and scalability To evaluate the performance of our tool, including the com-
putational overhead caused by the anonymization, we run queries Q1, Q2, Q4, and Q5
(described in Table 5.10) using our access control prototype experiment, 100 times for
each query to average out the variance of the response time. In Figure 5.7 we report the
results of the experiments for the four queries for the 6 trustworthiness levels.
For Q1, we observe that the anonymization process increases significantly the response
time. In fact when the query is carried out by the most trusted user (t = 0.9), with no
anonymization needed, the response time on average is less than 15ms (see Figure 5.7.Q1,
the diagonally striped bar corresponding to t = 0.9). By decreasing the trustworthiness
of the requester the view must be anonymized and the average response time increases
to 150ms in the worst case (cf. Figure 5.7.Q1, the diagonally striped bar corresponding
to t = 0.055). This time di↵erence is entirely due to the anonymization time (130 ms, as
shown in Figure 5.7, Q1, horizontal striped bars corresponding to t = 0.055). Increasing
the trust level decreases the needed anonymization, but it slightly a↵ects anonymization
time. We can observe a similar behavior in the other queries (see Figure 5.7, Q2, Q4, and
Q5), with an increase of response time when anonymization takes place and no significant
variations in performance for di↵erent levels of anonymization. For instance, for Q2 and
Q4 we have two views with an already medium level of anonymity (respectively k = 7
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Figure 5.7: Average anonymisation time (horizontal striped bars) and average total response time (diag-
onally striped bars) for Q1, Q2, Q4, and Q5 (data-views) and 6 di↵erent users (trust levels).
and k = 6),the anonymization (when needed) still impacts the performance in the same
scale then Q1 and Q5 with very low anonymity level (respectively k = 2 and k = 1).
From these experiments, we observe that when anonymization is applied the response
time increases, but, even in the worst cases, the increase is far less than one order of
magnitude, and, basically, it has no impact on the real-time response of the system.
Moreover, the application of di↵erent levels of anonymization (di↵erent k in our case) has
a small impact. We will investigate in the next paragraph the e↵ect of the data-view size
on the Anonymization and Response time.
Let us analyze the behavior of the anonymization time increasing the size of the dataset.
Typically patterns run in the limited time window (e.g., 10 to 30 minutes) producing
small-sized data-views (i.e., in the range of 10  103). To investigate the scalability of our
approach, in Figure 5.8, we report the average anonymization time variation for 5 di↵erent
data-view {Q1 to Q5} (with 5 di↵erent sizes see Table 5.10) and a low trustworthiness
level (t = 0.055, so anonymization is always applied). As mentioned above, the worst
case (around 5 · 104 records) takes less than 150ms, and a linear extrapolation of the
data allows as to estimate the anonymization time for a 105 data view (so, 100 times the
typical size) around 200ms, which it can be safely considered as a real-time response for
our use case.
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Figure 5.8: Average anonymization time variation according to data-view sizes ( for trustworthiness
t = 0.055).
Figure 5.9: Utility degradation by trust level for di↵erent queries
Utility: Trustworthiness levels (i.e., risk threshold) should be set to allow the best a
trade-o↵ between data exploitation and privacy protection. In our use case we set our
trustworthiness levels respecting a conventional distribution of privacy risk levels pre-
sented in Table 5.11, and we would like to investigate the convenience of this repartition
by answering the following question: Do these trustworthiness levels provide enough data
(or data with enough utility) to allow each user/role to fulfill their tasks described in
Table 5.8. In Figure 5.9, we report the utility degradation according to the six selected
trustworthiness levels, representing the 3 roles (reported on the top of the figure). We
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can observe that the utility degradation (obviously) decreases as we increase the trust
level, with the limiting case of t = 1 with no utility loss (and no anonymization) for the
Advanced Administrator. For most of the patterns (4 over 5, so except Q5), the Op-
erator role has a maximum utility loss of 30%, showing that the specific anonymization
transformations applied are strongly decreasing the risk, and limiting the impact on the
utility. That should allow performing the analysis on the anonymized data, without the
need to enhance the trust level (so no need to get Admin rights).
In the case of Q5, the anonymization is not able to significantly decreases the risk,
without largely impacting the utility. In fact, the Operator is left with no information
(utility degradation = 1), and to analyze the result an increase of the acceptable risk
threshold (trust level) is needed. Enhancing trust (i.e. assigning Admin rights to the
Operator) could reduce the utility degradation in the 30%   40% range, likely allowing
the assessment of the pattern result. We should note, that Q5 is particularly hard to
anonymize, because it has fewer events (around 10), and, since k-anonymity is a measure
of indistinguishability, it needs strong anonymization.
Figure 5.9 also shows that in most cases increasing the trust level for Administrator or
even Advanced Administrator (except of course for t = 1, where we have no anonymiza-
tion) the impact on utility degradation is moderate: for example Q1 and Q4 are almost
flat in the Administrator zone, similarly Q2 has a first drop, and stays flat in the Adminis-
trator and Advanced Administrator parts. In other words, increasing the risk thresholds,
we could take more risk, but we do not gain much in terms of the utility. This counter-
intuitive e↵ect is mostly due to the di culty to find an anonymization strategy able to
equalize the risk threshold. As mentioned in Section 5.2.3, in practical cases the number
of possible anonymization strategies is limited, and to fulfill the condition of Eq. 4.1 the
final risk may be quite below the risk thresholds (trust values). In practice, in many
cases, even increasing the risk thresholds (trust values), it is not possible to find a more
optimal (from the utility point of view) anonymization strategy. In Figure 5.9 we show
the utility loss for four patterns both showing the risk thresholds (dotted lines) and the
actual risk achieved after the anonymization. In the ideal case, the two curves should
be the same, meaning that we could always find a transformation that equalizes actual
risk and risk thresholds (trust), but in practice, we see that we are often far from this
optimal condition. For example, for pattern Q2, with risk thresholds t = 0.15, t = 0.45
(Administrator role) and t = 0.9 (Advanced Administrator), indicated with red circles, we
have the same value of utility degradation. In fact, the anonymization strategy found for
t = 0.15 case, corresponds to an actual risk of 0.14 (square dots with a circle in Figure 5.9,
upper-right panel), so quite close to the threshold. Increasing the thresholds to t = 0.45
and t = 0.9 (round dots with a circle in the figure), no better strategies were found, so
the same anonymization strategy is applied, and clearly, the final risk is still 0.14 (and
utility is the same), well below the thresholds. Similar e↵ects are also present in the other
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patterns.
The experimental analysis shows that adapting the anonymization to the specific pat-
terns, we can mostly preserve enough information for the investigation, keeping the privacy
risk low. In cases where this is not su cient, typically characterized by small data set,
the trust enhancement strategy can support the access to less-anonymized data.
5.7 Policy Implementation
In this section, we present a possible way of expressing the authorizations model, described
in Section 4.3 in Eq.4.1, through risk-based policies.
Since we based the access control model and architecture on a modified version of
XACML’s architecture, we will also propose an extended version of XACML’s language
to implement our policies (attribute based policies).
The Policy sample we present in this section will implement the authorizations pre-
sented in the use case “privacy aware threat investigation” introduced in Section 5.3. We
propose to organize policies according to patterns, i.e., each policy expresses the autho-
rizations required to run and investigate a pattern. This choice allows for a flexible policy
management (addition, modification, and deletion), in fact, new patterns are often added
and old once updated or removed from the system and each of these operations requires
an update of the policies. Hence if we dedicate a policy for each pattern, when an existing
pattern is modified or a new one is created, we just need to revise the policy expressing
the authorizations required by the pattern or create a new policy.
The proposed policies have a similar structure as described in Example 5.1. In this
policy example, we express the authorizations required by the pattern detecting Brute
Force Attacks.
1 <!   Bru t f o r c e a t t a ck po l i c y   >
2 <Pol i cy Po l i cy Id=” b r u t f o r c e a t t a c k p o l i c y ” RuleCombiningAlgId=”permit ov e r r i d e s ”>
3 <Target> . . . </Target>
4 <Rule RuleId=” deny a l l ” E f f e c t=”Deny”>
5 <!   Deny ac c e s s f o r the po l i c y Target   >
6 . . .
7 <Rule RuleId=” a l l ow t r u s t h i g h e r t h a n r i s k ” E f f e c t=”Permit”>
8 <!   Allow acc e s s i f t rus t>=r i s k   >
9 . . . </Rule>
10 <Rule RuleId=” ad j u s t r i s k h i g h e r t h a n t r u s t ” E f f e c t=”Permit”>
11 <!   Adjust Trust or Risk Values i f t rus t<r i s k   >
12 . . . </Rule>
13 <Rule RuleId=” e x c e p t i o n a l r u l e 1 ” E f f e c t=”Permit”>
14 <!   op t i ona l   >
15 <Target> <!   except ion ’ s t a r g e t   > </Target>
16 </Rule>
17 </Pol icy>
Listing 5.1: Risk-Based Policy Sample: Brute Force Attack Pattern
Each policy is composed by a main target and three rules expressing the three pos-
sible outcomes of the access evaluation, i.e., deny, grant, or apply an adjustment strategy
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  (see Eq 4.1 in Section 4.3 ). Rules will apply to the same target defined as the policy
target. We use the combination algorithm permit-overrides to select the rule to enforce,
in case more then one rule is applicable (i.e., rule’s target matches the request’s target
and the rule’s conditions are satisfied by the request). The algorithm permit-overrides
enforces the first rule that permits access (allows access) once the obligations defined by
the rule are enforced (see [58] for more details). If no rules permit access that the first
rule denying access will be enforced. Some patterns may require additional exceptional
rules (i.e., break the glass rules) usually more permissive and with a more specific target.
For instance, for very critical patterns (e.g., a denial of service attack) we can allow a
super administrator to access the data for investigation without trust assessment despite
the risk level (see Example 5.6).
The main target describes which subjects (requesters), which resources and what ac-
tions the policy applies to. In example (Example 5.1), for instance, the policy applies to
any requester with any role known to the risk-based access control system ROLE:ANY
(see Example 5.2). The targeted resource is the table containing the logs TABLE:LOGS
and the targeted action is ACTION:READ access. The policy target should also specify
the context of the access which can express for instance the access purpose e.g., running
or investigating the pattern PATTERN:BF-ATTACK. It could be also used to describe
the security context e.g., alert or logged event. The policy target (or main target) can be
refined within the rules. For instance, the exceptional rule target (Example 5.6) refers to
the group of subject with the role of ROLE:SUPER ADMIN which is more specific than
ROLE:ANY, it also narrows the context and make the rule only applicable in case of a
security alert SEC CONTEXT:ALERT.
1 <Target>
2 <AnyOf> <AllOf> <Match MatchId=” s t r i ng equal ”>
3 <Attr ibuteValue DataType=” s t r i n g ”>ROLE:ANY</Attr ibuteValue>
4 <Attr ibuteDes ignator Att r ibute Id=” subject r o l e ” Category=” sub j e c t ” . . . / >
5 </Match> </AllOf> </AnyOf>
6 <AnyOf> <AllOf> <Match MatchId=” s t r i ng equal ”>
7 <Attr ibuteValue DataType=” s t r i n g ”>TABLE:LOGS</Attr ibuteValue>
8 <Attr ibuteDes ignator Att r ibute Id=” resource id ” Category=” re sou r c e ” . . . / >
9 </Match> </AllOf> </AnyOf>
10 <AnyOf> <AllOf> <Match MatchId=” s t r i ng equal ”>
11 <Attr ibuteValue DataType=” s t r i n g ”>ACTION:READ</Attr ibuteValue>
12 <Attr ibuteDes ignator Att r ibute Id=” act ion id ” Category=” ac t i on ” . . . / >
13 </Match> </AllOf> </AnyOf>
14 <AnyOf> <AllOf> <Match MatchId=” s t r i ng equal ”>
15 <Attr ibuteValue DataType=” s t r i n g ”>PATTERN:BF ATTACK</Attr ibuteValue>
16 <Attr ibuteDes ignator Att r ibute Id=”pattern id ” Category=”environment” . . . / >
17 </Match> </AllOf> </AnyOf>
18 </Target>
Listing 5.2: Policy main target
The first rule, Deny Rule in the Policy (Example 5.3) does not specify the target,
hence, inherits the policy’s target. This rule does not have any conditions or obligation
its aim is to guarantee that the access is denied if none of the other rules allow it (e.g., the
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conditions of other rules were not satisfied or errors occurred during the rules evaluation).
1 <Rule RuleId=” deny a l l ” E f f e c t=”Deny”>
2 <!   Deny any acc e s s to a l l Roles / Sub jec t s in the Target   >
3 </Rule>
Listing 5.3: Deny Rule
The Adjust Rule (in Example 5.4) applies to the policies target as well. It expresses the
second outcome in Eq. 4.1, where an adjustment strategy   is required to be applied before
granting access. The condition of application of this rule (in Line 3), is that the trust is
lower than the risk level. To check this condition, we need, first, to compute the trust and
risk values, which as indicated in Section 4.4, is the task of the RBA-IP, however we need
to indicate to the RBA-IP where to possibly find the information, e.g., we define that
the request-trust can be computed using the TrustAssessmentModule (Line 8) and the
request-risk can be computed by the RiskAssessmentModule (Line 15). In case of failure
to compute the trust level, minimum trust level T = 0 will be assigned to the request, and
if the failure occurs in the risk computation, we will assign to the request maximum risk
level R = 1. If the condition of Adjust Rule is fulfilled then access cannot be granted to the
resource, unless an adjustment phase is successfully carried. The adjustment strategies
for each pattern are expressed through obligations (see Example 5.7, 5.8, or 5.9.).
1 <Rule RuleId=” ad j u s t t r u s t l ow e r t h a n r i s k ” E f f e c t=”Permit”>
2 <!   Ajust Trust or Risk Values i f t r u s t < r i s k   >
3 <Condition><!   app l i c ab l e i f t r u s t i s lower than r i s k   >
4 <Apply FunctionId=”double greate r than or equal ”>
5 <Apply FunctionId=” func t i on : or ”> <!   compute the t r u s t or t r u s t =0   >
6 <!   c a l l TrustAssessmentModule to compute the t r u s t   >
7 <Apply FunctionId=” func t i on : double one and only ”>
8 <Attr ibuteDes ignator Category=” request t r u s t ” Att r ibute Id=” t ru s t ” I s s u e r=”
TrustAssessmentModule”/>
9 </Apply>
10 <AttibuteValue>0</Attr ibuteValue>
11 </Apply>
12 <Apply FunctionId=” func t i on : or ”> <!   compute r i s k or r i s k =1   >
13 <!   c a l l RiskAssessmentModule to compute r i s k   >
14 <Apply FunctionId=” func t i on : double one and only ”>
15 <Attr ibuteDes ignator Category=” request r i s k ” Att r ibute Id=” r i s k ” I s s u e r=”
RiskAssessmentModule”/>
16 </Apply>
17 <AttibuteValue>1</Attr ibuteValue>
18 </Apply>
19 </Apply>
20 </Condition>
21 <Obl igat ionExpres s ions>
22 <!  Adjustment S t r a t e g i e s  >
23 </Obl igat ionExpres s ions>
24 </Rule>
Listing 5.4: Adjust Rule
The Allow Rule (see Example 5.5) expresses the last out come of evaluation in the
authorization model (Eq.4.1). Similarly to the Deny Rule and Adjust Rule, this third
rule, has the same target as the policy. According to Allow Rule, access to the requested
data is fully granted if the trustworthiness level of the request is higher than its risk level.
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Table 5.12: Obligation Types
at-decision Obligations Are similar to the classic XACML3.0 obli-
gations they are actions to be enforced at
the same time then the access decision e.g.,
sending notifications, logging session details.
These obligations fulfillment do not influence
the access decision
pre-decision Obligations Are actions to be enforced before enforcing the
access decision to a resource e.g., anonymiza-
tion, encryption, requesting a stronger au-
thentication. The success or failure to fulfill
these obligations can influence the access de-
cision
post-decision Obligations Are actions expected to be enforced after en-
forcing the access decision e.g., deletion of the
data
The trust and risk levels assessment is expressed the same way as the Adjust Rule in
Example 5.4 (Lines 4 to 18 ).
1 <Rule RuleId=” a l l ow t r u s t h i g h e r t h a n o r e q u a l s r i s k ” E f f e c t=”Permit”>
2 <!   Allow acc e s s i f t r u s t >= r i s k   >
3 <Condition><!   app l i c ab l e i f t r u s t i s h igher than or equa l s r i s k   >
4 <Apply FunctionId=”double greate r than or equal ”>
5 <!   compute and compare t r u s t and r i s k l e v e l s   >
6 </Apply>
7 </Condition>
8 </Rule>
Listing 5.5: Allow Rule
Obligations, in the XACML standard, are enforced by the PEP immediately after
granting or denying access, e.g., allowing access to a user Alice with the obligation to
log Alice’s actions during the access session. However, our authorization model needs, in
some cases to enforce certain actions before granting access, such as transformations on
data, and other actions during the consumption of the data. Thus we propose to use two
other types pre-decision and post-decision obligations categories. These new obligation
categories were inspired by [163]. In Table 5.12 we provide a description for each category,
we also provide an implementation example in Examples 5.7, 5.8 and 5.9.
We discussed in Section 5.6.5 possible ways to dynamically select the mitigation strate-
gies based on utility, but we are not including the implementation in this paper.
1 <Rule RuleId=” e x c e p t i o n a l r u l e 1 ” E f f e c t=”Permit”>
2 <Target>
3 <AnyOf> <AllOf> <Match MatchId=” s t r i ng equal ”>
4 <Attr ibuteValue DataType=” s t r i n g ”>ROLE:SEC ADMIN</Attr ibuteValue>
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5 <Attr ibuteDes ignator Att r ibute Id=” subject r o l e ” Category=” sub j e c t ” . . . / >
6 <AnyOf> <AllOf> <Match MatchId=” s t r i ng equal ”>
7 <Attr ibuteValue DataType=” s t r i n g ”>SEC CONTEXT:ALERT</Attr ibuteValue>
8 <Attr ibuteDes ignator Att r ibute Id=”pattern id ” Category=”environment” . . . / >
9 </Match> </AllOf> </AnyOf>
10 </Target>
11 </Rule>
Listing 5.6: Exceptional rule allowing the super admin to access without risk and trust assessment
1 <Obl igat ionExpres s ion Obl iga t ion Id=”system : log ” ObligationType=”at ac c e s s ” Fu l f i l lOn=Permit>
2 <!   Temporairly Grant h igher t r u s t l e v e l   >
3 <!   Log the ac c e s s r eque s t and ac c e s s s e s s i o n   >
4 </Obl igat ionExpress ion>
Listing 5.7: at-access Obligations
1 <Obl igat ionExpres s ion Obl iga t ion Id=”system : anonymize” ObligationType=”pre ac c e s s ” Fu l f i l lOn=
Permit>
2 <Attr ibuteAss ignmentExpress ion><!  compute r equ i r ed anonymity l e v e l  >
3 <Attr ibuteDes ignator Att r ibute Id=” opt imal k ” I s s u e r=”TrustAndRiskAjustementModule” />
4 </Attr ibuteAss ignmentExpress ion>
5 <Attr ibuteAss ignmentExpress ion><!   apply anonymization   >
6 <Attr ibuteDes ignator Att r ibute Id=”anonymizer : k anonymity” I s s u e r=”
TrustAndRiskAjustementModule” />
7 </Attr ibuteAss ignmentExpress ion>
8 </Obl igat ionExpress ion>
Listing 5.8: pre-access Obligations
1 <Obl igat ionExpres s ion Obl iga t ion Id=”remote rba ep : data d e l e t i o n ” ObligationType=”post ac c e s s ”
Fu l f i l lOn=Permit>
2 <Attr ibuteAss ignmentExpress ion><!   Enhance Trust  >
3 <Attr ibuteDes ignator Att r ibute Id=”enhanced t rus t l e v e l ” I s s u e r=”
TrustAndRiskAjustementModule”/>
4 </Attr ibuteAss ignmentExpress ion>
5 <Attr ibuteAss ignmentExpress ion><!   f i x a c c e s s time window  >
6 <Attr ibuteDes ignator Att r ibute Id=”time window” I s s u e r=”TrustAndRiskAjustementModule”/>
7 </Attr ibuteAss ignmentExpress ion>
8 <Attr ibuteAss ignmentExpress ion><!   de l e t e data  >
9 <Attr ibuteDes ignator Att r ibute Id=” ac t i on : data d e l e t i o n ”/>
10 </Attr ibuteAss ignmentExpress ion>
11 </Obl igat ionExpress ion>
Listing 5.9: post-access Obligations
5.8 Chapter conclusions
Nowadays preserving privacy is a major concern in every organization. Software market
leader seeks to develop a new e cient solution to address privacy and security issues and
provide innovative products o↵ering the best tread-o↵ between privacy preserving and
data exploitation.
In this chapter, we propose a privacy-aware risk-based access control model able to
address these issues and support a flexible access control in privacy demanding scenar-
ios. In our model, we propose to manage the privacy-risk using the concept syntactic
anonymity. This category of privacy metrics is designed to ensure privacy-protection in
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data publishing [43]. Although these metrics have received a fair amount of cretinism,
they are still widely used. For instance, when publicly releasing sensitive datasets, using
such metrics will clearly lower privacy risk compared to releasing actual data values. In
addition syntactic anonymity is preferred in some cases since it provides better quality of
data than most noise addition techniques like di↵erential privacy.
We focus (in this chapter) on re-identification risk assessed using a well known metric
k-anonymity. However, the approach is not bound to these choices and it can be readily
adapted to alternative syntactic metrics (e.g., `-diversity, t-closeness). It can also integrate
the concept of di↵erential privacy to which we will dedicate the next chapter (Chapter 6).
When the privacy risk is too large, the framework can apply privacy preserving ad-
justment strategies (risk mitigation and trust enhancement strategies) to increase the
exploitation of the data while ensuring an acceptable risk level. As an example of privacy
risk mitigation, we propose to apply on-the-fly anonymization, instead of denying access
to any “risky” information, The level of anonymization is dynamically assessed (for each
data request) to enhance the availability of information while respecting a privacy level
desired by the organization. Current anonymization techniques are typically computa-
tionally intensive [84, 164] and their applicability is limited to o↵-line scenarios or small
size datasets, diminishing their business impacts, not allowing the usage by more advanced
applications, such as real-time analytics and on-demand data services. In practice, with
current technologies, querying a large database and extracting an anonymized dataset in
real-time is not possible, and most anonymization processes are run o↵-line (i.e., as batch
processes). However new recent technologies (such as in-memory databases combined
with column-store optimized algorithms) would facilitate the implementation of run-time
data anonymization, allowing our model to be easily integrated with new data-intensive
business applications.
In the experimental sections of this chapter, we show how the framework can simulta-
neously address both the privacy and the utility requirements within di↵erent industrial
use cases. Indeed the obtained results show that the framework leads to meaningful results
and real-time performance.
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Chapter 6
Di↵erential privacy based access
control
Syntactic anonymity heuristics propose to alter identifying attributes to grantee
certain level of anonymity. Although this approach presents some weaknesses,
it is still widely applied especially when publicly releasing sensitive data-sets.
Another privacy-preserving approach, the di↵erential privacy, have been lately
proposed as an alternative to syntactic anonymity. Di↵erential privacy is a
formal mathematical framework allowing to guarantee a certain level of privacy
when analyzing or releasing statistical data.
In this chapter we propose a di↵erent version of the privacy-aware risk-based
access control model, based on di↵erential privacy and more suitable to preserve
privacy in the context of data mining. The model allows for data access at dif-
ferent privacy levels, generating an anonymized data set according to the privacy
clearance of each request. The architecture also supports re-negotiation of the
privacy level, in return for fulfilling a set of risk and trust adjustment strategies
expressed through Access and Usage Control Obligations. We also show, how the
model can address the privacy and utility requirements, in an human-resource
motivated use-case with a classification task. The model provides a flexible ac-
cess control, improving data availability while guaranteeing a certain level of
privacy.
6.1 Introduction
In Chapter 4 we proposed a novel access control model aiming, like most risk-based, to
bring more flexibility, replacing (or integrating) pre-defined access control policies, with
access decisions based on the risk estimation of specific requests. Our model evaluates each
request using a user/role dependent risk and risk thresholds which can be set considering
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the trustworthiness of a requester or a request’s context. Our approach goes beyond the
binary access decision (allow, deny) supported by most risk-based models, and we propose
a third option, which is to adjust the trust and risk levels allowing for restricted, partial
and/or monitored access to the data instead of denying risky requests.
This approach requires domain-specific risk assessment heuristics. In Chapter 5 we
propose to explore how to apply the approach in the context of data privacy. Therefore we
develop a privacy-aware adaptation of our framework using syntactic anonymity metrics
(e.g., k-anonymity) to assess the risk (i.e., privacy-risk) and privacy-related factors to
assess trust. Although widely used in practice, k-anonymity and the related family of
syntactic privacy metrics [43]), is susceptible to various attacks (e.g., [62]), and, in the last
10 years, another formal approach has been proposed to provide strong privacy guarantee:
di↵erential privacy [54].
In this chapter, we propose a privacy-aware risk-based access control model, which uses
di↵erential privacy to reduce the data disclosure risk. The model, in case the access to
raw data is not permitted, is able to provide a di↵erential private data set, according to
the privacy clearance of the user, which plays the role of the trust in the previous model.
This allows for a more flexible access, improving data availability, and at the same time,
guaranteeing a formal level of privacy.
The main contributions of this chapter are as follows:
1. We propose a privacy-aware risk-based access control model that evaluates access
and clearance decisions based on a privacy-preserving approach.
2. We propose to use a di↵erentially private algorithm to enforce these decisions, re-
specting the adequate privacy level.
3. We define an architecture for our access control system, which integrates a classic
policy-based access control, and also supports mechanisms for (temporarily) increas-
ing privacy clearance.
4. We implement a proof-of-concept prototype and run preliminary experiments, to
evaluate the utility of the data, using a simple classification task, and the performance
of the system.
In the next section (Section 6.2), we provide a motivating use case for our work. In
Section 6.3, we give a short overview on Di↵erential Privacy. In Section 6.4, we introduce
our privacy-aware access control model. Section 6.5 is dedicated to the description of the
architecture of the access control framework. In Section 6.6, we describe the experimental
evaluation and discuss the main results. We conclude, in Section 6.7,with some final
remarks.
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Table 6.1: Usage scenarios, comprising di↵erent actors (data requesters), security levels, and expected
utility (i.e., type of reports needed)
# Role Operation Risk Utility
1 HR manager HR view (int.) Low Risk full access
2 HR manager HR view (ext.) Medium Risk aggregated
3 HR developer Testing data Medium-High Risk anonymized
4 HR Benchmarking Benchmark High Risk anonymized
6.2 Use Case
Human Resource (HR) data are becoming increasingly important for the management
of the company workforce. Whereas traditionally, they were mostly accessed in tabular
form from the HR department and people managers, there is nowadays a large number
of additional analytics and functionalities to improve HR key processes [100, 142] (e.g.,
talent discovery, compensation process, training), and, correspondingly, there is an in-
creased need for access to HR data, reports and analytics, involving multiple actors in the
company. At the same time, HR data contain sensitive and personal information, which
is subject to, often complex, data protection regulations, and data access should carefully
manage.
For example, an HR manager can have a full view of the HR information for her/his
department, but an aggregated view for the HR data from other departments. In some
cases, for example, employee survey results for collecting employee feedback, a certain level
of anonymity is needed even for the data within the department. Legal framework, such
as the European data protection regulations [59], can additionally impose geographical
constraints on access and transfer of personal information.
HR data are also needed for the testing phase in the development of HR applications.
In this case, the data should not contain personal information, but they should be realistic
enough to allow for significant testing. So, an in-house developer may have access in a
controlled environment to an anonymized version of the data. If the development task is
outsourced to an external company, an even stronger anonymized is likely needed.
HR data (e.g., compensation and health care cost data) are also sometimes shared
with external parties for benchmarking purpose (see e.g. Bureau of Labor Statistics
(BLS) [132]). and, for that scope, they need a high level of privacy guarantees to be
released.
The requirements of these illustrative examples can be summarized as in Table 4.1.
These scenarios show how a rather complex access control framework should be set up
to address the privacy requirements. Currently, in most cases, these requirements are
addressed with a mix of specific configurations of traditional access control systems (e.g,
RBAC systems for the HR manager use-case), usage of specific anonymization tools (e.g.,
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for releasing data for application testing or benchmarking services), and, often, relying
on human-based processes. In the next sections, we will show how these scenarios can be
realized.
6.3 Background on Di↵erential Privacy
Di↵erential privacy [54] is a privacy framework devised for providing a formal, strong
privacy guarantee. Whereas, traditionally, privacy-preserving data publishing was based
on syntactic privacy [43] mechanisms, where, for example, it is imposed as condition that
a record being indistinguishable from k other records [135] (equivalence group), or the
sensitive values to be well distributed within the equivalence groups [92, 99], di↵erential
privacy takes another approach, requiring that the answer to any query being probabilis-
tically indistinguishable if a particular record is present in the database or not. In other
words, an adversary cannot learn (almost) anything about an individual record, since
the output does not (almost) change, whether that specific record is present or absent
in the data set. Following [113], we can define di↵erential privacy, in the context of
privacy-preserving data publishing, as:
definition 6.3.1. A randomized algorithm K satisfies ✏-di↵erential privacy if for all
pairs of data sets D,D0, di↵ering for at most one record (D ⇠ D0), and for all possi-
ble anonymized data sets Dˆ, we have that:
Pr [K(D) = Dˆ]  e✏ ⇥ Pr [K(D) = Dˆ]
where the probability is computed over the randomness of K, and the parameter ✏ > 0
sets the bound of the privacy guarantee, with low values of ✏ providing stronger privacy.
The mechanism for providing di↵erential privacy (called ✏-di↵erentially private san-
itizer) is typically based on noise addition. There are two approaches: interactive and
non-interactive. Historically, di↵erential privacy was devised for the interactive model [54]:
a user sends a set of queries to a database, and the database owner, to assure privacy,
adds some random perturbation to the query answer (e.g., adding Laplace noise with
variance related to ✏ parameter). Although the interactive framework is mostly used, it
has some drawbacks [146], e.g., after a limited number of queries the noise level should
be increased, highly impacting the utility.
In the non-interactive model (see [91, 94, 113, 146]), the database owner anonymizes
the original raw data, and then releases the anonymized version, providing the user a
greater flexibility for data analysis, and basically no limitation in terms of queries. Indeed
this model allows producing data-views meeting a certain level of privacy and utility.
However, it is important to mention that this assumption does not take multiple releases
in consideration, and the utility is estimated considering a generic assumption on what
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the data will be used for (e.g., assuming that the data will be used analysis relies mostly
on the counts of certain attributes).
We will be using the latter model in this chapter. In particular for deriving di↵erential
private data set for our evaluation (see Section. 6.6), we follow the approach of [113].
The method considers the raw data, and it computes the contingency tables, counting the
number of records sharing a combination of attributes. Then, it probabilistically (using an
exponential mechanism) generates a generalized contingency table (generalizing attribute
values in wider classes). Then, it applies Laplacian noise to the generalized contingency
table. The generalization step allows increasing the counts for the cells, resulting in
lowering the utility-impact of the noise addition. Synthetic data can be produced from
the generalized and randomized contingency table. The resulting data set, generated by
a ✏-di↵erential privacy mechanisms, can be safely used for any data analysis (we will test
it on a classification task, as in [113]).
6.4 Di↵erential privacy based access control model
In this section, we provide a general description of our di↵erential privacy based model.
The privacy-aware risk-based access control model presented in this chapter can generally
be mapped to the general model presented in Chapter 4. However, unlike the model
based on syntactic anonymity (presented in Chapter 5), it is harder to quantitatively
assess the privacy-risk (before mitigation) using di↵erential privacy since this privacy
metric quantifies the privacy guarantee provided by a release mechanism, and it uses
added noise to achieve this measure.
Therefore, to assess the privacy-risk in this model, we propose a qualitative risk measure
based on the sensitivity of the data requested and the presence of identifying attributes.
The application of di↵erential privacy requires a limited number of queries and a knowl-
edge about these queries, this makes easier the task of assessing the privacy-risk. We
consider here a risk domain of 5 qualitative risk levels L = {l1: Very-Low, l2: Low, l3:
Medium, l4: High, l5: Very-High}. Note that the number of levels can vary depending on
the use-cases and risk policies, with no major di↵erences for the access control model. In
Table 6.2 we map a required privacy clearance interval (T1 . . . T5) with each of risk levels
based on a tread-o↵ between the expected utility (see Table 6.1) and the privacy goals of
the company. In the last column (of Table 6.2) we report the required level of sanitization
✏i corresponding to the clearance Ti.
The authorizations in our model can be built as an extension of the traditional policy-
based authorizations, such as XACML model [115]. Generally speaking, the model pro-
ceeds as follows: The policy determines the clearance level/interval (depending on its
risk level) required to access a given dataset (data resulting from a given query). When-
ever a user/role issues a request, the access control model checks if his/her request has
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Table 6.2: Mapping between privacy risk, required privacy clearance and equivalent level of sanitization
Privacy-risk
Privacy
Requirement
Needed
sanitization
l1 : Very-Low risk T1 ⇡ 0 none (✏1 ⇡ +1)
l2 : Low risk T2 = [0.01, 1[ ✏2 ]1, 10]
l3 : Medium risk T3 = [1, 10[ ✏3 2 ]0.1, 1]
l4 : High risk T4 = [10, 20[ ✏4 2 ]0.05, 0.1]
l5 : Vary-High risk T5 = [20,+1[ ✏5  0.05
the adequate privacy clearance (with respect to the clearance level/interval of the issued
query).
Di↵erently from the classic policy-based access control, the system, in addition of a
allow or deny decision, can deny access to the data set in the raw version, but still, provide
the user with an anonymized version of the data.
More formally, each access query req = (u, v)1 is characterized by a privacy clearance
T✏ which depends on user u and context information C (e.g., within the corporate network
users may have a larger clearance); a required clearance level T assessed depending on
the risk level risk of the dataset v resulting from the query.
The query req with a risk = li will be evaluated by the function Auth(req) defined as
follows:
Auth(req) =
8>><>>:
grant if T✏ 2 Ti
adjust i if T✏  Ti
deny if denied⇧
(6.1)
T✏ the privacy clearance of the request, expresses the trust we have that a query
will not violate privacy it plays the role of trust parameter used in the general model
(Chapter 4 Section 4.3). T✏ ⌘ T✏(u, C) depends on user u and context information C
(e.g., within the corporate network users may have a larger clearance)
Note that the privacy clearance parameter T✏, here, plays a role similar to the privacy
budget [126] typically used for di↵erential privacy models. But, in our case, we only
consider accessing disjoint sets of data, so each user/role can spend all his/her budget for
a single request, and he/she has access to data at the same, or lower, level as the pri-
vacy clearance. This is similar to the security clearance parameter in multi-level security
models.
Therefore, a user u (say the people manager of the department) with a trust clear-
ance T✏(people manager) is granted access to an dataset v (say the HR data of a de-
1In most cases the dependency between u and v is mediated by roles and/or permissions that should also be considered
in the evaluation of the query. However for the sake for simplicity, we do not consider roles, and focused only on read access,
for an extension of this model including roles, we can follow the lines of access control risk models as described in [14,34].
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partment risk = li) if the access control policy of the dataset ⇧ includes user u and
T✏(ppl manager) 2 Ti the clearance required by v.
If the query clearance is not su cient T✏  Ti we propose to apply the adjustment
strategy  i. An adjustment strategy  i can be predefined for each risk level li2, to mitigate
the risk (e.g. by sanitizing the data) and/or increase the privacy the same way we propose
to enhance trust in the general model (in Chapter 4 Section 4.3).
If we chose to provide a sanitized version of the data (say for the people managers
of other departments), in this case, the system retrieves the privacy clearance value, T✏,
associated to the user/request, and it applies the di↵erentially private sanitizer to the
original data to obtain a data set of di↵erential privacy ✏ = 1/T✏3.
Adding this option of providing sanitized data can increase the flexibility and, ulti-
mately, the access to data. On the other hand, especially for large privacy clearances,
T✏, the high level of sanitization (very small ✏) can severely impact the utility, making
the data not usable. To this aim, we foresee mechanisms to (temporarily) increase the
privacy clearance to meet the expected utility, for example asking the user to fulfill some
obligations (as we proposed in Chapter 4). The architecture described in Section. 6.5 can
support this privacy clearance enhancement (trust enhancement) functionality, but, we
do not discuss them in details in this study, focusing more on data sanitization for risk
mitigation.
Finally Access can be denied if the policy denies4 ⇧(req) = denied. Of course, this
implies that for the first two outcomes (allow and adjust) the request was not denied by
the policy.
6.5 Architecture
In this section we present an abstract architecture for our privacy-aware Risk-based access
control framework based on di↵erential privacy. We will also highlight the main modi-
fications with respect to the architecture of the general model presented in Chapter 4
Section 4.4 The architecture, depicted in Figure 6.1, is composed of three main modules:
Privacy-Aware Access Control Module is the entry point of the system, through
which users can submit requests to retrieve data from the underlying database. This
module evaluates the access request, and it grants access to (original or sanitized
version of) the requested data or denies access.
For this scope, the Privacy-Aware Access Control Module assesses the data request
2The possibility of dynamically selecting an adjustment strategy was also discussed in Chapter 5
3Note that the system may have already in the cache the anonymized data set, if it had received the same data request
at the same privacy clearance. In this case, there is no need to re-anonymize the data, and it uses the already produced
data set, improving performance and security.
4explicitly or implicitly as discussed in Chapter 4
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Figure 6.1: Architecture of the Privacy-Aware Risk-Based Access Control framework (Based on di↵eren-
tial privacy)
against an access policy to determine whether the requester has the needed au-
thorizations to access the resource (requested data-view) and, also, to evaluate the
privacy clearance (as discussed in Section. 6.4). Then, the decision is enforced by
calling the Privacy Enforcement Module or renegotiate by calling the Privacy Clearance
Enhancement Module.
The Privacy-Aware Access Control Module is based the on the XACML (eXtensible
Access Control Markup Language) standard [115]. XACML is a declarative fine-
grained, access control policy language. The standard also provides an access control
architecture and a description of the access evaluation process (data-flows, access
request, access decision etc.)
In this module Access Control is realized internally using a PEP-PDP 5 pair. A
PIP (Policy Information Point) is used to provide additional information needed to
evaluate the request and estimate its privacy clearance (e.g., in our use case if the
requester is a manager, we would like to know her/his department in order to de-
fine her/his privacy clearance, if the requested data contains information about his
department this queries clearance will be higher than the clearances of queries re-
questing data about other departments)
5In XACML the PDP is the point that evaluates an access request against an authorizations policy and issues an access
decision and the PEP Policy Enforcement Point is the point that intercepts user’s request, it calls the PDP for an access
decision then it enforces the decision by allowing or denying the access.
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Privacy Enforcement Module. After evaluation of the access request, the Privacy En-
forcement Module receives a data view (non-anonymized version) and a privacy clear-
ance value. The role of this module is applying data sanitization algorithms, and
generating an anonymized version of this data view, according to the privacy clear-
ance.
Privacy Clearance Enhancement Module. The privacy clearance defined by the
Privacy-Aware Access Control Module can be re-negotiated to a higher level in some
cases (for example if the utility of the anonymized data is not su cient) to allow
more flexibility. The user can ask (temporally) for a higher clearance, in exchange,
for example, of fulfilling some obligations to mitigate the additional risk. These oper-
ations are typically expressed as access and usage control obligations (see Chapter 4),
for example imposing deletion of a resource after that a retention period expires, or
providing stronger authentication credentials.
It is easy to see that the Privacy-Aware Access Control Module is also risk-based in this ar-
chitecture and can be mapped to the Risk-based access control module in the general archi-
tecture presented in Chapter 4, Figure 4.2. The Privacy Clearance Negotiation Moduleplays
the role of Trust Enhancer aiming to provide the requester/request with higher privacy
clearance to reach the required clearance to execute a query. The Data sanitizer in the
Privacy enforcement Module allows enforcing the selected risk mitigation strategy. Com-
bined together the Privacy Clearance Negotiation Module and Privacy enforcement Module
can be mapped to the Trust and Risk adjustment module in the general model Figure 4.2.
No Risk estimation or Trust estimation modules are included in our architecture (Fig-
ure 6.1) since the version of the model presented in this chapter do not support dynamic
risk and trust (trust is substituted by the privacy clearance in this chapter) assessment.
Indeed the risk and privacy clearance are pre-computed and can be extracted respectively
from the Policy repository and Attributes repository (represented in Figure 6.1). Of course,
these modules can be integrated into our architecture if we will include dynamic risk and
privacy clearance assessment in a modified version of this di↵erential privacy based model
as we will discuss later in this chapter.
6.6 Experimental Evaluation
In order to evaluate the practical feasibility of our approach, we developed a proof-
of-concept implementation of the framework, to assess: i) the impact of our privacy-
preserving access control on the data quality. To this aim, we defined a simple classifica-
tion task, and test the performance using data sanitized at di↵erent privacy clearances. ii)
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to evaluate the impact of the enforcement of di↵erent privacy clearance levels (anonymiza-
tion by applying di↵erential privacy) on the performance of our access control system, in
terms of response time.
To address these questions, we implemented a prototype of our Privacy Enforcement
Module as described in Section. 6.5. As data sanitizer we used “Di↵Gen” a Di↵erentially-
private anonymization algorithm based on Generalization, proposed and implemented by
Mohammed et al. in [113].
Di↵Gen anonymizes the raw data by probabilistically generalizing the attributes. More
in details, starting from the most general state (one-single group), a set of specializations
are randomly selected, using an exponential mechanism with a predefined scoring func-
tion (e.g. a utility-based function assessing the information gain for each specialization).
Then, the algorithm computes the contingency tables, counting the number of records
sharing a combination of attributes, and, it applies Laplacian noise, with variance ✏, to
the generalized contingency table. Synthetic data can be then produced from the gener-
alized and randomized contingency table (see in [113] for details). The resulting data set,
generated by a ✏-di↵erential privacy mechanisms, can be safely used for any data analysis.
In Table 6.3 we represent di↵erent scenarios introduced in our use case in Section. 6.2.
We also map each scenario with the query’s risk level and required privacy clearance T 6.
Table 6.3: Example of risk and privacy clearance levels for di↵erent access scenarios introduced in the
use case Section. 6.2.
# Role Operation Risk level
Required
(clearance)
1 HR manager HR view (int.) Low Risk T2 = [0.01, 1[
2 HR manager HR view (ext.) Medium Risk T3 = [1, 10[
3 HR developer Testing data High Risk T4 = [10, 20[
4 HR Benchmarking Benchmark Very-High Risk T5 = [20,+1[
For our test, we use the Adult Data Set 7 from the UCI Machine Learning Repository.
This dataset contains 45K records from the US Census dataset with 15 demographic
and employment-related variables (6 numerical, 8 categorical, and 1 binary class column
representing two income levels,  50K or > 50K). The Experiments were conducted on
an Intel Core i5 2.6GHz PC with 8GB RAM.
Data Quality To evaluate the impact of anonymization on the Utility of data we pro-
pose to assess its impact on the accuracy of a simple classifier trained and tested using
anonymized data at di↵erent clearance levels (shown in Table 6.3).
We use as (binary) class attribute the income level,  50K or > 50K, and as classifier
6the full mapping between the risk levels and required privacy clearances can be found in Table 6.2
7Available at http://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/datasets/Adult
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the well-known C4.5 Algorithm [133]. Each anonymized data set is split in two. First
part of the data (2/3) is used as training data to build a classifier, and the remaining data
(1/3) is used as test data to measure the classification accuracy.
Figure 6.2: Classifier Accuracy for di↵erent privacy clearance T✏ in di↵erent intervals T . Each data point
represent the average over 100 runs (parameters of Di↵Gen: number of specialization of specialization
Ns = 10, and scoring function u = Max).
In Figure. 6.2, we report the accuracy of classifiers for di↵erent privacy clearances.
We can observe that for queries with Very-High Risk risk level, requiring a large privacy
clearance T✏ 2 T5 (where we sanitize the data to obtain small values of ✏ = 1/T✏), the
accuracy is highly impacted.
In fact, with ✏ = 0.01, the attributes are almost fully generalized, and the accuracy is
close to the case where all the attributes (but the class attribute, of course) are removed.
Still, the accuracy level of ' 75% could be enough for many benchmarking tasks.
The accuracy goes up, as expected, for when lower privacy clearance values are re-
quired. Privacy clearance in the range T4 = [10, 20[, still considered reasonably safe in
practical cases, allows producing data able to provide an accuracy close to 80%, which
it could be su cient as testing data for development, and to have a general view for a
manager on other department analytics.
Privacy clearance > 1 (manager view on own team data, in our use case), gives levels
of accuracy close to the raw data ' 85%.
Performance We estimate the computational overhead caused by the sanitization. From
these experiments, we observe that the time for performing the sanitization can be easily
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of the order of seconds, see Figure. 6.3. The e↵ect of the required privacy clearance (and
the epsilon for the required level of sanitization) on the performance (time) is limited.
Figure 6.3: Anonymization time for di↵erent privacy clearance T✏. Each data point represent the average
over 100 runs (parameters of Di↵Gen: number of specialization of specialization Ns = 10, and scoring
function u = Max).
Despite being preliminary results, it is clear that for reaching real-time performance
(as it is possible for k-anonymity algorithms, see Chapter 4), it is needed to include some
optimization, for example in terms of caching or testing other algorithms for generating
di↵erential private data set.
6.7 Chapter conclusions
In this chapter, we proposed a novel privacy-aware access control model, based on di↵er-
ential privacy. The model allows for data access at di↵erent privacy levels, generating a
sanitized data set according to the privacy clearance of the request. This model is com-
plementary to the one based on syntactic anonymity (to which we devoted the previous
chapter), indeed although di↵erential privacy was originally devised for privacy-preserving
data mining (so to answer a limited number of specific queries), it is becoming popular
also for privacy-preserving data publishing (so to produce anonymized dataset) [167], as
in our case. As we have shown, here, using a risk-based access control model in combina-
tion with di↵erential privacy, we are able to provide a flexible access control mechanism
producing su ciently accurate data for a classification task, and, at the same time, with
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a formal guarantee of the privacy level.
To evaluate our approach we developed a proof-of-concept prototype. A first exper-
imental analysis, considering an HR related use case, and a benchmarking dataset, in-
dicates that the model can address complex privacy and utility requirements. Indeed,
in our use case, we propose to integrate di↵erential privacy within a privacy-aware risk-
based access control model to prevent classification model from violating the privacy of
individuals in the training data while ensuring a decent level of accuracy to allow di↵erent
actors to exploit the results of this analysis.
This approach still presents a number of open issues to be solved for a practical usage.
For example, the performance of the current implementation is not a real-time perfor-
mance, therefore di↵erent algorithms and optimization strategies for the anonymization
need to be investigated.In addition, whereas in previous models we used the concept of
privacy risk, which has a clear business interpretation, here we used the ✏ parameter of
di↵erential privacy. In future works, we would like to relate the two approaches, including
explicitly privacy-risk assessment and adjustment mechanisms based on the concepts of
di↵erential identifiability [90] and interactive di↵erential privacy [54].
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Chapter 7
Evaluation of the Privacy-aware
Risk-based access control model
Using EPIC
In this chapter, we propose to evaluate our privacy-aware risk-based access con-
trol approach from privacy enhancement perspective using the EPIC method-
ology. We apply EPIC to identify and evaluate privacy threats originated by
authorized insider actors for two cybersecurity systems (CSS): a) a “classic
TDS” and b) the same TDS equipped with our privacy-aware access control
“privacy-aware TDS”. Then comparing the risk level of insider privacy threats
(i.e., privacy threats originated by authorized insider actors) identified in both
CSS.
The results of this evaluation show that the privacy violation risk of privacy
threats for several actors is significantly mitigated after the implementation of
our privacy-aware risk-based access control system.
7.1 Introduction
Threat Detection Systems TDS (described in Chapter 5, Section 5.5) are CSS (cyberse-
curity systems) used by organizations to monitor their information systems and detect
security threats and anomalies. A TDS collects and processes security information from
several entities deployed in the organization’s network (e.g., routers, end-user machines,
other CSS). Human agents (security experts) constantly interact with the TDS to ac-
complish several tasks e.g., monitoring security events, investigating alerts, maintaining
improving the threat detection. The data collected by TDS and accessible by the agents
often contain private information about individuals in the organization (e.g., employees,
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collaborators, clients). Therefore a TDS can be the source of several privacy violation
threats that the organization should identify, evaluate, and mitigate. These privacy vio-
lation threats include threats originated the security agents, who are authorized to access
data but can abuse their access privileges, not respect the purposes of accessing data, and
violate privacy.
In Chapter 5, we propose a privacy-aware risk-based access control system as a solution
to mitigate this category of threats. In this chapter, we evaluate our privacy-aware risk-
based access control system from the privacy perspective and highlight its mitigatory
impact on threats identified for a TDS deployed in a testing environment (as described
in Section 5.5).
To identify the privacy threats, and evaluate the impact of our solution on these threats,
we will use the methodology EPIC (described in Section 4)). As a reminder, EPIC
(Evaluating privacy risk in cybersecurity systems) is a four-step methodology used to
identify, evaluate and prioritize privacy violation threats in CSS. In addition, EPIC can
also be used to compare two CSS from the privacy perspective or a CSS before and after
the adoption of a privacy-enhancing feature. Consequently, the methodology can also be
used to evaluate a given privacy-enhancing solution by assessing the privacy improvement
brought by the adoption of this solution.
Since the evaluation carried in this chapter aims at studying the impact of our privacy-
aware risk-based access control on the privacy threats originated by authorized actors,
we will only focus on the aspects of the TDS related to these actors and components
equipped with the access control system. Moreover there will be no need to go through
the threat prioritization (last part of EPIC Step 4 Section 3.3.4), since we are not expecting
the privacy-aware risk-based access control to have an impact threat priority level (from
adversaries trust perspective), we are rather interested in observing its mitigatory impact
on the risk level.
The remaining of this chapter will be structured as follows: In Section 7.2, we will apply
the EPIC analysis to the Threats Detection System “TDS” (described in Section 5.5). in
Section7.3 e will apply the EPIC analysis to the “Privacy-aware TDS” and highlight the
we will summarize, comment the results and conclude in Section 7.4
7.2 Privacy evaluation: TDS
In this section, we report the main results of privacy threat analysis of the TDS. The
privacy threat analysis is achieved through the application of the evaluation methodology
EPIC presented in chapter 3.
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7.2.1 EPIC Step 1 (TDS)
The aim of this first step “Model the cybersecurity system” (described in 3.2.2) is to un-
derstand the cybersecurity system architecture, its data flows, and its functional aspects.
For this scope, we model the TDS using an extended data-flow diagram DFD+ (the dif-
ferent elements of DFD are described in Figure 3.2 . The elements added by the extended
version DFD+ are described in Figure 3.3).
Figure 7.1: DFD+ model (TDS)
Figure 7.1 depicts di↵erent components and data flows in the TDS. Security informa-
tion and events are constantly collected by di↵erent security (e.g., intrusion detection,
firewalls) and networking (e.g., routers, servers) components, deployed in the information
system. This information is sent to the TDS through the channel C1 and it goes through a
pattern matching executed by the process P2 to detect attacks and malfunctioning alerts
(that needs to be further investigated) as well as suspicious events (that needs to be mon-
itored to prevent other attacks and anomalies). After transiting through the channels
C2 and C3, alerts and events are respectively stored in the storage DS1 and DS2. The
logs can be retrieved from the data storage through channels C2.1 to the process P2 and
C3.1 to P3 The process P3 enables the three actors (i.e., Operator, Administrator and
Advanced administrator) to investigate the alerts logged by the TDS. Data is delivered
to the actors through C2.1.1, C2.1.2 and C2.1.3. The process P3 allows the actors to
monitor suspicious events delivered through C3.1.1, C3.1.2 and C3.1.3.
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7.2.2 EPIC Step 2 (TDS)
The aim of the second step “Identify data exposure” is to identify and evaluate possible
data exposures, i.e., situations in which data is disclosed to a potential adversary (see
Section 3.2.3 for more details about this step).
Table 7.1: Adversaries table (TDS)
Adversary Description
Operator Classify alerts and report patterns anomalies His/Her tasks require access to
pattern detection results (events/log data related to the suspicious pattern) in
case of alerts.
Administrator Has all Operator tasks and privileges. They can also Investigate alerts, Create
or Reconfigure patterns. He/She should have access the detection results and
events data related to the patterns.
Advanced
administrator
Has all Administrator tasks and privileges. Can also grant exceptional access to
the data by attributing higher trust level to an Operator or an Administrator.
As explained in the introduction we will mostly focus on aspects of the analysis re-
lated to authorized actors. We first identify di↵erent actors/adversaries interacting with
the TDS. In Table 7.1 we report a list of authorized adversaries (these adversaries have
been first introduced in Section 5.5). After that, we study di↵erent security mechanisms
protecting of components identified in step 1 (depicted in Figure 7.1). Actors, in our
case, have authorized interacts only with processes P2 and P3 (these interactions are
controlled by an access control system). In Table 7.2 we report the security mechanisms
protecting these two processes.
Table 7.2: Components security table (TDS)
Component Authorized users Security mechanisms
P2
Advanced admin.,
Administrator,
Operator
Access control, authentication, network security
P3 same as above Access control, authentication, network security
Once we have the description of adversaries and components, we can now establish the
list of exposures and assess their magnitudes and the likelihoods of access. We report the
results of this assessment in Table 7.3.
We identify three exposures for each for each component: Exp1, Exp2, and Exp3 at the
level of process P2 and Exp4, Exp5, and Exp6 at the level of process P3. As mentioned
earlier, actors are authorized to access the data from processes P2 and P3 consequently
the likelihood of access La = Authorised for all six exposures in Table 7.3. The magnitude
of exposure in a process is assessed considering the number and frequency of access for
each actor and the amount of data available to access i.e., amount of data collected
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Table 7.3: Data exposures table (TDS)
Component Adversary Exposure La Exposure magnitude
P2: Alert
investigation
Advanced admin. Exp1 Authorized Important
Administrator ExP3 Authorized Important
Operator Exp3 Authorized Important
P3: Events
monitoring
Advanced admin. Exp4 Authorized Very-Important
Administrator Exp5 Authorized Very-Important
Operator Exp6 Authorized Very-Important
daily, retention time (see Section 3.2.4 for more details). All our actors in our case have
unlimited access the data both for alert investigation (P2 ) and event monitoring (P3 ).
In addition, our threat detection system o↵ers the possibility to collect a huge amount
of data which companies store for an extended amount of time. For example, our data
security events data set has over 1bn entry collected in a testing environment in a period
shorter then a month this amount can be way bigger in production environment e.g., an
organization with 1000 employees will process in average 3.5 terabytes of security data
monthly [65].
7.2.3 EPIC Step 3 (TDS)
After identifying the exposures in the previous steps, we now assess whether these expo-
sures (summarized in Table 7.3) represent privacy threats or not (see Section 3.2.4 for
mode details about Step 3 “Identify privacy threats”). To do so we need to take into
account which attributes and which types of data are actually exposed, thus we start by
listing and describing these data attributes.
For example, the TDS we have been studying (SAP ETD) logs and uses over 40
attributes related to security events. However, not all of these attributes are interesting
for us (e.g., meta-data of filters and patterns, processing time stamps, log type), therefore
we dismissed these attributes during the analysis. Some of these attributes are also privacy
neutral (i.e., not identifiers, not QIDs, nor sensitive), and, for the sake of brevity, we do
not mention these attributes either during the analysis. In Table 7.4 we report a sample
of relevant attributes, and we provide a description and an example of each attribute.
In the example given in Section 3.2.3, we explained the data leaked in each exposure is
composed of heterogeneous types of records (i.e., records with di↵erent attributes). Our
TDS, however, can correlate di↵erent events from several types of logs (and other sources)
to generates unified logs that are as homogeneous and rich as possible. Nonetheless, the
data views exposed through processes P2 and P3 have di↵erent structure (i.e., di↵erent
attributes) depending on the pattern (anomalies and security threat patterns described
in Section 5.5) generating the alerts to investigate or the events to monitor. Therefore,
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Table 7.4: Attributes description table (TDS)
Name Description Domain Example
Timestamp Event (log entry) timestamp DD.MM.YYYY
hh:mm:ss
07.10.2015 18:39:36
UserID pseudo-anonymised user identifier Alphanumeric
pseudo
DG70W98CY1
SysID (origin) Identifier of the system originating a re-
quest (client or server)
Alphanumeric
code
MAIL/X009
SysID (target) Identifier of the system targeted a re-
quest (client or server)
Alphanumeric
code
ERP/E113
Hostname Machin ID (often organized by geo-
location)
Alphanumeric
code
ITA-Trento-ND0606
IP (origin) IP adress (source) of a machine in the
internal or external network
IP Address 91.218.36.178
IP (target) IP adress (destination) of a machine in
the internal or external network
IP Address 239.121.10.177
PrivilegeName Name describing a given privilege (ac-
tion, transaction)
action-
TransactionName
create-FS-45 (create
an outgoing payment)
TransactionName Technical name of a specific business
transaction
Alphanumeric
code
FS-45 - outgoing pay-
ments
File(metadata) File name, download path, size, author
creation time etc.
path\name.pdf, 504kb,
2017-06-06 12:07:10
File(content) A file being downloaded String of bytes
Email(header) Email Object, Sender and Reciver
adresses
smtp header from: to: date: sub-
ject: etc.
Email(content) Content of an Email(textual) and at-
tachments
URL (path) visited sites urls and parameters if any URL https://youtube.
com/watch?=mmtgs
in our analysis, di↵erent data contents will be defined for each used pattern. For sake of
brevet, we will only report some of the most commonly used patterns.
In Table 7.51 we describe the patterns that we will be used and the data attributes
collected and (can be exposed) by each pattern. A data content will be associated to each
pattern or more exactly to the data exposed by a pattern (e.g., dc1 will be associated to
Brute force attack pattern and will expose the following attributes IP (origin), IP (tar-
get), UserID, Hostname, and Timestamp).
As required by the EPIC methodology, we continue our analysis by classifying the
attributes of each data content as identifying (ID), quasi-identifying (QID), or potentially
1Note that this Table 7.5 does not belong to the list of tables used for EPIC (see Figure 3.1). We use this table in this
use case for clarity proposes.
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Table 7.5: Data contents patterns association, description of the patterns, and attributes used by each
pattern (TDS)
Data
content
Pattern Name Pattern description Attributes collected
dc1 Brute force attack
Event : failed login attempt
Alert : 20 failed login attempts in
less than 10 minutes
IP (origin); IP (target); UserID;
Hostname; Timestamp
dc2
Irregular
transactions
Event : failing transaction
Alert : successful transaction after
failure or Blacklisted transaction
IP (origin); IP (target); UserID;
Hostname; SystemID (target);
TransactionName;
PrivilegeName; Timestamp
dc3 Blacklisted URL
Alert (and Event): request to
access a blacklisted URL
IP (origin); IP (target); UserID;
Hostname; SystemID (origin);
Timestamp; URL
dc4
Multiple downloads
by one user (Files)
Event : a file is downloaded to a
monitored system
Alert : file size or files number exceeds
the allowed threshold
IP (origin); IP (target); UserID;
Hostname; SystemID (origin);
File(metadata); File(content);
Timestamp
dc5
Multiple downloads
by one user (Emails)
Alert (and Event): email size or
number exceeds the allowed threshold
IP (origin); IP (target); UserID;
Hostname; SystemID (origin);
Email(header); Email(content);
Timestamp
sensitive information (PSI). When an attribute is classified as QID we indicate which
background knowledge may lead to re-identification when joined with the attribute value.
Results are reported in Table 7.6.
Finally, in Table 7.7 we show which data contents are exposed by each component. 5
data contents have been identified for of the processes P2 and P3 since the two processes
mostly use the same patterns (in our use case), the data contents exposed are similar
for both of them. In addition all adversaries (Advanced administrator ,Administrator,
and Operator) have access to all data contents. In this step, no privacy threat (i.e., a
combination of exposure and data content) will be cleared and all identified threats will
be further assessed in the next section.
7.2.4 EPIC Step 4 (TDS)
EPIC’s fourth step “Evaluate and prioritize privacy threat risk” aims at evaluating and
prioritizing the identified privacy threats (see Section 3.3 for more details about this
step). In this chapter, however, we will omit the very last part of Step 4 “the threat
prioritization” since we are only interested in comparing the privacy risk before and after
adopting the privacy-aware risk-based access control model as a privacy risk mitigation
solution.
As defined by EPIC, we start this step by evaluating privacy violation likelihood of
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Table 7.6: Data content attributes analysis table (TDS)
Data
content
ID
QID
PSI
Attribute Bg. Kowledge
dc1 None IP (origin); UserID;
Hostname
List associating IP-addresses or UserIDs or
Hostnames with user-names
IP (target);
Timestamp
dc2 None
IP (origin);
UserID;
Hostname;
PrivilegeName
List associating IP-addresses or UserIDs or
Hostnames with user-names.
Knowledge about privilege-users assignment
(especially for very particular privileges)
IP (target);
SystemID (target);
TransactionName;
Timestamp
dc3 None
IP (origin); UserID;
Hostname;
SystemID (origin)
URL
List associating IP-addresses or UserIDs or
Hostnames with user-names
IP (target);
Timestamp; URL
dc4 None
IP (origin); UserID;
Hostname;
SystemID (origin)
File(metadata);
File(content)
List associating IP-addresses or UserIDs or
Hostnames with user-names
IP (target);
File(metadata);
File(content)
dc5 None
IP (origin); UserID;
Hostname;
SystemID (origin);
Email(header);
Email(content)
List associating IP-addresses or UserIDs or
Hostnames with user-names
IP (target);
Email(header);
Email(content)
Table 7.7: Data content identification table (TDS)
Exposure
Data content
Exp. Component Adversary La
Exp1
P2. Alert
Investigation
Advanced
administrator
Authorized dc1, dc2, dc3, dc4, and dc5
Exp2 P2. Administrator Authorized Same data contents as above
Exp3 P2. Operator Authorized Same data contents as above
Exp4
P3. Event
Monitoring
Advanced
administrator
Authorized dc1, dc2, dc3, dc4, and dc5
Exp5 P3. Administrator Authorized Same data contents as above
Exp6 P3. Operator Authorized Same data contents as above
privacy violation threats (see Table 7.8), then impact severity of these violations (see
Table 7.9), and finally we evaluate the privacy violation risk (Table 7.10) as the combina-
tion of privacy violation likelihood and impact severity using the risk matrix presented in
Section 3.3.3 in Table 3.10. In the following, we provide some details on how these values
were obtained.
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Table 7.8: Privacy violation likelihood table (TDS)
Exposure
Data
content
La Lrid Th L
Exp1: P2
Advanced admin.
dc3 Authorized Medium Th1 High
dc2 Authorized High Th2 Very High
dc3 Authorized High Th3 Very High
Exp2: P2
Administrator
dc4 Authorized High Th9 Very High
dc5 Authorized Certain Th10 Very High
Exp3: P2
Operator
dc4 Authorized High Th14 Very High
dc5 Authorized Certain Th15 Very High
Exp1: P3
Advanced admin.
dc3 Authorized Medium Th16 High
dc2 Authorized High Th17 Very High
dc3 Authorized High Th18 Very High
Exp2: P3
Administrator
dc4 Authorized High Th24 Very High
dc5 Authorized Certain Th25 Very High
Exp3: P3
Operator
dc4 Authorized High Th29 Very High
dc5 Authorized Certain Th30 Very High
In threats Th1, Th2, and Th3 data contents dc1, dc2, and dc3 are (respectively)
exposed (in Exp1) at the level of process P2 (Alert investigation) to the adversary
Advanced administrator (Exp1) who has a likelihood of access La = Authorized (see
Table 7.8). In Th1, the data content dc1 contains (among others) the QID attribut
IP(origin) that can be used by the adversary to reidentify the records with a medium
likelihood (Lrid = medium). Indeed the Alert investigation is not supposed to access in-
formation mapping the IP(origin) and the identity of respondents. He/She can however
easily gain this information a long exercising his/her security tasks. Th2 and Th3 have a
re-identification likelihood Lrid = High. In addition to the QID IP(origin) data content
dc2 and dc3 (exposed by Th2 and Th3) contain the QID attributes PrivilegeName and
SystemID (origin) (see Table 7.6) which can increase the likelihood of re-identification
especially since the Alert investigation has a fairly high capacity of obtaining this infor-
mation especially for particular Privileges (e.g., high-level privileges often assigned to very
few people) and Systems(e.g., very old or very new systems are easy to single out).
The impact of Th1 and Th2 is low (see Table7.9). The violation magnitude of these
threats is quite limited (respectively limited and very-limited) because there are very few
alerts related to dc1 and dc2 (they are mostly collected as events) in addition data at-
tributes in these two data contents are not very sensitive (mostly internal IP addresses and
work related information) therefore in the context of a security alert both non-compliance
impact IC and reputation Loss impact IR2 have low levels. Th3 however has an important
2In this evaluation, we do not have data to evaluate the impact of privacy violation in terms of business agreements
(failure to meet business agreements). Therefore, and for sake of simplicity, we will assume the company has no privacy
business agreements to comply with, and we will not consider the impact factor IB
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Table 7.9: Qualitative privacy violation impact table (TDS)
Exposure
Data
content
Th
Violation
magn.
IC IR I
Exp1: P2
Advanced
admin.
dc1 Th1 Limited Low Low Low
dc2 Th2 Very-limited Low Low Low
dc3 Th3 Important Low Medium Medium
Exp2: P2
Admin.
dc4 Th9 Medium Med-high Med-high Med-high
dc5 Th10 Limited Med-high Med-high Med-high
Exp3: P2
Operator
dc4 Th14 Medium High High High
dc5 Th15 Limited High High High
Exp4: P3
Advanced
admin.
dc1 Th16 Medium Low Low Low
dc2 Th17 Medium Low Med-low Med-low
dc3 Th18 Important Low Medium Medium
Exp5: P3
Admin.
dc4 Th24 Medium High High High
dc5 Th25 Limited High High High
Exp6: P3
Operator
dc4 Th29 Medium High High High
dc5 Th30 Limited High High High
magnitude of violation and dc3 contains URLs which might leak important information
about respondents. This reflects on Th3 risk level R = high (see Table 7.17).
In threats Th16, Th17, and Th18 the same data contents dc1, dc2, and dc3 are ex-
posed (in Exp4) to the same adversary (Alert investigation) in an other context (event
monitoring ) from process P3. Overall these threats slightly higher risk (with respect to
Th1, Th2, and Th3. see Table 7.17). In fact, the magnitude of violation in this context
(Event monitoring) is more important for all three threats because generally more data
is collected as events (the number of events is higher than the number of alerts) and this
a↵ects more respondents. In addition access to some sensitive data might not be always
justifiable (in the public opinion) if there is no real need (security alerts) and if this access
is used to violate privacy the impact on reputation can be important (e.g., in the case of
Th18). (e.g., in the case of Th18).
Th9, Th10, Th14 and Th15 describe the threats of exposing data contents dc4 (in
Th9 and Th14) and dc5 (Th10 and Th15) by the process P2 to two di↵erent actors
(Administrator and Operator). The above threats, all, have very high likelihoods of re-
identification Lrid = high or Lrid = certain (see Table 7.8) which overall leads to very
high likelihoods of violation (L). This is due to the fact that both data contents exposed in
these threats (dc4 and dc5) leak very strong QIDs (highly identifying attributes/attribute
combinations e.g., Email(header), Files(meta) and Files(content) see Table 7.6). These
threats have average magnitude of violation (limited to medium) because, although very
sensitive dc4 and dc5 are not collected very .
Th24, Th25, Th29, and Th30 are threats identified at the level of P3. They expose data
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Table 7.10: Qualitative privacy violation risk table (TDS)
Th Exposure Data content L I R
Th1 Exp1: P2 Advanced admin. dc1 High Low Low
Th2 Exp1: P2 Advanced admin. dc2 Very-high Low Medium
Th3 Exp1: P2 Advanced admin. dc3 Very-high Medium High
Th9 Exp2: P2, Administrator dc4 Very-high Med-high High
Th10 Exp2: P2, Administrator dc5 Very-high Med-high High
Th14 Exp3: P2, Operator dc4 Very-high High High
Th15 Exp3: P2, Operator dc5 Very-high High High
Th16 Exp4: P3 Advanced admin. dc1 High Low Low
Th17 Exp4: P3 Advanced admin. dc2 Very-high Med-Low Medium
Th18 Exp4: P3 Advanced admin. dc3 Very-high Medium High
Th24 Exp5: P3, administrator dc4 Very-high High High
Th25 Exp5: P3, administrator dc5 Very-high High High
Th29 Exp6: P3, Operator dc4 Very-high High High
Th30 Exp6: P3, Operator dc5 Very-high High High
contents dc4 and dc5 to the actors Administrator and Operator in the context of event
monitoring. Similarly to Th9 and Th10, Th24 and Th25 have very high likelihoods of
violation (L see Table 7.8) since they expose the same data contents (dc4 and dc5). Despite
also having the same magnitude of violation, Th24 and Th25 have higher overall impact
severity (I see Table 7.9) for when involving the actor Administrator (with respect to Th9
and Th10). This increase of the impact severity is due to the lack of appropriateness in
the decision of granting these two actors (with average levels of trust) access to this very
sensitive data (in dc4 and dc5) without a real need for this leakage, both from compliance
and reputational standpoint. We can observe the same trends with threats Th29 and Th30
involving the actor Operator which have similar privacy violation likelihood that Th14
and Th15 (threats involving the same actor and exposing the same data contents dc4 and
dc5 in a di↵erent context). The impact severity level changes were not very observable
in this case because the impact levels are already at their highest level see Table 7.9,
however, a quantitative assessment would probably reveal slightly higher values.
7.3 Privacy evaluation: Privacy-aware TDS
In this section, we apply the EPIC methodology on a TDS equipped with the privacy-
aware risk-based access control system (we refer to this TDS as “Privacy-aware TDS”).
We will then compare these results with the results obtained in the last section (reporting
the EPIC analysis of the TDS without privacy-aware risk-based access control system
“classic TDS”) to assess the privacy improvements.
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7.3.1 EPIC Step 1 (Privacy-aware TDS)
The architecture of the TDS (components, and actors interacting with the system) is not
a↵ected by the adoption of the privacy-aware risk-based access control system. Therefore
we will use the DFD+ diagram modeling depicted in Figure 7.1) for the rest of the analysis.
7.3.2 EPIC Step 2 (Privacy-aware TDS)
The adversaries interacting with the Privacy-aware TDS are the same adversaries identi-
fied in Table 7.1, they also have the same description and tasks.
Table 7.11: Components security table (Privacy-aware TDS)
Component Authorized users Security mechanisms
P2
Operator,
Administrator,
Advanced Admin.
Privacy-aware risk-based access control,
authentication,
network security
P3 same as above same as above
The security mechanisms implemented to protect processes P2 and P3 3 of the privacy-
aware TDS (reported in Table7.11) are similar to the mechanisms identified for the classic
TDS (reported in the previous section Table7.2) with the exception, of course, of the
privacy-aware risk-based access control equipping the privacy-aware TDS.
Table 7.12: Data exposures table (TDS)
Component Adversary Exposure La Exposure magnitude
P2: Alert
investigation
Advanced admin. Exp1 Authorized Important
Administrator Exp2 Authorized Important
Operator Exp3 Authorized Medium
P3: Events
monitoring
Advanced admin. Exp4 Authorized Very-Important
Administrator Exp5 Authorized Important
Operator Exp6 Authorized Limited
The adoption of the privacy-aware risk-based access control (in the Privacy-aware
TDS) does not a↵ect the likelihood of access (La) of the identified exposures, as reported
in Table 7.12 (with respect to the one reported in Table 7.3). The magnitude of exposure,
however, will slightly decrease especially in P3 and for the adversaries Administrator and
Operator, since this process (Events monitoring) does not have the same emergency level
than P2 (Alert investigation), in addition, it can be carried on using partially obfuscated
data. If needed the Administrator and Operator, according to their trust levels, can re-
quest additional data in return for fulfilling trust enhancement obligations. The Advanced
3Similarly to the previous section, Section 7.2 we are only interested in studying processes P2 and P3 since they are the
only component with which authorized actors interact through an access control system
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administrator is expected to have a very high trust level, and his ability to access even
very risky data will be very little a↵ected by the new access control system.
7.3.3 EPIC Step 3 (Privacy-aware TDS)
After identifying the exposures in the previous steps, we now assess whether these expo-
sures (summarized in Table 7.3) represent privacy threats or not (see Section 3.2.4 for
mode details about Step 3 “Identify privacy threats”).
Table 7.13: Data contents patterns association, description of the patterns, and attributes used by each
pattern (Privacy-aware TDS)
Data
content
Pattern Name Pattern description Attributes collected
dc4.1
Multiple downloads
by one user (Files)
Alert : file size or files number exceeds
the allowed threshold
IP (origin); IP (target); UserID;
Hostname; SystemID (origin);
File(metadata); File(content);
Timestamp
dc4.2
Multiple downloads
by one user (Files)
Event : a file is downloaded to a
monitored system
IP (origin); IP (target); UserID;
Hostname; SystemID (origin);
File(metadata);
Timestamp
dc5.1
Multiple downloads
by one user (Emails)
Alert : email size or
number exceeds the allowed threshold
IP (origin); IP (target); UserID;
Hostname; SystemID (origin);
Email(header); Email(content);
Timestamp
dc5.2
Multiple downloads
by one user (Emails)
Event : email size or
number exceeds the allowed threshold
IP (origin); IP (target); UserID;
Hostname; SystemID (origin);
Email(header);
Timestamp
The attributes exposed by the privacy-aware TDS are the same attributes exposed by
the classic TDS. A list of the most relevant attributes is reported and described Table 7.4.
In addition, the new access control system introduces dc4.1, dc4.2, dc5.1 and dc5.2.
These are sub-contents respectively of dc4 and dc5 (see Table 7.5). dc4.2 and dc5.2 are
sub-contents from which we remove the most sensitive attributes Email(content) and File
(content). dc4.1 and dc5.1 have exactly the same attributes than dc4 and dc5. The access
control system, now, distinguishes between data contents, released for event monitoring
(i.e., dc4.2, dc5.2), and data contents released for alert investigation (i.e., dc4.1 and dc5.1)
for the attack patterns “Multiple downloads by one user (Emails)” and “Multiple down-
loads by one user (files)”(see Table 7.13). Indeed, the actors (see Table 7.1) do not need to
see the Email(content) and File (content) when monitoring events for these two patterns,
so there is no need to take a risk in this context, especially when the request does not
have high-level of trust (e.g., low trust user, low trust device).
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The data contents exposed by each exposure is also slightly modified by the adoption
of the privacy-aware risk-based access control systems for some of the actors, as reported
in Table 7.14. Indeed, only the Advanced administrator will still be able to access all
data contents (list in Table 7.13) from both processes P2 and P3. For the Administrator
and Operator, data contents dc4.1 and dc5.1 are only accessible through P2 to investigate
alerts, whereas event monitoring tasks (in P3 ) only expose the “sub-contents” dc4.2 and
dc5.2, which, we will later see, has a lower risk level than dc4.1 and dc5.1 when exposed
to these adversaries.
Table 7.14: Data content identification table (Privacy-aware TDS)
Exposure
Data content
Exp. Component Adversary La
Exp1
P2. Alert
Investigation
Advanced
administrator
Authorized dc1, dc2, dc3, dc4.1, and dc5.1
Exp2 P2. Administrator Authorized Same data contents as above
Exp3 P2. Operator Authorized Same data contents as above
Exp4
P3. Event
Monitoring
Advanced
administrator
Authorized dc1, dc2, dc3, dc4.2, and dc5.2
Exp5 P3. Administrator Authorized Same data contents as above
Exp6 P3. Operator Authorized Same data contents as above
7.3.4 EPIC Step 4 (Privacy-aware TDS)
Threats Th1, Th2, and Th3 (threats identified at the level of process P2 ) risk levels
were not a↵ected by the adoption of the privacy-aware risk-based access control solution
(observable by comparing Tables 7.10 and 7.17). This can be explained by the fact
that adversary (or adversaries with this role Advanced administrator) usually has a very
high trust level and the fact that the context requires a more permissive access to data
to react to a potential security emergency. Therefore our access control system will
not take restrictive decisions regarding requests issued by this adversary in this context.
Consequently the re-identifiability (observable through Lrid see Tables 7.8 and 7.15), the
violation magnitude, and the sensitivity (see Tables 7.9 and 7.16) of the data remain
the same for these threats, whether we use our privacy-aware risk-based access control
solution or not.
For similar threats Th16, Th17, and Th18 (threats exposing data contents dc1, dc2,
and dc3 to the same adversary Advanced administrator in a di↵erent context “event
monitoring”) the overall risk level slightly dropped for the privacy-aware TDS using our
access control approach (see Tables 7.10 and 7.17). Although the adversary (Advanced
administrator) is very trusted, some of the data (the most sensitive) will only be released
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Table 7.15: Privacy violation likelihood table (Privacy-aware TDS)
Exposure
Data
content
La Lrid Th L
Exp1: P2
Advanced admin.
dc3 Authorized Medium Th1 High
dc2 Authorized High Th2 Very High
dc3 Authorized High Th3 Very High
Exp2: P2
Administrator
dc4.1 Authorized Medium Th9 High
dc5.1 Authorized High Th10 Very High
Exp3: P2
Operator
dc4.1 Authorized Medium Th14 High
dc5.1 Authorized High Th15 Very High
Exp1: P3
Advanced admin.
dc3 Authorized Medium Th16 Medium
dc2 Authorized High Th17 High
dc3 Authorized High Th18 High
Exp2: P3
Administrator
dc4.2 Authorized High Th24 Medium
dc5.2 Authorized Certain Th25 High
Exp3: P3
Operator
dc4.2 Authorized High Th29 Negligible
dc5.2 Authorized Certain Th30 Medium
Table 7.16: Qualitative privacy violation impact table (Privacy-aware TDS)
Exposure
Data
content
Th
Violation
magn.
IC IR I
Exp1: P2
Advanced
admin.
dc1 Th1 Limited Low Low Low
dc2 Th2 Very-limited Low Low Low
dc3 Th3 Important Low Medium Medium
Exp2: P2
Admin.
dc4.1 Th9 Very-limited Medium Medium Med-high
dc5.1 Th10 Very-limited Medium Medium Med-high
Exp3: P2
Operator
dc4.1 Th14 Very-limited Med-High Med-High High
dc5.1 Th15 Very-limited Med-High Med-High High
Exp4: P3
Advanced
admin.
dc1 Th16 Medium Low Low Low
dc2 Th17 Medium Low Med-low Med-low
dc3 Th18 Important Low Medium Medium
Exp5: P3
Admin.
dc4.2 Th24 Medium Med-low Med-low High
dc5.2 Th25 Limited Med-low Med-low High
Exp6: P3
Operator
dc4.2 Th29 Medium Medium Med-low High
dc5.2 Th30 Limited Medium Med-low High
with some adjustments (e.g., anonymization to lower the risk, monitored access to enhance
trust).
Threats Th9, Th10, Th14 and Th15 expose data contents dc4.1 (in Th9 and Th14)
and dc5.1 (Th10 and Th15) by the process P2 (in the context of alert investigation) to
two di↵erent actors (Administrator and Operator). The likelihood of re-identification Lrid
dropped significantly for both involved actors (Administrator and Operator) from {high,
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certain} to {medium, high} which makes the overall likelihood of violation L drop (in
an observable way for Th9 and Th14, see di↵erence between Table 7.8 and Table 7.15).
This decrease is due to the fact that our privacy-aware risk-based access control system is
expected, even in this context, to enforce anonymization (more or less strong anonymiza-
tion depending on the trust of the actor/requester) on dc4.1 and dc5.1, before releasing
the information, because these data contents are very easily re-identifiable (they con-
tain attributes like Email(header)) and very sensitive (contain sensitive information e.g.,
Email(content) and File(content)). The magnitude of violation decreases as well and it
becomes very-limited for all four threats, in fact, as mentioned earlier, the adoption of our
access control system divided dc4 and dc5 (see Table 7.5) to “sub-contents” dc4.1, dc5.1
only exposed in case of alerts and dc4.2 and dc5.2 exposed as events. dc4.2 and dc5.2
contain less sensitive attributes (see Table 7.13), but have higher number of records with
leave dc4.1 and dc5.1 with a limited number of records. This also reflected on the impact
severity of the threats, which dropped from (see Tables 7.9 and 7.16) med-high to medium
for Th9 and Th14 (threats involving the actor Administrator) and from high to med-high
Th10 and Th15 (threats involving the actor Operator) the operator accessing this very
sensitive data (even in a security context) is still problematic and have high impacts on
both compliance and reputation the data accessed was used to violate privacy. The overall
risk for these threats
Th24, Th25, Th29, and Th30 are threats identified at the level of P3. They now
expose data contents dc4.2 and dc5.2 (instead of dc4 and dc5 see Tables 7.7 and 7.14) to
the actors Administrator and Operator in the context of event monitoring. As mentioned
earlier dc4.2 and dc5.2 are sub-sets of dc4 and dc5 and containing less QIDs and sensitive
attributes (e.g., no File(content) in dc4.2 and no Email(content) in dc5). These attributes
are not supposed to be accessed in the context of event monitoring, and if really needed
the Administrator and Operator have to fulfill trust enhancement actions to be granted
access. These changes in the data contents in addition to anonymization applied to high
risk views of dc4.2 and dc5.2, drastically decrease the likelihood of re-identification Lrid and
the overall privacy violation likelihood L of these threats (see Tables 7.8 and 7.15). The
magnitude of the violation does not observably decrease (since the quantity of data is still
very important and contains some sensitive information e.g., Email(header), File(meta)
that can still be used to violate privacy). Nonetheless, impact factors IC and IR and
the overall I decrease significantly. Consequently, the adoption of our privacy-aware risk-
based access control system decreased significantly the over all risk for threats Th24,
Th25, Th29, and Th30 (see Tables 7.10 and 7.17)
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Table 7.17: Qualitative privacy violation risk table (Privacy-aware TDS)
Th Exposure Data content L I R
Th1 Exp1: P2 Advanced admin. dc1 High Low Low
Th2 Exp1: P2 Advanced admin. dc2 Very-high Low Medium
Th3 Exp1: P2 Advanced admin. dc3 Very-high Medium High
Th9 Exp2: P2, Administrator dc4 High Medium High
Th10 Exp2: P2, Administrator dc5 Very-high Medium Medium
Th14 Exp3: P2, Operator dc4 High Med-high High
Th15 Exp3: P2, Operator dc5 Very-high Med-high High
Th16 Exp4: P3 Advanced admin. dc1 Medium Low Low
Th17 Exp4: P3 Advanced admin. dc2 High Med-Low Medium
Th18 Exp4: P3 Advanced admin. dc3 High Medium Medium
Th24 Exp5: P3, administrator dc4.2 Medium Med-Low Low
Th25 Exp5: P3, administrator dc5.2 High Med-Low Medium
Th29 Exp6: P3, Operator dc4.2 Negligible Medium Low
Th30 Exp6: P3, Operator dc5.2 Medium Medium Medium
7.4 Chapter conclusions
In this chapter, we evaluated the privacy-aware access control approach from the privacy
perspective by using the EPIC methodology (described in Chapter 3). To this scope, we
applied the methodology to identify and evaluate privacy threats originated by authorized
insider actors for two cybersecurity systems: a) a “classic TDS” and a the same TDS
equipped with our privacy-aware access control “privacy-aware TDS”. Then, we compared
the risk values of threats identified in both systems.
The overall mitigatory impact of our approach (privacy-aware access control approach)
on authorized insider threats’ privacy risk level can be seen by comparing Table 7.10 and
Table 7.17. Integrating our approach within a privacy-aware TDS results in a significant
decrease of the risk levels of threats where sensitive data was accessed in contexts where
there no “strong” need to access it. Thus, it reinforces the application of the data min-
imization principle and grants access on real need-to-know bases. The adoption of our
approach did not have an observable impact on threats when data are accessed for analyz-
ing a security alert. Indeed in this context, the security needs outweigh the sensitivity of
the data and legitimize access especially for trusted actors. At a more granular level, our
privacy-aware access control approach decreases the magnitude of exposures even in this
context, by 1) decreasing the magnitude of violation by decreasing access to sensitive data
contents 2) decreasing the likelihood of re-identification by limiting access to identifying
attributes (e.g., through anonymization) and consequently the total privacy-violation like-
lihood. 3) mitigating the impact of privacy violations from both legal (non-compliance
impact factor) and reputational (reputation loss impact factor) aspects. these impacts
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are more observable for categories of actors with low trust level (i.e., Operators).
One of the aspects that we did not consider in this evaluation the impact of our
access control models on privacy threats involving access to data in a non-trusted context
(e.g., from a personal mobile). This is mainly because this scenario is very unlikely in
the context of corporate cybersecurity. It is indeed rare that a company allows security
agents to carry on critical security tasks, such as attack investigation, and forensic from
a personal laptop or even a corporate mobile. However, if this scenario was to be, our
methodology (EPIC) would model these two situations (i.e., access from a trusted device
and access from a non-trusted device) as two di↵erent data flows (in the DFD+ at Step1
see 3.2.2) through di↵erent components with di↵erent security mechanisms (see Table 3.1)
and involving two di↵erent actors (see Table 3.2) with di↵erent trust level. This way we
can also capture the impact of using our privacy-aware risk-based access control in these
scenarios.
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Chapter 8
Industrial Impact
This thesis is part of a the European Industrial Doctorate on SECurity and
Trust of Next Generation ENTerprise Information Systems (SECENTIS)
held in collaboration with the industrial partner SAP. Therefore this work is
partly motivated by industrial applications. In this Chapter, we discuss the im-
pact of our work in terms of possible migration to industry, standardization
bodies, and open source communities.
8.1 Introduction
Businesses are increasingly leveraging data to provide their customers with more e -
cient, more customized and faster services and products. (as epitomized by the famed
Economist’s article: Worlds most valuable resource is no longer oil, but data ). In fact, by
collecting and analyzing more data, companies are now in the position to improve their
products, which, in turn, can attract more users, and generating even more data, and so
on.
The access to massive and granular data can provide a company a competitive advan-
tage, but it also imposes significant burden on the management and governance of this
(often) confidential data. This is particular true, when we deal with personal data, which
are highly regulated, and the desirable utility of data access should be carefully balance
with the privacy risk. As a consequence, companies need processes and technologies to
carefully assess and control privacy risk, and, if needed apply risk mitigation measures to
limit the risk exposure.
As the market leader in enterprise software applications, SAP is also working to address
these concerns. Indeed, SAP is focusing on developing novel applications, which fully
exploit the competitive advantage (in terms of performance) of cutting-edge technologies
such as HANA its in-memory database. At the same time, SAP supports its customers
to comply with data protection regulations and the increasing privacy awareness of their
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users, especially in the light of the new European data protection regulation (GDPR).
Therefore both research axes covered by the thesis (privacy threat assessment and risk-
aware access control as a privacy-enhancing solution) are relevant for the software industry
as well as for SAP. More in details, threat modeling is considered one the key element of
SAP secure development lifecycle, and although originally focusing on security threats, it
is including more and more data protection aspects. Indeed privacy threat identification
and evaluation is one of the requirements of the new GDPR regulation, for all organiza-
tions dealing with personal data (which is almost the case of all modern organizations).
The methodology described in Chapters (REF) provides a valuable instrument for privacy
threat modeling and assessment of risk, which fits the SAP risk-based approach for secure
software development.
The balance between data access and privacy is also of primary importance for SAP and
SAP customers. classic access control systems (currently used) can cope with most of the
existing business scenarios, but they can do that at the price of using complex and ad-hoc
security policies, and in perspective more flexible and intuitive access controls systems
are desirable. The business decision process is driven by risk assessment, accordingly,
it appears natural considering access control system based on risk evaluation. In this
context, the examples presented here represent a significant playground for testing novel
access control methods on SAP technologies. Indeed using our privacy-aware risk-based
access control allows for optimizing the trade-o↵ between privacy and data exploitation.
We also showed how a calibrated application of anonymization can be used to reduce the
risk. SAP has a relatively long history in research on anonymization [154], and, more
recently, it has been releasing anonymization capabilities in its products [137].
In this chapter, we will emphasize the relevance of this thesis work in the industrial en-
vironment and particularly for our industrial partner SAP. In Section 8.2 we will describe
more in detail to some usage scenarios concerning both “EPIC” and the privacy-aware
risk-based access control. In Section 8.3 we will discuss existing standardized relevant to
this thesis and in Section 8.4 we will present some open source tools used in our research.
8.2 Industrial Use cases
8.2.1 Processes and automation for privacy impact assessment
Preserving users privacy has become a major concern for every organizations and busi-
nesses in the last decade. Indeed an IBM report [96] estimates a $4 million average cost of
a privacy breach in 2016. In 2018, the European Unions General Data Protection Regula-
tion (GDPR) will introduce fines of to 20 million euros or 4% of annual worldwide turnover
for companies failing to meet the GDPR requirements [57]. A recent research [97] reveals
that an organization expect to spend over one and a quarter million euros (e1,360,567 or
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$1,432,176) in order to achieve full compliance. This amount is obviously well below the
possible cost of non-compliance, however, it is also a strong call for methods and tools to
support privacy threat modeling and risk assessment for GDPR compliance.
Risk management is of primary importance at SAP. At global level, SAP has estab-
lished comprehensive internal control and risk management structures that enable the
company to identify and analyze risks early, and take appropriate actions [139] This sys-
tem has numerous control mechanisms and it is an important element of SAP corporate
decision-making process; it is therefore implemented as an integral part of SAPs business
processes across the entire SAP group and SAP’s business. The risk-based approach is
also at the core of SAP security. Starting from 2012, SAP established a threat model-
ing process and it is now a standard component in SAPs Secure Software Development
Lifecycle. Originally based on the STRIDE threats list [124], it is increasingly integrating
new threats, and especially privacy threats.
The increasing complexity and specialization of software systems (and corresponding
privacy threats) calls for more sector-specific threat assessment. In this context, the EPIC
methodology, described in Chapter 3, provides a strong guidance for the adaptation and
extension of privacy threat models specific for cybersecurity systems. SAP is largely
investing for keeping its track record of safeguarding businesses against security and pri-
vacy threats, continuously innovating the security features of its product portfolio, but
also releasing specific security products such as SAP Enterprise Threat Detection (SAP
ETD), SAP Governance, Risk and Compliance solution (GRC), SAP Identity Manage-
ment. The secure development of all cybersecurity products needs a careful and specific
threat modeling, and the large presence of personal data, such as log-entries (SAP ETD)
or identity information (SAP Identity Management), give a predominant role to specific
privacy threats.
Lastly, we have to mention that structured approach of EPIC methodology makes
it particularly suitable for being implemented as a tool to increase the automation of
the whole process, along the lines of the customization of SAP GRC for privacy impact
assessment, which was recently pioneered by SAP Security Research [3, 49].
8.2.2 Privacy preserving threat detection
As described in the use-cases, presented in Chapter 5, Section 5.5, the risk-based access
control model could be applied to enhance data access for threat detection systems.
SAP has a solution to analyze security log files for detecting possible intrusions, SAP
Enterprise Threat Detection (SAP ETD) [140]. This product was originally prototyped
by SAP Security Research, which has still a strict interaction with the product team.
Accordingly, it is not surprising that our research has been conducted in close interaction
with the product team.
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SAP ETD collects application level security-relevant log data from SAP and non-SAP
systems and analyzes the collected information in real-time in order to automatically
detect attack patterns and generate alerts.
The logs often contain personal information (e.g., user-ids, IPs) together with informa-
tion on the behavior of users (which, in case of employees, is strictly regulated by labor
laws). The current version of ETD uses a pseudo-anonymization of User IDs as basic pri-
vacy enhancement technique to fulfill the data minimization requirement. This method
provides privacy protection, but in complex scenarios, it may su↵er from the existence
of several identifiers and other elements that could be combined to re-identify or infer
information about users (e.g., MAC and IP addresses, Terminal IDs, Timestamps).
In our research, we proposed a model permitting to devise a privacy-preserving access
to logs (see Figure 8.1), keeping risk under control, and, at the same time, limiting the
impact on the utility, as we showed in [110] testing our approach with real data from ETD
infrastructure. In the same context, we also proposed tailored anonymization techniques
applicable to security log-files.
Figure 8.1: Single domain log files sharing
The results were presented to SAP DKOM event, which is the main SAP development
community event, gathering representatives from a broad range of SAP development
teams.
Furthermore, the ETD system is in premises solution: a company running an SAP
ecosystem and the threat detection system, collects and use internal anonymized data to
fulfill the privacy requirement described above, but the data stay within the same com-
pany, or in other words, they remain in the same trusted domain (see Figure 8.1). On the
other hand, the access to logs from multiple domains (say, di↵erent companies/organiza-
tions) can help to detect more complex attacks, but it also increases tremendously the
requirements from data protection and privacy point of view. Our research can support
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the implementation of multi-trust domain logs access (as depicted in Figure 8.2), it could
be realized in our model by setting di↵erent trust levels (i.e., di↵erent risk threshold) based
in the trust relationship between the parties, for instance, a long-term partner organiza-
tion may be more willing to share data (so high trust threshold), whereas other parties
may have stronger privacy requirements and choose a more conservative approach. The
usage of obligations, as proposed in Chapter 4 can increase the flexibility of the solution,
allowing for handling more complex scenarios, such as considering geographical locations
(geographies are extremely relevant for applicability of privacy laws).
Figure 8.2: Miltiple-trust domain log files sharing
Although Threat Detection Systems are the prominent application example in the
thesis, we should note that the model could be applied to other solutions, for example, to
address complex authorization scenarios for Human Resource solutions (see the example
use-case described in Chapter 6) or more general reporting use-cases, including mobile
solutions (see the example use-case described in Chapter 4).
Lastly, a key element of our research is the usage of anonymization for reducing the
risk and increasing the access of the data. Due to its relevance for multiple business cases,
anonymization has considerably been investigated by SAP Security Research, both in the
context of k-anonymity family models [154] and di↵erential privacy models, and SAP o↵ers
multiple solutions with anonymization features: SAP TDMS [138], Anonymization Service
for SAP Cloud Platform [137], and the above-mentioned SAP ETD. Our solution can
leverage the features of SAP technologies, indeed, in many cases, querying a large database
and extracting an anonymized dataset in real-time is very hard, and most anonymization
processes are run o↵-line (i.e., as a batch process). However, exploiting the e ciency of in-
memory databases, combined with column-store optimized algorithms as provided by SAP
Hana would facilitate the implementation of an on-the-fly, flexible Privacy Risk Aware
Access Control model that can be easily integrated with new data-intensive business
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applications.
8.3 Standardization Bodies
There are no standards yet for privacy-aware and risk-Based access control systems. How-
ever, during the conception of our Risk-Based Access Control framework, as well as the
implementation of prototypes we took reference from several well-known standards such
as: the eXtensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML). XACML is an OASIS
standard for fine-grained authorization management. XACML defines both an attribute-
based policy language, and the architecture and dataflow model describing how to evaluate
access requests and enforce access decisions according to the rules defined in policies. 5
In particular, our architecture (see Figure 4.2), is reminiscent of XACML proposal, and
part of our results may be considered as an extension of the standards.
In addition, there are standards for security risk, such as the ISO/IEC 27000 family, and
an access control based on risk estimation could be beneficial for implementing security
control and mitigation measures for those standards.
8.4 Open-source Software
To the best of our knowledge no open source implementation, of any kind risk aware
access control system, has been proposed yet (neither as a proprietary solution). However,
several open source implementations of di↵erent models of access control system have been
proposed. The most interesting propositions for as were “balana API” by Wso2 [162],
HerasAF [53], and “ALFA” [11] a free closed source API by axiomatics.
For the implementation of the privacy-aware and risk-based Access control system we
used open source Privacy Enhancement libraries available such as the java anonymization
toolkit ARX [128]
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Chapter 9
Conclusions and Future work
9.1 Conclusions
In this dissertation, we motivated, designed, implemented, and validated a novel privacy-
aware risk-based access control model.
We develop and validate EPIC (Evaluating Privacy violation rIsk in Cyber-security
systems), a privacy threat identification and evaluation methodology for cybersecurity
systems. Since it is very di cult to follow a unique methodology to carry a privacy threat
assessment in a general context [161] we chose to focus assessing privacy threats in cyber
cybersecurity systems. This choice was motivated by the two facts a) these systems are a
vital component of any information system; b) current cybersecurity products collect huge
quantities of sensitive information and become increasingly invasive which makes a privacy
threat assessment on these systems a very interesting and useful exercise. We use EPIC
to study di↵erent privacy threat scenarios in the cybersecurity systems of an organization
and emphasize the importance of dealing with insider privacy violation threats since the
threats have high risk and priority levels.
We propose, implement, and evaluate a novel access control model that integrating
trust with risk and supports a flexible access control in dynamic contexts. trust and risk
adjustment strategies are applied prior to access, in parallel with the resource consumption
to ensure an acceptable level of risk.
We adapt this trust and risk-based access control model to the context of privacy and
propose a privacy-aware risk-based access control.In this model, we provide a concrete way
to quantitatively estimation of privacy risk based on a category of metrics called “syntactic
anonymity metrics”. To evaluate the feasibility and e↵ectiveness of this approach we
selected two case studies namely “HR information disclosure” and “Privacy aware threat
investigation”. We developed two prototypes based on a slightly di↵erent version of the
framework and run a set of experiments on each implementation. The obtained results
show that the framework leads to meaningful results and real-time performance for both
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case studies.
We propose a second version of the privacy-aware risk-based access control using an-
other category of privacy metrics, equally interesting “the di↵erential privacy” metrics.
This di↵erential privacy based model allows for data access at di↵erent privacy levels,
generating a sanitized data set according to the privacy clearance (trustworthiness) of
a request. A first experimental analysis, considering an HR related use case, and a
benchmarking dataset, indicates that the model can address complex privacy and utility
requirements. Indeed, in our use case, we use this model to prevent classification model
from violating the privacy of individuals in the training data while ensuring a decent
level of accuracy to allow di↵erent actors to exploit the results of this analyses. The
performance of this model, however, did not meet the real-time requirements and several
improvements are still to be added to reach this goal.
We evaluate the privacy-aware access control approach impact on privacy by using the
EPIC methodology. We do so by comparing the privacy violation risk of di↵erent threats
identified in threat detection system (TDS), before and after integrating our privacy-
aware access control to the TDS. The evaluation results show the mitigatory impact of
our model on the threats originated by insider authorized actors.
Since this work is part of SECENTIS the European Industrial Doctorate on Security
and Trust of Next Generation Enterprise Information Systems the Chapter 8 of this
thesis was dedicated to discussing the industrial impact of the Ph.D. thesis.
9.2 Future work
Some aspects of the work presented in the thesis could be further developed as future
work. For instance in Chapter 6, we present a “di↵erential privacy based” privacy-aware
risk-based access control model; di↵erentially private mechanisms su↵er from privacy
protection degradation [80] (i.e., privacy guarantees are lower) when the dataset is queried
multiple times (by the same user, or several users if we consider a collusion scenario [43]).
It would be interesting to develop metrics assessing this degradation in our model but
also explore how our model can mitigate (if not reverse) this degradation when evaluating
access decision for multiple queries.
The model we proposed (in Chapter 6) does not support yet this kind of scenarios
and doesn’t consider queries history. Although this might be su cient for some cases
(similar to the case study used to assess this model Section 6.2), in the majority of cases
users are allowed to query the dataset multiple times. Therefore, more investigations and
modifications are needed to make this model compatible with such scenarios.
Moreover, several possible future research directions can also be explored based on the
work done in this thesis.We will describe three of them in this section: i) Improve the
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trust and risk assessment (in Section 9.3).ii) a cryptographically enforced privacy-aware
risk-based access control a distributed access control handling new software architectures
and usage scenarios (in Section 9.4). iii) Develop privacy metrics and privacy manage-
ment tools enabling the data-owner to be more involved in the access control process(in
Section 9.5).
9.3 Improve the Trust and Risk Assessment
In Chapter 5 and Chapter 6, we show how it is possible, using some heuristics, to derive
sound relative estimation (i.e., using dimensionless units) for trust and risk, in some
specific usage scenarios. However a general approach applicable to multiple use cases is
still missing.
Ideally, we should estimate trust and risk in terms of monetary value, which has sev-
eral advantages: 1) it provides a common unit of measure to combine risk and trust
factors of very di↵erent nature (e.g., security risk, compliance risk, privacy risk or trust
from reputation systems, trust-factors, behavioral analysis), 2) it is easy to understand
for non-technical experts 3) it can be easily combined with risk mitigation and trust
enhancement strategies that have a clear monetary value (e.g., insurance, certifications,
legal contracts, trusted devices).
Regarding the Risk assessment, in the short term, we would like to validate our risk-
based access control model on other use cases, where some, quantitative methods are,
even partially, available (ideally using monetary values). In this respect, it is particularly
interesting to investigate emerging cyber-insurance models (building on techniques derived
by the financial sector, e.g. Value-at-risk, Monte-Carlo simulations) to compute the values
of cyber-risk and hence the cost of insurance premiums [143].
In terms of Trust assessment, as hinted in Chapter 5 we would also like to investigate
the impact of authentication mechanisms on trust. This assessment is particularly relevant
in cloud ecosystems such as the example presented in 9.4. Based on this estimated (i.e.,
probability of authentication success [83]) we should be able to significantly improve the
trust assessment and implement optimal trust enhancement strategies. These strategies
could include a combination of multiple authentication methods according to the risk
associated with the request.
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9.4 Cryptographically Enforced privacy-aware risk-based access
control
The risk-based access control model we present in Chapter 4 (as well as the privacy-aware
access risk-based control model in Chapters 5 and 6), is operating under the assumption
that the party storing the data (and handling the risk-based access control process) is
“fully” trusted. However, in more and more frequent cases this assumption does not hold
anymore.
Let’s consider, for instance, an e-Health service that monitors the health status of
elderly people patients su↵ering from cognitive troubles. This monitoring is based on
behavioral analyses using data collected in the patient’s home. The service detects be-
havioral anomalies that can endanger the health of the patient (e.g., missing a prescribed
medication for several days) and sends evaluation reports to the treating physician. It also
allows family members to check on the patient. finally, the serves can detect emergency
situations (e.g. potential fire hazard, the patient fell, wrong medication) and send alerts
for quick interventions (e.g. to emergency services, firefighters).
Figure 9.1: Smart-Home Behavioral Analysis Systems
Technically speaking, the service relies on a pervasive sensing infrastructure is deployed
in each monitored home. The sensing devices unobtrusively capture the interaction of the
inhabitant/patient with his/her surrounding environment. These raw measurements are
then sent to a gateway, combined, analyzed and translated humanly readable information
(e.g. temperature in a room, open/closed doors/repositories, manipulations of objects)
called events. An event is represented by the type, the status and the time-stamps at
which the event occurred. Due to the huge amount of data produced by the system,
the gateway periodically (according to a user-defined time interval) transmits collected
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data (i.e., events, ADLs, and anomalies) to a external storage hosted by a cloud service
provider CSP. Data can then be queried and analyzed by authorized actors. Figure 9.1
illustrates a high-level architecture of the service as well as di↵erent actors interacting
with (this model was inspired by a similar model proposed in [131]).
It is easy to see that this e-Health service is very privacy-invasive (i.e., permanent mon-
itoring), and the kind of data it collects and processes is very sensitive (e.g., health, habits,
and preferences etc.). It is, therefore, very important to preserve the confidentiality of this
data and to carefully control access requests, respecting data minimization principle and
data owners privacy preferences. For instance, the CSP, although semi-trusted, should
not be able to see the data. this confidentiality requirement could be satisfied by storing
the data encrypted. However, it is not very convenient to retrieve and decrypt all the
data each time an actor requests access. Ideally, actors should be able to query the data
while revealing a minimum amount of information to the CSP. Di↵erent actors should
also have access to di↵erent amount (or granularity) of the data depending on their roles
(e.g., family members, doctor, firefighters), data owner preferences(e.g., notify only the
designated a next of kin, change doctors), and the context of access (e.g., the security
level of the device used, geographical location).
Some of requirements identified in this example can be fulfilled using cryptographic
access control models(see [64, 159]). Along these e↵orts, the framework will protect the
confidentiality of the data from unauthorized accesses (including the CSP) by encrypting
the data at the data owner level, before sending the encrypted version to be stored. The
selected encryption schemes should allow executing a set of search queries as well as some
operation such as risk estimation and mitigation operations. Search-able data storage
Moreover, this framework will also provide a flexible access to authorized actors (e.g.,
doctors, emergency services) to fulfill their health-care tasks, while protecting the data
owner’s privacy Attribute Based Encryption. This second feature will be implemented
through risk-based approach ensuring the enforcement of the minimization principle and
maintaining the privacy risk under an acceptable threshold. Finally, risk mitigation ac-
tions such as data anonymization can be performed at the CSP level (en encrypted data)
using homomorphic encryption schemes.
Search-able data storage As mentioned earlier this feature task is to ensure the confi-
dentiality of the data (from non-authorized actors including the CSP hosting the data)
and at the same time allow authorized users to run search queries over this encrypted
data. Several encryption schemes have been proposed in the literature to enable queries
over encrypted data (see [23] for review) Most of these works focus on a specific category
of queries (e.g., word search queries, number comparison queries). However, as suggested
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in [127] some of these cryptosystems can be combined and used to encrypt and store
several version of the data in a way that covers the category of queries needed by the
actors. After encryption, the encrypted data-set, with this new schema, is stored at a
cloud storage. Each user/application (authorized to query the data) is equipped with a
proxy that translates the data requests and answers to enable querying the encrypted
data-set. This “new” data-set is stored in a cloud storage with a new schema (pseud
anonymity table and column names).
Privacy-aware access control The privacy-aware risk-based access control process, pro-
posed in this framework can be executed in three main operations:
• Identity/attributes management. The identity and attributes management consists of
collecting, updating, and suppressing authorized actors attributes. These attributes
can describe the actor him/her self (e.g., role, name), it can describe the device/net-
work used to send the access request, it can also describe the context of the request
(e.g., geographical location, time of the request). This operation aims to control the
integrity and availability of information useful for the other two operations (i.e., priv-
ilege management and ). In fact, a subset of the attributes will be used to generate
decryption keys that will allow the actors to access the data, another subset will be
used during the access evaluation to assess the access risk.
• Privileges management. As its name indicates, privilege management, is the en-
semble of steps allowing to assign, update, and revoke privileges to/from an actor.
A privilege in our context is the ability to decrypt data attributes and access the
message in clear. Which means privileged actors will possess a decryption key, and
managing privileges comes back to managing the actors key (i.e., encrypting data
and generating decryption keys) Di↵erent actors will have di↵erent privileges, and
consequently di↵erent keys. However, we would also like the encryption to be done
on a unique version (i.e., not an encrypted version for each user) and we would like
it done by a unique key (possessed by the data owner). Attribute-based encryption
or ABE presented in [64, 77], o↵ers a natural solution to this situation. In fact this
encryption model allows i) to generate a master key held at the data owner and used
to encrypt the data, ii) to generate several user keys (using the data owner’s master
key), and iii) to define an access structure/policy and a set of attributes describing
which key can decrypt which data. It is possible to express authorizations through
attribute-based object-centric policies using Cipher-text attribute-based encryption
(CP-ABE [18,70]). A policy ⇡o 2 Pi is used for the encryption for each object o 2 O
( with Pi the set of all policies defined by a data owner and O the set of objects
possessed by the data owner). Each policy ⇡o uses a set of attributes A⇡ to describe
set of privileged users U⇤ can decrypt the data and in which set of contexts C⇤ the
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privilege applies.
⇡o  
_
u2U⇤
c2C⇤
⇣ ^
au2A0u
au ^
^
ac2A0c
ac
⌘
With A0u ✓ Au a subset of a user’s attributes and A0c ✓ Ac a subset of a context’s
attributes. Indeed each user u 2 U is grated a user key generated using set attributes
Au that describes c and a set of attributes Ac describing a context c 2 C where the
key can be used. Each key describes the user and context according to the description
function:
D(key) =
^
au2Au
au ^
^
ac2Ac
ac
The decryption privilege applies for a user u in the context c i↵ ⇡o ⌘ D(u)^⇡o ⌘ D(c)
• Access evaluation and enforcement. Similarly to the model presented in Chap-
ter 4 4.1, in this step the access control system, decides to grant access or not to the
encrypted resource the requester based on the privacy risk (sensitivity and likelihood
of re-identification of the requested data-view) and the trust of the request.
Risk and Trust evaluation and Adjustment Since the data is stored encrypted at the
CSP level. The CSP should be able to provide a way to estimate the privacy risk.
If we take the case of k-anonymity based re-identification risk the estimation of k the
cardinality of a data-view (as described in Section 4.3.3) is based on a comparison of
QIDs and can be computed using searchable encryiption [127]. For more elaborate risk
evaluation over encrypted data, some work is still to be done by exploring the possibilities
of using homomorphic encryption algorithms to compute over encrypted data (see [38,
39]). Same for data anonymization (as risk mitigation strategy) we would like to develop
anonymization algorithms that could be executed over homomorphically encrypted data
so the CSP can execute the adequate anonymization corresponding to the risk and trust
level of a request and return an anonymized version of the data when needed, still without
discovering the content of the data.
9.5 Data-owner centric privacy management
The third direction is to develop privacy metrics and privacy management tools based
on a “crowdsourced” perception of privacy and enabling data-owners to be more involved
controlling access to their data.
The idea is to provide data owners with tools to monitor their privacy and be able to
grant (or deny access) to their data in a privacy-preserving way when this is possible. It
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Figure 9.2: Privacy radar
also can be used to enforce data-owners privacy preferences when a third-party is handling
access to their data. This can be achieved through the classification of the requested data
into categories (e.g., Activism, Business, Health, Law, Politics, Relationships, Religion).
Then we assess the privacy sensitivity of the data in each category (as shown in Figure 9.2).
Figure 9.3: Privacy Lexicon: distributions of
words by category
Figure 9.4: Privacy Lexicon: distributions of
words by sensitivity level
These two operations will be carried using a crowdsourced privacy lexicon labeling a set
of words with sensitivity and category tags (as inspired by sentiment analyses approach).
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The access is then evaluated based on these sensitivity levels assessed against a sensitivity
threshold set by the data-owner (or based on her/his preferences).
The first step toward this, is to build the privacy lexicon. We already started this
operation using amazon mechanical turk [25] and we collected a first batch of 1030 words
classified according to 12 categories and a sensitivity range between 0 to 4 (0 being
the least sensitive and 4 the most sensitive). We are currently trying to enrich this
privacy lexicon using lexicon extension techniques and will be soon releasing for public
use. Figure 9.3 and 9.4 describe some characteristics of our lexicon in terms of categories
and privacy sensitivity.
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